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As the United States Navy reportedly prepares to mount a direct challenge to 
China’s island-building project in the South China Sea, it is appropriate to focus 
renewed attention on this long-standing irritant in the relationship among China, 
its neighbors in the region, and the United States. In “America’s Security Role in 
the South China Sea,” Andrew S. Erickson, of the Naval War College’s China Mar-
itime Studies Institute, in a presentation originally offered as testimony before the 
Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific of the House Foreign Affairs Committee in 
July of 2015, provides a succinct overview and analysis of the issue. He contends 
that “China’s combination of resolve, ambiguity, activities, and deployments has 
corrosive implications for regional stability and international norms. That’s why 
the United States now needs to adjust conceptual thinking and policy to stabilize 
the situation and balance against the prospect of negative Chinese behavior and 
influence.”
It has long been assumed that the most likely trigger of a clash of arms between 
China and the United States is Taiwan. Given China’s increasingly provocative 
behavior in the South China Sea (as well as in the East China Sea with respect to 
Japan), we should revisit this assumption. China’s interest in these areas is not an 
existential one to the same extent as its well-advertised interest in Taiwan. But 
this makes it all the more important to develop a general understanding of the 
dynamics of Chinese crisis behavior across a variety of scenarios. In “The Evolu-
tion of Interstate Security Crisis-Management Theory and Practice in China,” 
Alastair Iain Johnston sets out to do exactly that. In a pathbreaking analysis that 
encompasses a growing Chinese academic literature as well as the organization 
and organizational culture of China’s military and security bureaucracies, John-
ston shows that Chinese crisis-management thinking has been shaped to a sur-
prising extent by the tradition of American, or more broadly Western, theorizing 
on crises originating in the Cold War. While emphasizing that this tradition is in 
many ways in tension with traditional Chinese attitudes toward war, he suggests 
that there may be an opening here for a productive dialogue between the two 
nations. Alastair Iain Johnston is the Governor James Albert Noe and Linda Noe 
Laine Professor of China in World Affairs at Harvard University.
The recently coined military term of art “antiaccess and area-denial” (A2/AD) 
appears in discussions primarily of China’s ability to interpose significant naval 
FROM THE EDITORS
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and air power between its shores and the American military presence in the Asia-
Pacific region. Jonathan Altman, in “Russian A2/AD in the Eastern Mediterra-
nean: A Growing Risk,” makes the novel and important argument that the new 
Russian presence in Syria and the eastern Mediterranean generally raises very 
similar issues for the United States and its allies in that region. What remains to 
be seen is whether Russia will be able to establish a permanent Syrian base that 
will inevitably change the strategic calculus—particularly for the United States, 
but also notably for Israel—in a dangerously volatile part of the world. Jonathan 
Altman is a program analyst with Systems Planning and Analysis, Inc.
Alfred Thayer Mahan taught that a robust commercial fleet is an inseparable 
component of maritime power. Today it is fashionable to argue or assume that 
the virtual disappearance of an American merchant fleet in recent times gives the 
lie to this idea. But does it? In “The U.S. Merchant Marine: Back to the Future?,” 
Christopher J. McMahon makes the case that the nation’s current reliance on 
foreign-flagged vessels poses an unacceptable danger, both economically and 
strategically. Rear Admiral McMahon, U.S. Maritime Service (Ret.), is currently 
Emory S. Land Chair of Merchant Marine Affairs at the Naval War College. 
It is no secret that military organizations tend to dislike change. In “Systems 
of Denial: Strategic Resistance to Military Innovation,” Andrew Hill and Stephen 
Gerras provide an anatomy of this phenomenon in a larger context that includes 
innovation in business and in theories of science, and offer recommendations 
for overcoming it. At a time when truly paradigm-challenging thinking appears 
to be increasingly at risk, even in the academy (is global warming really “settled 
science”?), it is important to ponder these issues and their implications for pro-
fessional military education. Andrew Hill and Stephen Gerras are professors in 
the Department of Command, Leadership, and Management of the Army War 
College.
If the American way of war is overwhelmingly focused on its kinetic dimen-
sion, the Chinese tend to take a more holistic approach, with special emphasis on 
psychological and legal instruments. But the use of law, both international and 
domestic, as an instrument of irregular or asymmetric warfare is not confined to 
nation-states. As Michael T. Palmer and J. Michael Johnson argue in “Undersea 
Lawfare: Can the U.S. Navy Fall Victim to This Asymmetric Warfare Threat?,” 
activist environmental organizations of varying motivations have proved capable 
of posing obstacles to American naval activities, especially active sonar testing for 
purposes of antisubmarine warfare, that often rise above the level of mere annoy-
ance. They suggest it is time for the Navy to treat this “lawfare” with the serious-
ness it deserves. Captain Michael T. Palmer is a Navy Judge Advocate General 
Corps officer; Rear Admiral J. Michael Johnson (Ret.) is a former naval aviator.
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Finally, we are pleased to note that this column once more has a plurality of 
authors, with the arrival in October 2015 of the new Managing Editor of the 
Naval War College Press, Robert Ayer� Rob is a retired U�S� Coast Guard captain 
and longtime military professor at the Coast Guard Academy, and brings superb 
editorial skills to a demanding assignment� We trust Rob’s Newport experience 
will be a pleasant and productive one�
IF YOU VISIT US
Our editorial offices are now located in Sims Hall, in the Naval War College 
Coasters Harbor Island complex, on the third floor, west wing (rooms W334, 
335, 309)� For building-security reasons, it would be necessary to meet you at 
the main entrance and escort you to our suite—give us a call ahead of time (401-
841-2236)�
STATEMENT OF OWNERSHIP, MANAGEMENT, AND CIRCULATION
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Allow me to share my assessment of the current situation in the South China Sea, 
followed by my recommendations concerning how the U�S� government should 
understand the situation and how it may best work to address it�
Emerging Situation
A major Chinese narrative regarding the South China Sea is one of unrecipro-
cated restraint� But Chinese leaders have clearly had an ambitious long-term vi-
sion of some sort, backed by years of efforts, themselves based on long-standing 
claims encapsulated in an ambiguous “nine-dash line” enclosing virtually all of 
the South China Sea�
Beijing’s stance regarding South China Sea sovereignty issues is categorical 
and steadfast� In a position paper rejecting outright the Philippines’ recent initia-
tion of international arbitration regarding their bilateral dispute, China’s Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs states, 
China has indisputable sovereignty over the South China Sea Islands (the Dongsha 
[Pratas] Islands, Xisha [Paracel] Islands, the Zhongsha Islands [whose main features 
include Macclesfield Bank and Scarborough Shoal] and the Nansha [Spratly] Islands) 
and the adjacent waters�*
Despite all its rhetoric, actions, developmental efforts, and apparent prepara-
tions, however, China has repeatedly declined to disclose the precise basis for, the 
precise nature of, or even the precise geographical parameters of its South China 
Sea claims� As the U�S� Office of Naval Intelligence documents, China “has never 
published the coordinates of the “nine-dash line” that it draws around virtually 
the entire South China Sea—perilously close to the coasts of its neighbors, all of 
Testimony by Andrew S. Erickson before a Hearing of the House Foreign 
Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, 23 July 2015.
AMERICA’S SECURITY ROLE IN THE SOUTH 
CHINA SEA
 * “Summary of the Position Paper of the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Matter 
of Jurisdiction in the South China Sea Arbitration Initiated by the Republic of the Philippines,” 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 7 December 2014, available at www 
�fmprc�gov�cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1217149�shtml�
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whom it has disputes with. It has not “declared what rights it purports to enjoy 
in this area.”* Beijing still has not specified whether or not it considers the South 
China Sea to constitute a “core interest.” Given China’s statements and actions 
to date, however, there is reason for concern that it is determined to maintain 
expansive claims based on unyielding invocation of the “nine-dash line.” 
Island Seizure History. China’s military and paramilitary forces have a half- 
century-plus history of capturing islands and other features, many in the South 
China Sea. It appears that Beijing long harbored ambitions to seize significant 
numbers of South China Sea islands, and indeed took several occupied by Viet-
nam in 1974 and 1988 even though severely limited in sea and air power at that 
time. Such operations have not received sufficient analytical attention. In some 
respects, they may have been more complex than previously appreciated outside 
China. For example, maritime militia forces appear to have been employed in the 
1974 Paracels conflict, the 2009 Impeccable incident, the 2012 Scarborough Shoal 
standoff, and the 2014 Haiyang Shiyou 981 oil rig standoff.† It is important to note 
that in none of these cases—nor in recent Chinese cutting of the cables of Viet-
namese oil and gas survey vessels or Chinese intimidation of Philippine forces at 
Second Thomas Shoal—did the United States intervene to stop Chinese actions. 
Regarding the above-mentioned cases that occurred since the end of the Cold 
War, this is, in part, because Washington does not take a position on the relative 
validity of South China Sea countries’ sovereignty claims per se. Instead, what the 
United States opposes consistently is (1) the use of force, or the threat of force, to 
resolve such disputed claims; and (2) attempts to limit freedom of navigation or 
other vital international system-sustaining norms.‡
Industrial-Scale Island Construction. That brings us to recent events, which I be-
lieve have precipitated today’s hearing—and rightly so. In 2014, China greatly ac-
celerated what had long been a very modest process of “island building,” develop-
ing land features in the Spratlys and Paracels on a scale and [with a] sophistication 
 * Office of Naval Intelligence, The PLA Navy: New Capabilities and Missions for the 21st Century 
(Washington, D.C., 2015), p. 39, available at www.oni.navy.mil/.
 † For Paracels, 万启光 [Wan Qiguang], 南海水产公司志 [A Record of South China Sea Fisheries 
Company] (Beijing: 海洋出版社 [Ocean Press], 1991), pp. 115–33. For Scarborough Shoal, 
Andrew S. Erickson and Conor M. Kennedy, “Tanmen Militia: China’s ‘Maritime Rights Protection’ 
Vanguard,” The National Interest, 6 May 2015, available at nationalinterest.org/. For Haiyang Shiyou 
981, Andrew S. Erickson and Conor M. Kennedy, “Meet the Chinese Maritime Militia Waging a 
‘People’s War at Sea’,” China Real Time Report (中国实时报) (blog), Wall Street Journal, 31 March 
2015, blogs.wsj.com/.
 ‡ Daniel R. Russel, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, “Remarks at the 
Fifth Annual South China Sea Conference” (The Center for Strategic and International Studies, 
Washington, D.C., 21 July 2015), available at www.state.gov/. 
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that its neighbors simply cannot match, even collectively over time.* “Features” 
is the key word here, because many were previously small rocks or reefs not le-
gally considered “islands.” Then China used some of the world’s largest dredgers 
to build up some of the most pristine coral reefs above water with thousands of 
tons of sand, coral cuttings, and concrete. U.S. Pacific Fleet commander Admiral 
Harry Harris aptly terms China’s creation a “Great Wall of Sand.” It has created 
over two thousand acres of “land” where none remained above South China Sea 
waters before.† But it’s what China is constructing atop this artificial edifice that 
most concerns its neighbors and the United States: militarily relevant facilities, 
including at least two runways capable of serving a wide range of military air-
craft, that could allow Beijing to exert increasing influence over the South China 
Sea.
Beijing itself has stated officially that there will be military uses for the new 
“islands” it has raised from the sea. On 9 March 2015, China Foreign Ministry 
spokeswoman Hua Chunying stated that Spratly garrison “maintenance and 
construction work” was intended in part for “better safeguarding territorial sover-
eignty and maritime rights and interests.” ‡ Hua elaborated that construction was 
designed in part to “satisfy the necessary military defense needs.” Chinese military 
sources employ similar wording.
The likely translation, in concrete terms:
• Better facilities for personnel stationed on the features
• Port facilities for logistics, maritime militia, coast guard, and navy ships
• A network of radars to enable monitoring of most of the South China Sea
• Air defense missiles
• Airstrips for civilian and military aircraft
Then-commander of the U.S. Pacific Command Admiral Samuel Locklear’s 15 
April 2015 testimony before the House Armed Services Committee supports this 
assessment: In addition to basing Chinese coast guard ships to expand influence 
over a contested area, “expanded land features down there also could eventu-
ally lead to the deployment of things, such as long-range radars, military and 
advanced missile systems.” Locklear added: “It might be a platform for them, if 
 * For specific details, see “Island Tracker,” Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, Center for Strategic 
and International Studies, amti.csis.org/.
 † Subsequent to this testimony, Chinese reclamation has exceeded 2,900 acres. Department of 
Defense, Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy (Arlington, Va.: 20 August 2015), p. 16, available at 
www.defense.gov/. 
 ‡ As elsewhere in this testimony, italics are inserted by author for emphasis.
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they ever wanted to establish an ADIZ [air defense identification zone] for them 
to be able to enforce that from�”
Airstrips . . . and ADIZ? For airstrips, after structural integrity, it’s length that 
matters most� There’s no need for a three-thousand-meter runway (as China now 
has on Woody Island and Fiery Cross Reef) to support evacuation of personnel 
for medical or weather emergencies via turboprop and other civilian aircraft�* 
Such a runway is only needed to support a full range of military options� Building 
a separate taxiway alongside, as China has already done at Fiery Cross Reef, sug-
gests plans for high-tempo, high-sortie-rate military operations� No other South 
China Sea claimant enjoys even one runway of this caliber on any of the features 
that it occupies�
One logical application for China’s current activities: to support a South China 
Sea ADIZ� Beijing announced an ADIZ in the East China Sea in November 2013� 
Many nations—including the United States—have established such zones to track 
aircraft approaching their territorial airspace (out to twelve nautical miles from 
their coasts), particularly aircraft apparently seeking to enter that airspace�†
Radars on China-controlled features can form a network providing maritime/
air domain awareness for the majority of the South China Sea� Fighter aircraft can 
allow China to intercept foreign aircraft it detects operating there, particularly 
those that do not announce their presence, or otherwise engage in behaviors that 
Beijing deems objectionable�
But while any coastal state is legally entitled to announce an ADIZ, the way 
in which China has done so in the East China Sea is worrisome� China threatens 
still-unspecified “defensive emergency measures” if foreign aircraft don’t comply 
with its orders—orders that an ADIZ does not give it license to issue or enforce 
physically� This suggests that China is reserving the “right” to treat interna-
tional airspace beyond twelve nautical miles as “territorial airspace” in important 
respects�
China’s record on maritime sovereignty fuels this concern� The vast majority 
of nations agree that under international law a country with a coastline controls 
only economic resources in waters twelve to two hundred nautical miles out—
and even less if facing a neighbor’s coast less than four hundred nautical miles 
away� But China additionally claims rights to control military activities in that 
exclusive economic zone, as well as, apparently, in the airspace above it�
 * After this testimony was given, evidence emerged that China was constructing an airstrip on Subi 
Reef as well� Victor Robert Lee, “South China Sea: Satellite Imagery Makes Clear China’s Runway 
Work at Subi Reef,” The Diplomat, 8 September 2015� 
 † For a detailed explanation, see Andrew S� Erickson, “Lengthening Chinese Airstrips May Pave Way 
for South China Sea ADIZ,” The National Interest, 27 April 2015� 
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China currently lacks long-range capable antisubmarine warfare (ASW) as-
sets akin to U�S� P-3 and P-8 aircraft� The more “islands” it builds, even if only 
with helicopter pads (as opposed to full runways), the more it can increase 
helicopter-based ASW coverage of the South China Sea� In this way, distribution 
of Chinese-held features could compensate for ASW helicopters’ “short legs�” 
China could thereby attempt to start to negate one of the last remaining major 
U�S� Navy advantages—submarines—and possibly pursue a bastion strategy for 
its nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) in the South China Sea�
Tipping Point. My Naval War College colleague, China Maritime Studies Institute 
(CMSI) director Peter Dutton, characterizes the aforementioned Chinese activi-
ties as a “tipping point,” meriting U�S� government response� “Militarization of 
the newly constructed islands,” which China appears determined to do, will, he 
argues cogently, alter strategic stability and the regional balance of power� “It will 
turn the South China Sea into a strategic strait under threat of land-based power�”* 
This is part of a “regional maritime strategy � � � to expand China’s interior to 
cover the maritime domain under an umbrella of continental control�”† Dutton 
contends, and I agree, that Beijing’s militarization of artificial islands 
sets the clock back to a time when raw power was the basis for dispute resolution� 
China’s power play, combined with its refusal to arbitrate, its aversion to multilateral 
negotiations, and its refusal to enter into bilateral negotiations on the basis of equal-
ity, undermines regional stability and weakens important global institutions�‡
As bad as things are already, they could get worse—particularly if American 
attention and resolve are in question� In attempting to prevent China from using 
military force to resolve island and maritime claims disputes in the South China 
Sea, the United States will increasingly face Beijing’s three-pronged trident de-
signed precisely to preserve such a possibility� Maritime militia and coast guard 
forces will be forward deployed, possibly enveloping disputed features as part of 
a “Cabbage Strategy” that dares the U�S� military to use force against nonmilitary 
personnel�§ Such forces would be supported by a deterrent backstop that includes 
 * Peter A� Dutton, “Did the Game Just Change in the South China Sea? (And What Should the U�S� 
Do about It?),” A ChinaFile Conversation, 29 May 2015, www�chinafile�com/�
 † Peter A� Dutton, Professor and Director, China Maritime Studies Institute, U�S� Naval War College, 
Testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Hearing on China’s Maritime Disputes in the 
East and South China Seas, 14 January 2014, 113th Cong�, 2nd sess�, available at docs�house�gov/�
 ‡ Dutton, “Did the Game Just Change in the South China Sea?”
 § For a Chinese description of such a concept, see “张召忠: 反制菲占岛 只需用 ‘包心菜’ 战
略” [Zhang Zhaozhong: To Counter the Philippines’ Encroachment on Islands, [We] Need 
Simply to Employ the “Cabbage” Strategy], 环球网 [Global Network], http://mil�huanqiu�com/
observation/2013-05/3971149�html�
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both China’s navy and its “anti-navy” of land-based antiaccess/area-denial 
(A2/AD), or “counterintervention,”* forces, collectively deploying the world’s 
largest arsenal of ballistic and cruise missiles. In the region, only Vietnam also has 
a maritime militia, and the U.S. Coast Guard is not positioned to oppose China’s. 
Meanwhile, China’s coast guard is already larger than those of all its neighbors 
combined, and still growing rapidly.†
More broadly, worries about China’s island construction, developing force 
posture in the South China Sea, and accompanying official statements exemplify 
broader foreign concern about China’s rise—that as it becomes increasingly pow-
erful, Beijing will
• Abandon previous restraint in word and deed
• Bully its smaller neighbors
• Implicitly or explicitly threaten the use of force to resolve disputes
• Attempt to change—or else run roughshod over—important international 
norms that preserve peace in Asia and underwrite the global system on 
which mutual prosperity depends
China’s combination of resolve, ambiguity, activities, and deployments has 
corrosive implications for regional stability and international norms. That’s why 
the United States now needs to adjust conceptual thinking and policy to stabilize 
the situation and balance against the prospect of negative Chinese behavior and 
influence. 
The Need for a Paradigm Shift
As Peter Dutton has long emphasized, the way forward for the United States is 
clear: Even as China advances, we cannot retreat. Together with the East China 
Sea and the Yellow Sea, the South China Sea is a vital part of the global commons, 
on which the international system depends to operate effectively and equitably. 
Half of global commerce and 90 percent of regional energy imports transit the 
South China Sea alone. We cannot allow Beijing to carve out within these in-
ternational waters and airspace a zone of exceptionalism in which its neighbors 
face bullying without recourse and vital global rules and norms are subordinated 
to its parochial priorities. This would set back severely what Beijing itself terms 
 * For an explanation of this concept published subsequent to the testimony itself, see Timothy R. 
Heath and Andrew S. Erickson, “Is China Pursuing Counter-intervention?,” Washington Quarterly 
38, no. 3 (Fall 2015).
 † Andrew S. Erickson, “Did the Game Just Change in the South China Sea? (And What Should the 
U.S. Do about It?),” A ChinaFile Conversation, 29 May 2015, www.chinafile.com/.
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“democracy” or “democratization in international relations.”* Instead, we must 
maintain the national will and force structure to continue to operate in, under, 
and over the South China, East China, and Yellow Seas and preserve them as 
peaceful parts of the global commons for all to use without fear. 
Accepting Moderate Friction. Here, given China’s growing power and our own 
sustained power and resolve, we must accept a zone of bounded strategic friction 
and contestation. Such friction is manageable, and we must manage it. To do so 
effectively, we should develop the mind-set that we are in a great power relation-
ship wherein we need to act to protect our vital interests and support the global 
system even as China is working to promote its own vital interests. It means pre-
paring to live in the same strategic space together, with overlapping vital interests. 
This is the essence of great power relations, reflecting a reversion to historical 
norms after the brief and unsustainable unipolar moment is over—even as the 
United States remains strong as the world’s leading power, and the world remains 
far from being a true “multipolar” system.†
This robust but realistic approach includes accepting the fundamental reality 
that we will not roll back China’s existing occupation of islands and other features, 
just as we will not accept its rolling back its neighbors’ occupation of other islands 
and features. Most fundamentally, the United States must preserve peace and a 
stable status quo in a vital yet vulnerable region that remains haunted by history.
Embracing Competitive Coexistence. The paradigm we need to think about is a 
form of great power relations that I term “competitive coexistence.”‡ It is not a 
comprehensive rivalry, as between the United States and the Soviet Union in the 
Cold War. Hence, charges that it constitutes a “containment strategy” driven by 
a “Cold War mentality” would be inaccurate. Rather, it has specific competitive 
 * China’s paramount leader himself has declared that “we should work together to promote the 
democratization of international relations” (“我们应该共同推动国际关系民主化”). Xi Jinping, 
“习近平在和平共处五项原则发表60周年纪念大会上的讲话 (全 文)” [Speech of Xi Jinping on 
the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence at the 60th Anniversary Commemoration (Full Text)], 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 28 June 2014, http://news.xinhuanet 
.com/politics/2014-06/28/c_1111364206.htm. See also “Full Text: China’s Peaceful Development 
Road,” People’s Daily, 22 December 2005, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200512/22/eng20051222_ 
230059.html.
 † Thomas J. Christensen, “The U.S. Alliance System and the Lack of True Multipolarity,” in The China 
Challenge: Shaping the Choices of a Rising Power (New York: W. W. Norton, 2015), pp. 49–52. See 
also Thomas J. Christensen, “China’s Military Might: The Good News,” Japan Times, 8 June 2015; 
Thomas J. Christensen, “Managing Disputes with China,” Japan Times, 9 June 2015.
 ‡ Andrew S. Erickson, “Assessing the New U.S. Maritime Strategy: A Window into Chinese Thinking,” 
Naval War College Review 61, no. 4 (Autumn 2008), pp. 35–71. 
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aspects that we should not exacerbate gratuitously, yet must not shy away from� 
China’s current leadership is clearly comfortable with a certain level of friction 
and tension� Given the current unfortunate circumstances, for the foreseeable fu-
ture we too must accept—and make clear that we are comfortable with—a certain 
level of friction and tension� 
The above paradigm has important implications for both U�S� rhetoric and 
policy� First, American officials must recognize what their Chinese counterparts 
have long understood: words matter� The United States must not appear to em-
brace Chinese policy concepts or formulations that make us appear to fear ten-
sion, or to be willing to yield to Beijing’s principled policy positions in order to 
mitigate it� Such optics would only encourage Chinese testing and assertiveness 
vis-à-vis Washington and its regional allies� Accordingly, two particularly prob-
lematic formulations favored by Beijing (and their variants) must be banished 
from the lexicon of American official discourse:
1� “The Thucydides trap”
2� “New-type great-power relations”
Avoiding Thucydides Claptrap. As invoked by none other than Xi Jinping himself 
to pressure U�S� counterparts, as well as by influential Chinese public intellectu-
als to call for U�S� concessions, the idea of the imperative to avoid a “Thucydides 
trap” represents a misapplication of history�* It falsely implies that only by taking 
drastic measures can the United States and China avoid previous patterns of ru-
inous conflict between an established power and a rising power� The product of 
a time that human progress over the past century has finally rendered obsolete, 
Thucydides offers a cynical, outdated interpretation that has no place in Ameri-
can values, or the world that the United States seeks to promote: “The strong do 
what they can, while the weak suffer what they must�” I’m confident that’s not the 
kind of world we’re here to promote today�
Nor should we� As Thomas Christensen argues persuasively in his new book 
The China Challenge—already recognized as one of the leading works on U�S�-
China relations—the evolution of nuclear weapons, international institutions, 
globalization, financial markets, and transnational production chains have 
made the world a very different place than it was just over a century ago in 1914 
when the Great War erupted�† Washington and Beijing certainly face friction, 
 * For Xi Jinping: “Remarks by President Obama and President Xi Jinping of the People’s Republic 
of China after Bilateral Meeting” (White House, Washington, D�C�, 8 June 2013), available at 
whitehouse�gov/� For Chinese public intellectuals: Shi Yinhong, “An Analysis of the ‘New-Type of 
Major-Country Relationship,’” China-US Focus, 3 April 2014, chinausfocus�com/�
 † Thomas J� Christensen, “This Time Should Be Different: China’s Rise in a Globalized World,” in The 
China Challenge, pp� 37–62�
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tensions, and even the possibility of future crises of some severity, but signifi-
cant shared interests—economic and otherwise—as well as collective reliance 
on a dynamic international system, together with mutual deterrence, will en-
able them to avoid war� Both sides are restrained by these strong positive and 
negative incentives; it is not necessary for Washington to shoulder the burden of 
restraint alone� Instead, raising false hopes in Beijing only to have them dashed 
disappointingly is significantly more dangerous than being clear and firm from 
the start� U�S� policy makers must thus consistently avoid embracing flawed 
historical analogies that encourage unrealistic expectations on Beijing’s part� 
Such dangerous “claptrap” must be relegated to the dustbin of history, where it 
truly belongs�
To set the right tone and expectations while safeguarding U�S� interests, the 
Chinese policy bumper sticker that flows from falling for the “Thucydides trap” 
must likewise be rejected� As originated and promoted by Beijing, the concept of 
“new-type great-power relations” is invoked to imply that Washington must yield 
to China’s principled “core interests” (including, apparently, in the South China 
Sea) while not committing Beijing to corresponding accommodation in return�* 
As one Japanese contact asked me pointedly, “Why would you choose to wrestle 
in China’s own sumo ring?” 
Why indeed? Instead, the United States should proactively and consistently 
promote its own policy formulations� Robert Zoellick’s “responsible stakeholder” 
concept is an excellent example, and it was a serious mistake for the Obama 
administration to cede the field in this competition of ideas� To the extent that 
Beijing opposes the idea of responsibilities being thrust upon it, I propose that 
“strategic stakeholder” might be a better phrase� In any case, each side is free to 
employ its own concepts and rhetoric� But, at a minimum, the policy formula-
tions that we ourselves embrace should at least meet the standard of the Hip-
pocratic oath of international relations: “first, do no harm�” That typically means 
using our own wording unless there is a compelling reason to do otherwise� 
Specific Policy Recommendations
As for substantive efforts, we must develop and maintain a force structure and 
set of supporting policies and partnerships geared to ensuring access despite 
Chinese development of counterintervention capabilities� Even maintaining 
mutual deterrence vis-à-vis China could be good enough for the United States— 
Washington’s key objective is to prevent the use, or threat, of force to resolve 
regional disputes� But allowing even the perception that such ability to “hold the 
 * This has been more recently termed “new-type major-country relations,” but without any apparent 
change in its underlying meaning� For detailed analysis, see Andrew S� Erickson and Adam P� Liff, 
“Not-So-Empty Talk: The Danger of China’s ‘New Type of Great-Power Relations’ Slogan,” Foreign 
Affairs, 9 October 2014�
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ring” has eroded could gravely threaten the stability of a vibrant yet vulnerable 
region� Key questions for consideration thus include:
• What systems do we need to develop and acquire?
• How should we engage our military and other government forces to act?
• What risks must we accept?
• What should we ask of our allies and security partners in support?
In addition to cooperation and capacity building with regional allies and part-
ners, the United States must maintain robust deterrence that paces China’s grow-
ing arsenal of counterintervention weapons� Here, unfortunately, Washington 
continues to suffer lingering effects from the mishandling of the Iraq War and its 
aftermath� Among other problems, a decade of land wars with unclear, unrealis-
tic objectives diverted attention and resources from capabilities to preserve the 
ability of the U�S� military to operate in maritime East Asia even while threat-
ened by Chinese systems� Washington is finally devoting increased attention to 
several types of weapons with particular potential to demonstrate that counter-
intervention won’t work, but existing efforts may still be too slow and limited to 
arrest an emerging gap between U�S� goals and capabilities�
As I have testified elsewhere, at least some of the key military hardware re-
quirements to meet these objectives are straightforward and affordable�* We must 
make particular effort to preserve the significant U�S� advantage in undersea war-
fare by emphasizing nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) and offensive na-
val mines� We must also take a page from China’s counterintervention playbook 
and prioritize antiship cruise missiles (ASCMs)� We are already facing a signifi-
cant reduction in SSN numbers because of earlier decisions that are resulting in 
rapid retirement of Los Angeles–class SSNs without corresponding replacements 
to maintain force levels� That’s why I have consistently emphasized the following 
bottom line: if we’re not building at least two Virginia-class SSNs per year, we’re 
not being serious—and regional allies, partners, and China will see that clearly� 
Three a year would be even better, and I believe we can and should get there soon�
Closing a True Missile Gap. We should never have allowed American ASCM de-
velopment to languish so terribly� While I recognize and commend the important 
efforts under way now, I remain concerned and believe we need to move further, 
faster� Here’s why�
 * Andrew S� Erickson, “China’s Naval Modernization: Implications and Recommendations,” Testimony 
before the House Armed Services Committee Seapower and Projection Forces Subcommittee, U.S. Asia-
Pacific Strategic Considerations Related to PLA Naval Forces, 11 December 2013, 113th Cong�, 1st 
sess�, available at docs�house�gov/�
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Regardless of China’s precise economic trajectory, China’s navy—together 
with its other military and paramilitary forces—will be increasingly capable of 
contesting U.S. sea control within growing range rings extending beyond Beijing’s 
unresolved island and maritime claims in the South China, East China, and Yel-
low Seas. Experts at the annual conference we convened at CMSI earlier this year 
generally agreed that by 2020, China is on course to deploy greater quantities of 
missiles with greater ranges than those systems that could be employed by the 
U.S. Navy against them. China is on track to have quantitative parity or better 
in surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and ASCMs, parity in missile launch cells, and 
quantitative inferiority only in multimission land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs). 
Land-based missiles with potential to threaten U.S. ships and ports they deploy 
from include the world’s only antiship ballistic missiles (ASBMs)*—the numbers 
of which constitute only a tiny fraction of the world’s foremost substrategic bal-
listic missile force deployed by China. Let me be clear: Unless this gap can be filled 
credibly, China is poised to “outstick” the U.S. Navy by 2020 by deploying greater 
quantities of missiles with greater ranges than those of the U.S. ship-based systems 
able to defend against them.†
Retention of U.S. Navy superiority hinges on next-generation long-range 
ASCMs (the long-range antiship missile [LRASM] and the vertical launch system– 
compatible naval strike missile [NSM] variant). These remain “paper missiles,” 
as yet un-fielded on U.S. Navy surface combatants. The NSM represents the 
extraordinary case of the United States looking to Norway (in partnership with 
Raytheon) to supply a key weapons system that American industry itself should 
have been able to produce on favorable terms years ago. Additionally, new U.S. 
ASCMs may be unable to target effectively under contested A2/AD conditions. 
Failing to fill this gap would further imperil U.S. ability to generate and maintain 
sea control in the western Pacific.
Let me underscore once again that the United States and China can avoid 
war. I’m confident that we will avoid fighting each other. Rather, this is about 
maintaining robust deterrence in peacetime and in any crises that might erupt. 
Specifically, we must deter Beijing from attempting to resolve island or maritime 
claims disputes with the use of force, or even the threat of force. The aforemen-
tioned [U.S.] weapons systems, effectively deployed and combined with a broader 
 * Subsequent to this testimony, China revealed two different ASBMs at a 3 September military parade: 
the long-anticipated DF-21D and a variant of the newer DF-26. See Andrew S. Erickson, “Showtime: 
China Reveals Two ‘Carrier-Killer’ Missiles,” The National Interest, 3 September 2015.
 † Andrew S. Erickson, personal summary of discussion at “China’s Naval Shipbuilding: Progress and 
Challenges,” China Maritime Studies Institute conference, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, R.I., 
19–20 May 2015, available at andrewerickson.com/.
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strategy, can repeatedly convince China’s leaders that they will not succeed in 
their objective if they attempt to use military force to seize additional features 
and waters around them, or to prevent U.S. forces from operating in international 
waters and airspace nearby.
Maintaining Freedom of Navigation. Proper efforts in the abovementioned areas 
will thereby support access to pursue our vital interests, which include unfet-
tered access to all areas of operation allowed by international law. This access 
is not only in the form of freedom of navigation per se, but also to support a 
much broader set of fundamentals: access for American military force, economic 
power, political persuasion, and influence over regional events. All require the 
support of military power that underwrites American influence on behalf of the 
global system.
Supporting freedom of navigation, in turn, requires a broad array of measures, 
coordinated through a whole-of-government approach. Freedom of navigation 
operations should be pursued proportionally, in accordance with international 
law, whereby islands and rocks are accorded territorial waters and airspace out 
to twelve nautical miles, and reefs (features naturally underwater at high tide) 
are accorded zero nautical miles. Such legal distinctions are important, and we 
should operate accordingly.
Additionally, we need to reinforce the global institutions that the Law of the 
Sea [Convention] was designed to create and support. This entails underwriting 
with our power and example peaceful dispute resolution based on international 
law and international institutions. Among these, the United States must ratify 
the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). As Peter Dutton testified 
before the House Foreign Affairs Committee in 2014, 
American policy makers must realize that the contest for East Asia is one of both 
power and law. . . . Acceding to [UNCLOS] and once again exercising direct leader-
ship over the development of its rules and norms is the first and most critical step.  
. . . My sense is that East Asian states, indeed many states around the world, are des-
perate for active American leadership over the norms and laws that govern legitimate 
international action.*
Once again, I agree fundamentally with my colleague.
Regaining Legal Leadership. The United States should ratify UNCLOS because 
doing so would further support the rules- and norms-based international system 
that Washington is rightly trying to foster—in part as a means to ensure the 
 * Peter A. Dutton, Professor and Director, China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College, 
Testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Hearing on China’s Maritime Disputes in the 
East and South China Seas, 14 January 2014, 113th Cong., 2nd sess., available at docs.house.gov/.
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following: (1) that neither force, nor even the threat of force, will be employed to 
resolve island and maritime claims disputes in a dynamic but increasingly tense 
region, and (2) that such destabilizing approaches will not be encouraged any-
where else� Ratifying UNCLOS would also eliminate a perennial source of de-
flective criticism by China and understandable concern on the part of U�S� allies 
and partners� While the U�S� stance with regard to international maritime law 
is obviously far more sophisticated than this—including nuanced positions re-
garding the far-reaching applicability of customary international law—ratifying 
UNCLOS would nevertheless eliminate a perception that Washington is advo-
cating “Do as I say, not as I do�” The application of maritime law in practice is 
shaped over time, and China is already benefiting from U�S� vulnerability in this 
area—vulnerability caused by not joining 166 other states [sic] and the European 
Union in becoming a party to UNCLOS� 
I can attest from personal experience to the extent to which China has cul-
tivated a new generation of sharp, persistent maritime legal specialists who are 
active in the international arena� I believe that their concerted efforts can make 
a difference over time, a difference that would undermine the governance of the 
global maritime commons to our collective detriment�
But don’t just take it from me� What’s far more important is that UNCLOS 
ratification is supported by
1� The current President, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, Chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the heads of the U�S� maritime services: 
Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard
2� All their living predecessors, from Republican and Democratic 
administrations alike*
On how many issues does one witness this sort of unanimity across parties, 
agencies, and time? These people are true experts, not just on theory, but on how 
things play out in policy practice� There is a compelling reason for their unanim-
ity: U�S� UNCLOS ratification is a great idea whose time has more than come�†
Worth Defending: Not Thucydides’s World, but the Twenty-First-Century Global 
System. Safeguarding the long-term future of the global maritime commons, 
 * See, for example, Adm� Bob Papp, Commandant of the U�S� Coast Guard, “Benefits of Joining the 
Law of the Sea Convention,” The Hill, 19 April 2012; and John B� Bellinger III, Adjunct Senior Fellow 
for International and National Security Law, “Should the United States Ratify the UN Law of the 
Sea?,” Council on Foreign Relations, 11 November 2014, www�cfr�org/�
 † For related policy recommendations offered subsequent to this testimony, see Andrew S� Erickson, 
“New U�S� Security Strategy Doesn’t Go Far Enough on South China Sea,” China Real Time Report 
(中国实时报) (blog), Wall Street Journal, 24 August 2015, blogs�wsj�com/�
NWC_Winter2016Review.indb   19 12/3/15   11:47 AM
23
War College: Winter 2016 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2016
 2 0  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
including the freedom of the vital international sea-lanes of the South China Sea 
and the airspace above them, demands nothing less than the measures I have 
advocated here. We will have to accept some moderate friction, but we can man-
age that—all while cooperating with China and other nations in areas of mutual 
interest. We live in a far better world today than Thucydides could ever have 
dreamed of. Let’s be sure to keep it that way in all respects, for everyone, regard-
less of their relative power.
ANDREW S. ERICKSON 
Dr. Andrew S. Erickson is an associate professor in the Naval War College’s China 
Maritime Studies Institute. He serves on the Naval War College Review’s Editorial 
Board. Since 2008, he has been an associate in research at Harvard University’s John 
King Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies. Erickson is the author of Chinese Anti-
ship Ballistic Missile Development (Jamestown Foundation, 2013). He is coauthor 
of two other books: Gulf of Aden Anti-piracy and China’s Maritime Commons 
Presence (Jamestown, 2015) and Assessing China’s Cruise Missile Ambitions 
(National Defense University, 2014). Erickson’s coauthored Foreign Affairs online 
article, “Not-So-Empty Talk: The Danger of China’s ‘New Type of Great-Power 
Relations’ Slogan,” has been read widely in U.S. and Asian policy circles. He runs the 
research website www.andrewerickson.com and co-runs www.chinasignpost.com.
The opinions expressed herein are the personal views of the author and are not 
meant to represent the official views of the Department of the Navy or any other 
agency of the federal government. The text differs in minor ways from that pub-
lished online by the House Foreign Affairs Committee.
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PRESIDENT’S FORUM
THROUGHOUT ITS HISTORY, the U�S� Naval War College has 
continually adapted its educational and research programs to 
accommodate the shifting international security environment in order to educate 
the Navy’s future leaders effectively� From the introduction of war gaming into 
the curriculum in the 1880s to the “Turner Revolution” in the mid-1970s, the 
College has responded to the needs of the service by updating its curriculum and 
teaching methods and by establishing programs and activities designed not only 
to keep pace with change but to anticipate it�
Recognizing the need to strengthen the Navy’s ability to craft maritime strat-
egy and think both deeply and broadly about warfighting issues, then–Chief of 
Naval Operations (CNO) Admiral Thomas B� Hayward announced the establish-
ment of the Center for Naval Warfare Studies (CNWS) in 1981� The first head of 
CNWS, former Navy Under Secretary Dr� Robert J� Murray, saw the Center as a 
“place where the Navy is asking itself, ‘How do the forces fit together: first at the 
tactical level, then at the theater level, and then worldwide?’” 
Mindful of this strong foundation, and recognizing that the Navy was at a 
critical nexus—operating in a dynamic and increasingly unstable international 
security environment at a time of unrelenting budgetary pressure—the Center 
recently conducted a ten-month internal review to examine its current effective-
ness in meeting its mandate, and to identify ways in which it could better help the 
Navy adapt to the challenges it is facing now and will face in the future�
The review was initiated in the fall of 2014� Professor Tom Culora, the acting 
dean, formed an interdepartmental team of faculty members to examine four 
key criteria: the degree of success the Center was achieving in its core missions, 
the effectiveness of both internal and external communications, the efficiency of 
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the current organizational structure, and the adequacy of resources committed 
to naval issues� The study team developed a research design that, while primar-
ily qualitative in its approach, applied mixed methods for data collection and 
analysis that included conducting over eighty internal and external interviews 
and collecting scores of formal documents and directives�
The result of this effort was a comprehensive review that generated more than 
seventy relevant findings and made twenty direct recommendations that provid-
ed a foundation for the Center’s dean and department chairs to examine as they 
chart the course for the organization over the next several years� A systematic 
review and discussion within this group of leaders revealed three enduring issues 
they believe need to be considered for the Center to remain relevant and effective� 
First, they identified the need for effective and active communication both within 
the Center and, equally important, across the greater naval enterprise to leverage 
the full potential of the institution to influence and inform key decisions about 
naval strategy and operations� Second, the Center needs to maintain a balance 
perpetually between its research activities and gaming conducted in response 
to outside tasking / demand signals, on the one hand, and activities designed to 
generate independent analysis and creative thinking, on the other hand� By do-
ing so, the Center not only responds to the immediate needs of the Navy but also 
has the “bandwidth” to recognize emerging trends and issues, so as to enable it to 
conduct research and inquiry to anticipate challenges, not just respond to them� 
Lastly, there was recognition of the natural competition between the need to both 
address near-term challenges and pressing situations that demand attention now 
and devote time to anticipating, identifying, and exploring future operational and 
strategic questions� 
Beyond these three enduring issues, the study team’s other findings rep-
resented both challenges and opportunities for the Center� Among the key 
opportunities—in the form of strengths—identified were the strong, diverse, and 
widely respected faculty; the reputation of the Center for academic and research 
integrity; and the recognition of the value of independent and anticipatory re-
search� But ongoing challenges were identified as well, including the difficulty 
of fully and effectively communicating the research and gaming activities of the 
Center to outside organizations and stakeholders; the absence of research unity 
and a long-term strategy; the lack of coverage in several key issue areas, both 
regional and functional; and the ever-present challenge of sustaining research 
quality that is attendant on research organizations such as CNWS� Underpin-
ning all of these challenges was a growing concern that the critical support that 
enables this rich source of research and analysis was under both bureaucratic and 
budgetary pressure that could threaten the effectiveness, efficiency, quality, and 
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quantity of the research produced by the faculty, not only in CNWS but across 
the College at large�
In the months following the delivery of the study results to College leadership 
nearly all of the recommendations have been adopted in one form or another, 
including some additional recommendations from the department chairs� Sev-
eral responses to key recommendations were initiated immediately, including 
the following:
• The development and publication of an annual research plan, coupled with a 
yearbook to provide a compendium of all the work done by the Center in the 
preceding year� At the time of this writing, the first edition of this document 
is scheduled for release in the fall of 2015� We anticipate that future plans/
yearbooks will be developed earlier in the calendar year via a process that 
will more fully consult and consider the needs of key stakeholders and staffs�
• Improvement of both internal and external communication that goes beyond 
the publication of the research plan and yearbook, to include internal and 
external presentations of research findings; a CNWS “road show” that may 
become part of a larger College-wide outreach program and periodic work-
shops; and other events at the College designed to deliver research results 
and obtain feedback on that work more effectively�
• Establishment of a Center-wide research consultation and assessment process 
among all faculty members that creates a dialogue and encourages critical 
examination of key research efforts as a means of assessing the overall fidelity 
and quality of the research produced and released by the Center�
• A structural change within the Center that merges the Strategic Research 
Department with the Warfare Analysis and Research Department to improve 
collaboration and improve efficiency� This merger enables a talented group 
of topically diverse faculty members who apply a variety of research meth-
odologies and approaches to collaborate more effectively on a wide range 
of research projects and initiatives� This improves the potential to combine 
divergent research into a holistic view of the strategic and operational issues 
facing the fleet across the spectrum of conflict in both the near and far terms�
• Lastly, based on the internal review and the subsequent development of the 
research plan, efforts are under way to close recognized gaps in the research 
coverage by internally adjusting the focus of a few faculty members on the 
basis of their demonstrated expertise, while adding new faculty members 
targeted to fill these gaps when enabled by faculty retirements and depar-
tures� Developing the intellectual capital of the Center is perhaps the key 
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mechanism for ensuring a vibrant, agile, and forward-leaning organization� 
The follow-on to these faculty additions and adjustments is the development 
of a more comprehensive human resources plan that will outline priorities 
and identify opportunities with the most valuable asset the Center possesses 
—its people�
These recommendations, along with several others, are being implemented by 
the College to sustain and improve support to CNO, the OPNAV staff, and the 
fleet; to provide a measure of “headroom” to enable organizational agility; and to 
respond to demand signals as received on future needs of the fleet� 
History shows that good organizations respond to challenges and opportuni-
ties; but the best organizations anticipate and actively adapt to change in their 
environments and to the shifting uncertainty of an unstable world� The initial 
motivation behind CNWS’s internal review was to provide a deeper understand-
ing of the organization and the environment so that thoughtful and targeted 
adaptive change could be initiated to improve the organization—and this goal 
was accomplished� As the dean of CNWS stated at the review’s conclusion, “At 
the end of the day, the internal review provided the leadership, faculty, and staff 
within CNWS with a vehicle to begin a sustained and open dialogue about what, 
how, and why we do what we do�” I am convinced that this dialogue will continue 
in the coming months and years as the Center for Naval Warfare Studies shapes 
its research, gaming, and analytical work—ultimately contributing to the mission 
of the Naval War College as it provides support to CNO and our Navy at large�
P� GARDNER HOWE III
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, Naval War College 
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 As the frequency and scope of China’s paramilitary and military presence activities in the East and South China Seas have increased in the last few 
years, officials and analysts inside and outside China have worried more and 
more about the potential for military crises erupting between China and other 
actors. Given the perceived high stakes of many of these potential disputes—they 
touch on sovereignty, territorial integrity, national dignity, and development re-
sources—some observers are concerned about the risks of escalation to military 
conflict, whether deliberate or accidental.1 Adding to the worries is uncertainty 
about China’s commitment to crisis management and escalation control.2 
The purpose of this article is to help fill the gap in knowledge about Chinese 
crisis-management theory and practice. Focusing mainly on the evolution of 
thinking in China about international security crisis management over the past 
ten to fifteen years, the study begins with a short introductory description of 
Chinese theorizing about the definitions and characteristics of interstate crisis, 
about crisis-management principles, and about how crisis management fits into 
the evolving military operations of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). It then 
analyzes factors in Chinese crisis-management theory and practice that might be 
in some tension with these principles. Finally it examines some of the problems 
that Chinese crisis-management experts themselves have identified in setting 
up a leaner, more efficient, and better coordinated military crisis-management 
decision-making system. 
The bottom line is that China has developed a relatively large body of re-
search on crisis management, work that more or less endorses the principles 
Alastair Iain Johnston
THE EVOLUTION OF INTERSTATE SECURITY  
CRISIS-MANAGEMENT THEORY AND PRACTICE 
IN CHINA
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and practices developed by many American experts during the Cold War. In-
deed, much of the Chinese research explicitly draws on the substantial body of 
American literature on crisis management. Chinese experts have also developed 
concepts (e.g., nonwar military actions) and scenarios (e.g., border instability) 
that explicitly articulate roles for the PLA in crisis management distinct from 
its traditional war-fighting role. But there is also considerable tension between 
these principles and practices on the one hand and certain military operational 
concepts in China on the other. In addition certain biases—hypernationalism 
and visions of Chinese exceptionalism—are in tension with crisis-management 
principles as well. Finally, crisis-management decision-making institutions, 
mechanisms, and procedures are still relatively underdeveloped.
CRISIS-MANAGEMENT THEORY DEVELOPMENT
It is common in the United States, and to some degree in China, to hear com-
mentators pronounce that in the Chinese language “crisis” (weiji) means “danger” 
plus “opportunity.”3 According to some Western and Chinese crisis-management 
experts, this is an inaccurate or facile way of understanding the term. Rather, 
“crisis” comprises the characters for “danger” (wei) and for “decisive point/ful-
crum [ji] between life and death.”4 Some believe it can also mean “danger” plus 
“turning point” (zhuanji or zhuanzhe), a sense in which some positive outcome is 
possible.5 Indeed, a seminal study of crisis management by the influential China 
Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) notes that the EP-3 
crisis in 2001 led the United States (and China) to improve Sino-U.S. relations.6
In contrast, much of the Chinese literature focuses on the negative nature 
of crises. One of the first Chinese works on crisis management, published in 
1989, refers to a crisis as the intensification of contradictions between states 
that damages their normal relationship.7 It is a situation with some probability 
of escalation to armed conflict or war, and where there is only a short period in 
which to resolve the crisis. It is also common for Chinese sources to describe a 
crisis as being situated between war and peace.8 One source is explicit that there 
are three types of security situations: peace, crisis, and war.9 More recently, Yu 
Qiaohua, a PLA crisis-management specialist at the PLA National Defense Uni-
versity (NDU), citing Chinese dictionaries, concludes that a crisis is a “hidden/
concealed disaster or danger, a moment of serious difficulty[,] . . . a dangerous 
situation or stage where there is a possibility of war or armed conflict between 
countries or political groups.”10 CICIR’s study calls a crisis a cut point in a line or 
trend of normalcy and notes that after a crisis the situation rarely returns to the 
status quo ante.11 A widely cited NDU study argues that the resolution of a crisis 
means neither that complete cooperation has returned nor that the basic problem 
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behind the crisis is resolved.12 In short, interstate-security crises occur between 
adversaries and enemies, not between friends.
Generally, Chinese crisis-management experts characterize crises much 
along the lines of standard American definitions. This should not be surprising, 
as much of the Chinese literature draws extensively on the U.S. literature.13 In 
the American academic literature Michael Brecher and Jonathan Wilkenfeld’s 
definition of a crisis has been the most influential. They define it as a political-
military conflict where decision makers perceive there to be a threat to important 
interests, where stakes are high, where there is a growing probability of armed 
conflict, and where there is perceived pressure to resolve a dispute before it es-
calates to war.
Chinese crisis-management experts have adopted this definition.14 According 
to the 2003 CICIR study, crises have three main characteristics: threats to impor-
tant interests (weixiexing), high levels of uncertainty (buquedingxing), and a high 
sense of urgency (jinpoxing).15 
According to a 2006 NDU study on crisis-management decision making, cri-
ses have five characteristics: they are threatening (weixiexing), sudden (tufaxing), 
and marked by a high sense of urgency (jinpoxing) and high levels of uncertainty 
(buquedingxing) but are controllable (kekongxing).16 A 2008 NDU study of mili-
tary crises argues that crises have four characteristics: the possibility of escalation 
to war (zhanzheng weixianxing), seriousness of threat to interests and costliness 
of escalation (weixie yanzhongxing), uncertainty about the direction of the crisis 
(fazhan buquedingxing), and urgency in handling it (chuzhi jinpoxing).17 And the 
2015 edition of the NDU’s Science of Strategy simply adopts Brecher and Wilken-
feld’s definition of a crisis.18
In short, according to Chinese experts, crises are dangerous, given that escala-
tion to war is a strong possibility, but they are controllable through the applica-
tion of crisis-management principles and mechanisms, as will be discussed more 
fully below.19 As I will discuss later, the claim that crises reside between war and 
peace creates a potential set of missions for military power that are distinct from 
major interstate war. The problem is that, according to many Chinese military 
analysts, the PLA is still unprepared in terms of command, operations, and train-
ing to engage fully in crisis-management missions.
Types of Crises
Yu Qiaohua identifies six types of military crises: those between great powers, 
those among alliance members or within political groupings, those between 
major and minor powers, those between states with traditional adversarial rela-
tions or rivalries, those within states between political groups, and those induced 
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by terrorism.20 These types can be aggregated into traditional interstate crises, 
terrorism, and internal or domestic disorder (intrastate crises). Crises can be 
further categorized as those that lead to war (where one or more states provokes 
a crisis as an excuse for war), those that remain on the margins of war (where the 
threat or escalation to war is used for bargaining purposes to coerce the other 
side), accidental crises (where the crisis arises from unintended or chance events 
and actions), and quasi-crises (where sudden events in the context of somewhat 
conflictual relations precipitate a crisis but the probability of war is low, such as 
the EP-3 incident in 2001).21 
As for the causes of crises, aside from the occasional nod to historical materi-
alism (e.g., the claim that interstate crises are mainly a function of clashing eco-
nomic interests, U.S. hegemonic pursuit of energy being a major source of these 
crises), Chinese crisis-management scholars identify a range of fairly specific 
factors and examples.22 These fall into a number of categories from territorial 
and resources conflicts (e.g., Diaoyudao, Dokdo, South China Sea issues, energy 
disputes) to imbalances in, and the spread of, new military capabilities (e.g., nu-
clear proliferation in Korea and Iran, cyber weapons);23 the spillover of domestic 
conflicts into other countries (e.g., ethnic separatism, terrorism, DPRK* collapse, 
diversionary crises); unexpected military accidents and collisions; and the rise of 
new powers with more points of potential conflict with other states.24 
Crisis Management: Definitions and Principles
China’s crisis-management specialists commonly define crisis management as 
involving the use of diplomatic, military, and economic means to establish an 
advantageous position from which to reduce tension, minimize losses, and get 
the adversary to compromise, all the while avoiding loss of control or escala-
tion to war.25 Crisis-management policy, therefore, entails “a series of measures 
to prevent and control the occurrence and development of crises.”26 These can 
include, among others, building confidence and trust, increasing transparency, 
strengthening contacts across militaries, prior notification of military activities, 
participation in multilateral security institutions, deterrence (and sanctions), 
summit meetings and regularized high-level mutual visits, hotlines, mechanisms 
for arms control and disarmament monitoring, and the use of informal high-level 
trusted emissaries.27 A recent NDU study argues that direct communications 
between top leaders are more effective in restraining crisis escalation than sole 
reliance on military deterrence or economic sanctions.28 
Definitions and characterizations of international security and military crises 
in Chinese research draw heavily from American academic and government 
research. Senior Colonel Hu Ping of the PLA General Staff Department (GSD) 
 * Democratic People’s Republic of Korea; that is, North Korea.
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was a major figure in transmitting these ideas to the Chinese crisis-management 
community back in the early 1990s.29 In 2003, CICIR’s breakthrough study on 
crisis management praised the rigor and sophistication of “Western” crisis- 
management research and the role it plays in influencing foreign policy.30 Based 
on my own interviews with Chinese crisis-management specialists and from a 
look at the references used in PRC scholarship, it is also clear that a 2006 book 
coedited by Michael Swaine and Zhang Tuosheng on U.S.-Chinese crises—a 
product of a collaborative project on crisis management between the Car-
negie Endowment for Inter-
national Peace (CEIP) and 
the China Foundation for 
International and Strategic 
Studies (CFISS)—has had an 
important impact on crisis-
management research in China.31 The project has contributed to discussions 
inside China on the question of intracrisis signaling and it has contributed to a 
more critical self-evaluation of China’s own crisis-management practice. Most 
important, however, it has helped propagate crisis-management principles inside 
the Chinese national-security bureaucracies.32 
In particular, from this exposure to American crisis-management theory 
Chinese crisis-management theorists have converged on a set of principles for 
guiding crisis-management practice. The first analyst to develop such a list 
was Hu Ping, whose 1992 study, sponsored by CFISS, listed a range of dos and 
don’ts, mostly derived from American crisis-management literature.33 Indeed, at 
the time, some in the PLA criticized his work as too “Western,” as having insuf-
ficient “China” content. Judging from the frequency of its citation, however, this 
initial assessment evidently has not stopped scholars from relying on Hu’s work. 
Later, in 2003, the CICIR crisis-management group distilled Hu’s list down to six 
principles: “seek peaceful resolution” and don’t think of punishing the other side; 
“seek limited and realistic goals”; exercise restraint over one’s behavior; maintain 
communications with the other side; handle issues separately (e.g., don’t engage 
in issue linkage); and avoid zero-sum approaches to crisis.34 
The CEIP-CFISS project mentioned above appears to have been important 
in codifying crisis-management principles in China. The project participants 
worked out a list of principles derived mainly from Hu’s 1993 book. By 2007, after 
some discussion, these principles had been accepted by both CEIP and CFISS:35
• Communicate with the adversary clearly and constantly and be specific 
about what is being demanded.
• Articulate limited goals; be prepared to drop unlimited ones. 
According to many Chinese military analysts, 
the PLA is still unprepared in terms of com-
mand, operations, and training to engage fully 
in crisis-management missions.
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• Maintain military flexibility, respond symmetrically in your options; don’t 
excessively pressure the other side, and don’t take the use of force lightly.
• Avoid excessively ideological positions; don’t threaten the other side’s basic 
values, and don’t moralize conflicts of interest.
• Exercise self-restraint, including in response to provocative actions by the 
other side.
• Do not issue ultimatums; ensure that the adversary can back down in a face-
saving manner.
• Divide large issues into smaller, manageable parts.
• Anticipate unintended consequences of particular moves.
These principles, or variants of them, are routinely cited in the Chinese crisis-
management literature.36 
Two additional principles are sometimes found in the Chinese literature. First, 
the geographical scope of a crisis should be limited to the immediate parties to 
prevent third-party intervention or internationalization.37 Internationalization 
is generally considered a problem, because it can constrain freedom of action 
by bringing in the interests of third parties.38 That said, Chinese specialists have 
argued that China can play and has played a constructive third-party role in crisis 
management (for instance, vis-à-vis the DPRK).
Second, China should respect international law, as international norms can 
generally reduce uncertainty and thus reduce the volatility of crises.39 Two NDU 
crisis-management specialists, however, raise the caveat that national interest 
trumps international law. The main reason, it seems, for using international law 
in a crisis is to mobilize international and domestic support for one’s cause. The 
flip side is that egregious, blatant violations of international law in the name of 
national interest put a state in a passive position and isolate it, constraining its 
diplomatic and military options.40 Most recently a PLA study of military opera-
tions in crises suggests that if in border disputes China’s forces (maritime and air 
included) operate outside its boundaries, it will have to abide by international 
law, and the prior permission of highest-level decision makers will be required.41 
Doing so, however, helps China gain the moral high ground. 
Some of these principles are conditioned by the admonition that there are cer-
tain questions on which China cannot compromise or make concessions. NDU’s 
Wang Yong lists these as issues related to national dignity, territorial integrity, or 
national unity.42 Indeed, he and a coauthor argue that once a crisis has evolved 
to a point where “core interests” are threatened, standard crisis-management 
principles no longer apply and one has instead to use resolute methods to coun-
ter the adversary. Those methods include military means if necessary, though 
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with restraint, such that the adversary’s core interests are not threatened.43 Yu 
Qiaohua, for his part, includes these three in his list but adds others: long-term 
national development, the stability of political power, and ethnic unity.44 He adds 
elsewhere that “sovereignty is more important than everything.”45
In addition to the principles they now share with American crisis-management 
theoreticians, Chinese specialists point to some that they believe are uniquely 
rooted in Chinese historical experience. These are embodied in the phrase “just, 
advantageous, restrained” (youli, youli, youjie), an axiom often cited as a guid-
ing principle in China’s own approach to crisis management. Its meaning comes 
from its historical origins in the anti-Japanese war, when the Chinese Communist 
Party and the Kuomintang were fighting each other while at the same time trying 
to collaborate against Japan. “Just” refers to the principle of self-defensive actions 
(ziwei), that of not going on the offensive or attacking without provocation or 
reason. In other words, it means exercising restraint even in conflict situations 
but reserving the right to strike second, to retaliate. “Advantageous” refers to 
the principle of seeking victory—that is, being fully prepared for struggle, while 
avoiding unnecessary losses from pursuing overly ambitious goals. “Restrained” 
connotes self-control in operations—not pursuing an adversary to a total victory, 
refraining from escalation even after defeating an attack.46 
It is, of course, unclear to what extent this axiom actually constrains China’s 
crisis-management behavior. One argument might be that, like the language of 
exceptionalism in the United States, the axiom is a self-justification of behavior 
that in fact violates its principles. Alternatively, it could have a domestic political 
purpose, that of justifying concessions (restraint) after a politically acceptable 
level of demands has been made (just, advantageous). 
Another principle that Chinese experts claim to be particularly salient in 
Chinese thinking is the blending of crisis prevention and crisis management. 
Chinese ideas on crisis management often include more-general proposals 
about the need to promote economic development or political stabilization in 
failed states and regions, to build trust, etc., before focusing on specific crisis-
management mechanisms. In my private conversations with them, some Chinese 
crisis-management specialists have stressed the role that track II (that is, unoffi-
cial) diplomacy could play in allowing all sides to gauge the stakes at hand and to 
enhance their determination to avoid confrontations. My Chinese interlocutors 
have not been confident that these kinds of measures would necessarily resolve 
major conflictual issues, such as those relating to Taiwan or the South China 
Sea, but they believe they could reduce the probability of confrontation.47 Some 
have suggested that joint risk-reduction centers, joint crisis-analysis projects, or 
direct communications links between relevant military operations departments 
in China and other countries could also be useful in crisis prevention.
6886_Johnston_Lead.indd   35 12/9/15   1:47 PM
39
War College: Winter 2016 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2016
 3 6  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
The Status of Crisis Management in PLA Military Operations
As they theorized about crises and crisis management in general, over the last ten 
years or so PLA experts have begun to think both more conceptually and more 
concretely about the role of military operations in international crises. Their 
research appears to be moving from exploring (and even mimicking, to some 
degree) American-based work to developing concepts of military operations and 
of signaling more tailored to Chinese conditions.
The first official reference to a special PLA role in military crises or “sudden 
incidents” (tufa shijian) came in the 2002 Government Work Report presented to 
the National People’s Congress in March of that year. In it Premier Zhu Rongji 
called for strengthening the PLA’s ability to fight self-defensive wars and deal with 
sudden incidents under high-technology conditions.48 Two major real-world 
developments appear to have dovetailed during the years 2004–2009 to push 
forward this new focus on military crisis operations. One was a growing focus on 
domestic crisis management and on emergency-response laws, institutions, and 
operations in general. This impulse grew mainly from the severe acute respira-
tory syndrome (SARS) experience in 2003 but also from problems experienced 
in coordinating responses to natural disasters.49 In 2004 and 2005, in a flurry 
of legislation and institution creation, offices in charge of crisis and emergency 
response were quickly set up at all levels of government. Some of this legislation 
specifically addressed the role of the PLA in domestic emergency responses of 
various types.50 A second factor, one outside China, was the U.S. development of 
the concept of military operations other than war (MOOTW). It may have played 
a role in sharpening the PLA’s focus on organization and operations in external 
crises short of war.51 
As a result of these developments, in 2006 new PLA headquarters regulations 
(silingbu tiaoli) were issued that for the first time identified the handling of sud-
den incidents as an important part of PLA operations and outlined the principles, 
basic procedures, and important points of attention in this type of mission.52 In 
the same year the top military decision-making body, the Central Military Com-
mission (CMC), approved the Overall Contingency Plans for the Military’s Han-
dling of Sudden Incidents.53 This plan identified five types of such contingencies 
or events, the first being “military-conflict sudden events,” or military crises.54 
The 2008 White Paper on National Defense was the first to use the term “nonwar 
military actions” (NWMA), the Chinese term for MOOTW.55
The NWMA concept allowed the PLA to place crisis-management operations 
into a three-category overall typology of military operations (see figure 1): war, 
nonwar military operations, and foreign-military cooperation. 
Crisis management falls in the NWMA category. Within this category are four 
subtypes of crises, or sudden incidents, that could require the use of military 
force:56 
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• Incidents involving challenges to China’s control over its land, ocean, or air 
boundaries
• Incidents involving terrorist attacks 
• Incidents involving domestic social unrest
• Incidents involving natural or human-made disasters. 
According to Chinese experts, international security crisis management, as 
generally defined by both American and Chinese specialists alike, applies mainly 
to the first subtype—handling crises on China’s land, sea, and air borders.57 The 
PLA’s role is also greatest in such crises. In the remaining three subtypes, in most 
cases, the lead in the use of force would be taken by the People’s Armed Police 
or the Public Security Bureau. The PLA should, it is argued, play a role in these 
last three subtypes only when the crisis constitutes a serious threat to national 
security—the lives, property, or security of the people—and only when ordered 
to by the CMC.58
With regard to incidents involving China’s land, ocean, or air boundaries, 
PLA crisis-management experts have identified a range of scenarios for which 
they need to plan and exercise (and, as I examine later, the PLA appears to have 
developed contingency plans for some of these scenarios):59 
• Small-scale armed conflicts with other states over land-border disputes
• Small-scale armed conflicts over disputed ocean areas, over jurisdiction over 
shoals and reefs, and over the exploitation of resources in exclusive economic 
zones
• Small-scale military surveillance and harassment activities conducted by 
foreign militaries along land, ocean, and air frontiers 
• Terrorist or violent attacks along land and ocean frontiers by foreign- 
supported separatist and terrorist organizations 
FIGURE 1
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• Limited sealing of the border to prevent internal conflicts in other countries 
from spilling over the border in the form, say, of refugee flows
• Mistaken incursions by foreign soldiers or personnel into land and ocean 
border areas under China’s jurisdiction
• Accidental incidents that harm China’s interests, flowing from exercises and 
military activities by foreign militaries along China’s land, ocean, and air 
boundaries.
This effort to figure out where interstate military crisis management fits into 
the spectrum of military activity is, potentially, an important conceptual devel-
opment. It explicitly differentiates between the traditional PLA mission of using 
force in wartime to annihilate the enemy, on the one hand, and NWMA, wherein 
military power would be guided by the principles of crisis management, on the 
other. While the distinction may be hard for militaries to maintain in practice, 
especially those not having specially trained forces for crises and emergency 
management, the making of this distinction by the PLA is, arguably, a step to-
ward understanding that the use of force in crises has different purposes, differ-
ent milestones, and different manifestations than it does in interstate war. PLA 
specialists, however, complain precisely of the military’s difficulties in adjusting 
to crisis-management practices, wherein goals are much more limited than in 
wartime.60
The Institutional Development of Crisis-Management Research 
Stemming to some degree from the 1996 Taiwan crisis, the bombing in 1999 of 
the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, and the 2001 EP-3 incident, there has been a 
steady increase in Chinese scholarship on interstate crisis management. Much of 
this literature is still very self-critical with regard to the sophistication of crisis 
research. For instance, the authors of a recent volume on the military’s handling 
of sudden events noted that crisis-management research and analysis tend to be 
done by nonmilitary institutions about nonmilitary crises (e.g., natural disasters, 
economic or social crises, etc.), while the PLA’s study of, and training in, crisis 
management has tended to focus on counterterrorism, not on crises occurring 
around China’s borders. The authors recommend, therefore, that the PLA set up 
its own crisis-management research institute.61 Some PLA critics suggest China’s 
practical ability to anticipate crises is hampered by unsophisticated techniques of 
crisis early warning (e.g., the lack of databases and statistical skills).62
The first sustained research project on interstate-security crisis management 
was started in the early 1990s by the China Foundation for International and 
Strategic Studies, a think tank connected to the GSD’s intelligence department. 
As noted earlier, CFISS published one of the first major analyses of crisis man-
agement, by Hu Ping of the GSD, in 1993. Since then CFISS has become a major 
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player in the development of crisis-management concepts and their dissemina-
tion to the wider PLA and to the civilian foreign-policy community. It has col-
laborated with the U.S.-based CEIP on crisis-management discussions since the 
early 2000s.
A second important site of crisis-management research is the CICIR, an 
intelligence-analysis institute affiliated with the Ministry of State Security. In 
2002 it set up a Crisis Management and Countermeasures Center. The idea for 
a crisis-management research capacity was first broached around 2000, and the 
EP-3 incident and 9/11 attacks in 2001 soon underscored the importance of such 
a center. Analysts from other research offices and centers at CICIR are allocated 
on a part-time basis to the center. A handful of analysts focus mostly on crisis 
management, including domestic disaster response; they mostly come from the 
American Studies Institute, the Information and Social Development Institute, 
and the Arms Control Institute.63 Judging from citations, the center’s important 
2003 book on interstate crisis management has had a major impact on crisis-
management research in China. 
Another important institutional support for crisis-management research is 
the NDU’s Crisis Management Center, set up in 2004. It is clear that much of the 
more authoritative open literature on crisis management comes from this center 
or its affiliated scholars. It has produced research on crisis-management theory, 
decision making, and early warning, among other topics.
Finally, the General Logistics Department (GLD) appears to be another im-
portant site for crisis-management theory development. Specialists associated 
with the GLD are writing about the operational details of command and control 
in crisis situations, in part because the GLD is responsible for timely responses 
to internal natural and man-made disasters, as well as pandemics and epidemics, 
by virtue of its control of the military medical system. In addition, traditional 
military crises require the GLD to ensure the rapid delivery of appropriate logis-
tics support. 
 
Chinese crisis-management theorists have adopted and developed principles 
that, if internalized by top leaders, should lead to restraint in interstate crises. 
Chinese writings suggest that crisis management requires empathy, clarity, and 
non-zero-sum perceptions of the issues at stake, especially in an era of nuclear 
weapons.64 This view is quite close to the American literature on crisis manage-
ment. Indeed, much of the Chinese approach appears to draw directly or indi-
rectly from U.S. theory and practice. The authors of a recent NDU study were 
clear that proactive American research into crisis management and crisis preven-
tion was “one important reason” for relatively successful U.S. handling of crises in 
the 1990s and after (such as the first Gulf war and Kosovo) and for its victories in 
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recent limited wars.65 The authors suggested that the relative U.S. success had to 
do with adherence to the key principles of crisis management.66
Despite the convergence in many crisis-management principles and the rather 
steady development of research capacity, some PLA experts complain that there 
is still insufficient emphasis on practical and implementable crisis-management 
mechanisms.67 Moreover, these theorists recognize that crisis management re-
quires the military to think differently about the use of the military instrument. 
They understand that the PLA needs to be able to operate at levels of violence 
below that for which it has organized and trained in the past. But there are some 
major ideological, political, and military operational obstacles to the application 
of crisis-management principles. I take these up in the next section.
PROBLEMS AND ISSUES IN CHINA’S CRISIS-MANAGEMENT  
PRACTICE
There is considerable tension between many of the concepts and principles in 
Chinese crisis-management thinking, on the one hand, and some of China’s ap-
proaches to certain security problems, as well as certain military concepts and 
operational practice, on the other. Some of these tensions and contradictions 
are recognized as such by Chinese experts. Some are not. Many of them are not 
unique to China, of course. 
Threats to Sovereignty and Territory
A central feature of China’s crisis-management behavior is sensitivity to perceived 
threats to the nation’s sovereignty and territory. Concretely, this means that Chi-
nese leaders have been more risk acceptant, harder to deter, and more likely to 
escalate coercion on issues related to the defense of territory and external and 
internal sovereignty than on other “national interests.” In crises involving these 
matters it may be harder for them to preserve a limited-stakes perspective or to 
accept mutual concessions. Indeed, since around 2004 territory and sovereignty 
questions have been labeled “core interests,” analogous to what Americans might 
call “vital interests.” Thus far the content of core interests has been relatively 
stable. They include PRC control over Xinjiang and Tibet and the prevention 
of a de jure independent Taiwan, as well as, more generally, the preservation of 
China’s current political system, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and sustainable 
development.68 For some experts, the frequency of crises will increase as Chinese 
power increases and the scope of the nation’s interests expands.69 Others recog-
nize, however, that in multilateral nontraditional-security crises, China may have 
to downplay its emphasis on absolute sovereignty.70 
This determination to protect territory and sovereignty is neither new nor 
unique. It is, for one thing, evident in China’s past crisis behavior. According 
to the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) data set, Chinese propensity to crisis 
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was at a peak in the 1950s and the 1980s. In the 1950s the key issues were Korea 
and Taiwan;71 in the 1980s they were land and ocean disputes with Vietnam (see 
figure 2). The ICB data show that the majority of China’s crisis involvement has 
been related to territory. This pattern is not uncommon for new states trying 
to establish the credibility of their control over boundaries or for states whose 
nationalism posits victimization at the hands of colonialism.72 It would explain, 
for instance, the similarities between democratic India and nondemocratic China 
shown in figure 3. 
Given the importance of territory for security and as a symbol of sovereignty, 
it is also not surprising that the level of coercion occurring in territorial crises 
tends to be higher than in nonterritorial ones. In crises where the main values 
threatened were territorial, violence was China’s preeminent response in 50 per-
cent of the cases. Otherwise, violence was preeminent in 33 percent of China’s 
responses (see figure 4).73
What might explain China’s greater willingness to use violence in territorial 
crises? For the prereform era, the militarism inherent in Maoist ideology might 
be a reasonable hypothesis. The fact, too, that U.S. containment policy in East 
Asia was particularly and proactively coercive (at least as judged by China’s lead-
ers) may be part of the story. In the postreform period, we do not have a very 
large number of crises on the basis of which to test various explanations. Since 
many crises in the post–Mao Zedong era have involved Vietnam or Taiwan, the 
FIGURE 2
FREQUENCY OF CHINA’S FOREIGN POLICY CRISES, 1949–2007 
Source: International Crisis Behavior Database.
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FIGURE 3
COMPARATIVE IMPORTANCE OF DIFFERENT ISSUES AT STAKE IN CRISES
Source: International Crisis Behavior Database.






















































































RELATIVE FREQUENCY OF VIOLENCE AS PREEMINENT RESPONSE IN INTERNATIONAL 
CRISES, CONDITIONAL ON TYPE OF THREAT
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high level of coercion employed may have to do with the zero-sum nature of 
disputes over territory. 
It is a little hard to know what to infer from these data about China today, 
since, as of the most recent data from the ICB (2007), China’s last crisis was over 
the Taiwan Strait in 1995–96. Anecdotally, however, it does seem likely that the 
relationship between territoriality and intracrisis coercion will continue to hold. 
For instance, in my interactions with Chinese officials and analysts on crisis 
management, they have implied that in crises concerning territorial integrity, 
should an adversary take the “first shot” (e.g., an actual warning shot or the first 
use of, say, navy ships in place of coast guard assets) or threaten China’s actual 
control over territory, Chinese decision makers may conclude that the issue has 
moved from the realm of crisis management to that of escalation dominance. At 
that point, force (framed as a “second strike”) becomes necessary to compel the 
adversary to back down. Such a response would also help demonstrate resolve 
against the prospect of any further escalation. Like their American counterparts, 
Chinese leaders are intensely focused on the credibility of their resolve. In addi-
tion, it is not clear that Chinese leaders believe the crisis-management principle 
of early and clear communications with other relevant actors applies to territorial 
and sovereignty issues. In a territorial dispute, China might decline to initiate 
top-level crisis-management communications with actors who are not them-
selves actual claimants (e.g., the United States with respect to China’s maritime 
disputes), so as to underscore the illegitimacy of their involvement. The same 
reluctance to initiate high-level contacts might also be on display in a crisis inci-
dent (e.g., a ship or air collision involving foreign military forces) occurring very 
close to Chinese territory but outside territorial waters. The argument might be 
that the illegitimacy of foreign hostile actions so close to China means Beijing is 
not responsible for initiating high-level communication (though there are differ-
ent views on this within China’s crisis-management expert community). On ter-
ritorial issues the crisis-management principle of flexibility may also not apply.74 
Blurring of Internal and External in the Concept of Comprehensive National Security
The Chinese crisis-management literature tends to draw no clear distinction 
between internal and external contingencies. It acknowledges that internal crises 
often spill over into external conflicts (as the SARS and certain nontraditional 
security crises have suggested), and vice versa.75 Chinese analysts’ lists of the 
crises in which China has been involved in the past or may be involved in the 
future invariably include both external (e.g., the Korean War, the border war with 
Vietnam in 1979, the U.S. bombing of the Chinese embassy in 1999, the DPRK 
nuclear crisis of 2002, conflicts over ocean rights in the South and East China 
Seas) and internal crises (e.g., Tiananmen in 1989, SARS in 2003, Taiwan inde-
pendence, Tibet and Xinjiang separatism).76 
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The focus on the link between external and internal crises, however, implies 
that international crises can increase the intensity of any domestic legitimacy 
problems then ongoing.77 In the view of one NDU study, external crisis affects 
“comprehensive security,” which includes social and economic stability.78 The flip 
side of this is that international crises can also have a useful secondary effect in 
reinforcing domestic legitimacy and cohesion.79 
Whether a crisis threatens or helps domestic stability, for Chinese experts 
effective crisis management includes information management—constraining 
and guiding public opinion and avoiding domestic public debate that “limits 
the space for the government to handle the crisis situation.”80 Thus, according to 
these experts, a guiding axiom should be to consider the implications of exter-
nal crises for domestic political power and stability.81 As the 2003 CICIR study 
put it, in crisis management the leadership needs to prevent a bilateral political 
crisis from expanding into, or influencing, a domestic social one. Otherwise the 
population’s emotional and fearful responses could constrain options. Therefore, 
the authors argue, it is critical to manage the media and use them to guide public 
opinion.82 Or in the words of the 2010 Shanghai Institutes of International Stud-
ies (SIIS) study, in crises “China’s policy propaganda to a large extent is aimed at 
the internal population.”83 The risk for crisis management, however, is that this 
link between external crisis and internal legitimacy can raise the stakes in a crisis, 
making concessions harder. Indeed, according to some PLA authors, on issues 
related to domestic stability and the unity of ethnic nationalities in China there 
is no room for bargaining in a crisis.84 
Another implication of the blurring of inner and outer has to do with how 
some in China and outside view ethnic Chinese as potential extensions of PRC 
power and influence. Some analysts see overseas Chinese as useful tools in crisis 
management, particularly in information and perception management. They 
recommend making use of overseas Chinese networks to make Beijing’s case in 
a crisis.85 The downside for crisis management, however, is that other countries 
might see their ethnic Chinese communities as tools or agents of Chinese power 
and therefore as threats. For example, anti-Chinese sentiments in Indonesia have 
historically been a source of tension in PRC-Indonesian relations; also, there 
is survey evidence that a substantial minority of the U.S. population (around 
30–35 percent) view Chinese Americans as less loyal to the United States than 
to China.86 The risk for crisis management is that trying to exploit the presence 
of overseas Chinese to lobby in favor of China’s position, or even creating that 
impression, could lead to a backlash against them. In the American case, that in 
turn could accentuate zero-sum, racialist, and ethnocentric perceptions in the 
domestic politics of the bilateral U.S.-Chinese relationship, with concomitant 
negative effects on long-term bilateral political stability. 
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The Need to Claim the Moral Upper Hand 
A number of Chinese sources note that in a crisis the nation’s leaders need to 
appear to hold a normatively superior position, to be seen as just (zhengyi) and 
moral (daoyi). Preserving this image is considered a national interest.87 This may 
explain the highly moralistic language used in crises. Some experts claim that one 
of China’s strengths in international crises is its ability to mobilize external sup-
port through appeals to its normative superiority;88 others note that the targets of 
this moralism are often domestic constituencies within China. 
A corollary to moralism is the demand for apologies and symbolic concessions 
from the adversary. In particular there appears to be a preference for adversaries 
to accept responsibility before China acts to dampen the situation.89 This empha-
sis on putting normative responsibility on the adversary’s head is inconsistent 
with the crisis-management principle of avoiding zero-sum ideological positions. 
Moreover, to the extent that the notion of moral superiority is internalized, it can 
lead Chinese decision makers to underestimate the perceived threat that their 
actions can generate. In other words, it reduces the capacity for empathy and 
perspective taking, and perhaps even the urgency to resolve the crisis quickly.90
Beliefs about Chinese Exceptionalism
Another apparently deeply held belief that could affect crisis-management 
practice is the claim that, among the major powers, China’s people, history, and 
current policies are uniquely peaceful and defensive.91 These essentialized traits 
are rooted, according to many in China, in ancient political philosophy, such as 
Confucianism. 
This self-orientalization creates a problem for crisis management, however. 
Social psychology shows that under conditions of perceived threat, the more one 
believes that one’s in-group is uniquely different from others—even if one believes 
this difference starts with its peacefulness—the more one is likely to hold a realpo-
litik worldview and to support realpolitik practices to resolve conflicts. At the level 
of the individual, perceived threats to the in-group increase the salience of nega-
tive out-group traits. The more salient the out-group, the greater the perceived 
identity difference with the Other. The greater this perceived difference, the less 
empathy for the out-group, and hence the more competitive the relationship with 
the out-group is perceived to be.92 This sense of competition tends to be related 
to a view of the external world as dangerous to the group. This sense of danger in 
turn is associated with a greater concern for relative gains, and a more zero-sum 
perception of international politics.93 It is also associated with “attribution errors,” 
a tendency to see one’s own actions as unavoidably defensive in the face of an 
adversary predisposed to threaten. In a crisis situation, therefore, strong percep-
tions of exceptionalism may escalate stakes and limit options in more-coercive 
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directions. This may be especially the case when perceptions of Chinese excep-
tionalism meet perceptions of American exceptionalism in a crisis.94
Absolute Flexibility (Quanbian) 
The concept of quanbian infuses traditional and modern Chinese strategic think-
ing. It means, more or less, “weighing the situation and responding to [advanta-
geous] change.” It is an axiom asserting absolute flexibility; any limits on accept-
able actions are primarily political, not normative. This concept of expediency 
appears as well in discussions about how much benefit one side can prudently 
derive from a crisis. In the view of one NDU expert, one task of leadership is 
to discover and exploit any advantages that might accrue from a crisis.95 This 
requires that decision makers constantly search to see how benefits in one issue 
might connect to benefits in another. According to one GSD analyst, this flex-
ibility allows leaders to use small crises to prevent larger ones and to use larger 
crises to prevent war.96 
The question is whether, in practice, this emphasis on absolute flexibility re-
duces or increases the likelihood of crisis escalation. On the one hand, it could 
reduce escalation pressures, because a prior knowledge of linked benefits allows 
one to come to an agreement with the adversary earlier rather than later. On the 
other hand, the constant search for maximum linked benefits could lead a side 
to hold out for more, denying the other side any payoffs and thus increasing the 
chances of escalation. While some Chinese crisis-management experts appear to 
acknowledge this first possibility, they do not provide particularly clear guide-
lines for avoiding the second.97
Conforming to the “Overall Situation” (Da Ju) 
The term “overall situation” refers to the general political and strategic goals of 
the Communist Party. Conforming to the overall situation (fucong da ju) means 
subordinating narrower or parochial interests to this primary purpose of state 
action. More broadly, the overall situation can mean the objective trends in the 
development of a situation, as correctly understood by political leadership. Some 
crisis-management specialists believe that China’s strategic principle of subordi-
nating coercion to the overall situation is a source of restraint in crises.98 To the 
extent that the overall situation in, say, bilateral relations with another country 
is to preserve positive interactions, this concept could dampen escalation.99 Dia-
lectically, however, the “da ju” could have the opposite effect. From the perspec-
tive of da ju, military setbacks are not necessarily self-deterring if they either 
do not negatively affect the party’s control over the da ju or can be construed as 
supporting the da ju (e.g., losing tactically, but gaining strategically by standing 
up to hegemonism). A common narrative in Chinese perceptions of the nation’s 
strategic history is that “good guys” operate often as the weaker side and so lose 
a lot of battles but win in the long run by focusing on da ju.100
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Weak-State Identity 
Many Chinese crisis-management experts start with the assumption that China 
is weaker than the United States. Despite the growth in China’s relative material 
power in recent years, this still seems to be a commonly held heuristic; the stan-
dard for judging progress in acquiring power is often the United States. Accord-
ingly, they believe, it becomes important for China to show resolve in the face of 
superior capabilities and to be less transparent so that the stronger side (the Unit-
ed States) exaggerates Chinese capabilities, by which deterrence is enhanced.101
This concept of “asymmetrical transparency” (bu duichen de toumingdu) may 
well enhance deterrence, but it undermines crisis-management principles. Some 
analysts in the PLA are aware 
of this tension or contradic-
tion.102 As a recent NDU study 
put it, decision makers need 
to understand the trade-off in 
crises between hidden inten-
tions and transparent communications. The admonition is that in general one 
should not reveal one’s intentions but should also not let the adversary’s strategic 
misperceptions persist if they are disadvantageous to oneself.103 Nonetheless, it is 
not obvious from PLA writings how this tension should be resolved. That is, it is 
unclear under what conditions one should expect ambiguity versus clarity. This 
makes interpreting Chinese signals in a crisis difficult.104
Another problem for crisis management created by the weak-state identity is 
that, for some theorists, weak states are, and should be, less constrained by crisis-
management principles than strong states. For instance, weak states are under 
more pressure to show resolve, so as to compensate for limited capabilities. One 
also hears the argument that the weaker side should be less constrained by crisis-
management principles because it needs more flexibility and maneuverability. A 
weak state’s deterrence signals are easier to read. Since it cannot credibly threaten 
to defeat the stronger side, there is a large range of threats it will not make. There-
fore, the weaker side’s deterrence signals are, proportionately speaking, more 
obvious than the stronger side’s. This line of thinking, however, can lead to over-
estimating the clarity of one’s intentions and underestimating the provocativeness 
of one’s actions. In other words, it can reduce the empathy required to understand 
the other side’s redlines and to predict unintended consequences.105
Tension between Crisis-Management Principles and Military Concepts
Experts acknowledge that the PLA is primarily trained and configured to fight 
wars, not engage in crisis signaling. They tend not to go into detail about the 
contradictions between these two types of military actions. One exception is 
NDU senior colonel Xu Hui’s list of coercive-diplomacy tactics that could be 
A central feature of China’s crisis- 
management behavior is sensitivity to per-
ceived threats to the nation’s sovereignty and  
territory.
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useful in crisis situations (e.g., limited probes, faits accomplis, tit-for-tat retali-
ation, and clarification of bottom lines). He describes them as mostly involving 
limited demonstrations of capability and will to capture the diplomatic initiative 
and create coercive pressure on the adversary to back down. He is careful to point 
out that conditions for successful intracrisis coercive diplomacy are quite limited, 
and that in the heat of a crisis nonrationality, information problems, and rapidly 
changing circumstances can lead to escalation.106 Indeed, a closer look at some 
PLA operational concepts suggests obvious areas of tension or friction between 
the principles of crisis management and how the Chinese military tends to think 
about the use of force.
Windows of Opportunity/Vulnerability Logic. There is some evidence that in ap-
plying force in the past, Chinese leaders have been particularly sensitive to the 
closing of windows of opportunity or the opening of windows of vulnerability. 
They believe that force, even when China is relatively weak, can be useful in shap-
ing the political environment early on, before political and military trends turn 
even more unfavorable (wan da bu ru zao da—“fighting later is not as good as 
fighting earlier”), in order to seize the initiative and emerge superior.107 There are 
too few cases in the post-Mao period to determine how much this thinking has 
persisted, but it would seem inconsistent with stabilizing a crisis situation.108
The Importance of “Creating Inexorable Momentum” (Zaoshi). Central in Chi-
nese concepts of deterrence signaling is the notion of inexorable momentum, 
whereby the adversary comes to perceive that unless it backs down China is cer-
tain to use decisive force.109 Instilling this perception appears to be mainly an 
exercise in signaling willingness and intent to escalate—in other words, that the 
adversary has lost its ability to deter. The risk here is that in a crisis over territorial 
disputes, for instance, once a threshold of violence—real or symbolic—has been 
crossed, escalation might be seen as a legitimate tool to force the other side to 
de-escalate. The PLA concept of “war control” (zhanzheng kongzhi) seems to cap-
ture this process of creating “inexorable momentum,” by which, through credible 
threats of escalation, the scope and duration of wars can be limited.110
In some PLA writing there seems to be a hierarchy of means for creating inex-
orable momentum. For instance, the latest version of the NDU’s Science of Strat-
egy lists eight methods of signaling (moving from least to most escalatory): public 
statements indicating a willingness to use force; raising of the level of weapons 
preparations; displays of strength through publicized exercises; redeployment of 
forces; raising of military alert levels; attacks on the adversary’s information sys-
tems (including cyber attacks); weapons tests and proactive disruption of the ad-
versary’s military movements; and limited attacks as warning signals.111 Actions 
at and above category five could be particularly escalatory in a crisis, since they 
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would likely be viewed as marking a very dramatic shift in operational restraint 
and official policy.112 Variants of this list of actions for creating momentum show 
up in other PLA writings on deterrence, including a classified study of nuclear 
campaign theory.113
Uncertainty as a Source of Crisis Stability (and Deterrence). In contrast to the 
principles of crisis management, some deterrence thinking in the PLA stresses 
the importance, initially at least, of a lack of clarity and transparency, on the 
ground that uncertainty induces caution in an adversary (thus the importance of 
“tricking” [qi di] and “confusing” the enemy [mi di] for deterrence purposes).114 
Even some PLA authors on crisis management who acknowledge the importance 
of clear signals also caution that this principle is not absolute. Rather, there are 
occasions in a crisis when deliberately ambiguous signals can be used to ascertain 
the other side’s bottom line.115 
Controlled Hard-Line Policies. Another tension with crisis-management prin-
ciples arises from the idea that the controlled escalation of force can enhance 
diplomatic leverage and resolve crises to one’s advantage. Indeed, some ana-
lysts believe China’s uses of force in past crises are examples of successful crisis 
management.116 As one author puts it, limited war—conveying that even higher 
costs could result if a crisis is not resolved—is a potential tool of crisis man-
agement.117 Other Chinese crisis-management experts note the positive role of 
military force for crisis prevention and crisis-management purposes. Yu Qiaohua 
argues, for example, that operationally, military blockades, quarantines, and ac-
tual attacks are all potentially useful tools within a crisis, as long as “limits” (du) 
are observed and the overall political purposes of crisis management guide their 
use.118 Use of such tools would be a case of “using crisis to respond to crisis” (yi 
weiji yingdui weiji).119 Wang Yong suggests that military preparations for war and 
displays or flaunting of military power can enhance deterrence and thus serve 
the purposes of crisis management. Deliberately fostering dissension and intra-
state conflicts on the other side to enhance one’s political influence in a crisis is 
also useful. In the diplomatic realm, Wang suggests, cutting off or suspending 
diplomatic ties and trying to isolate the other side can on occasion be helpful 
diplomatic tools.120 Chen Zhou, a major strategist at the Academy of Military 
Science (AMS) and the lead author of China’s National Defense White Papers, 
argues that under conditions of informatization, precision conventional weap-
ons can take on strategic deterrence roles that nuclear weapons had in the past. 
But conventional weapons cannot by their mere presence generate the fear in an 
adversary that nuclear weapons can. Thus, unlike with nuclear weapons, actual 
demonstrations of conventional weapons are needed to enhance their credibility 
as instruments of deterrence.121 
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To be sure, the use of limited military operations is treated cautiously by some 
crisis-management specialists. Yu Qiaohua himself admits that there are risks in 
using military force as a bargaining tool in a crisis: it can lock one into a chain 
or cycle of escalation.122 SIIS crisis-management experts argue that given asym-
metries in hard power, China cannot rely on military force as a first resort in 
Sino-U.S. crises, even on the Taiwan issue, where the balance of interests favors 
China.123 Still, these voices of caution highlight the arguments in favor of limited 
uses of force to compel the adversary to back down.
Network and Electronic Integrated Warfare. Computer-network operations and 
electronic warfare are of growing importance in PLA operational concepts. There 
are at least three reasons why Chinese computer-network operations might make 
it harder to contain crisis escalation. First, the centrality of computer-network 
operations in the early stages of a conflict (to confuse and misdirect the adver-
sary, disrupt command and control, and thereby seize the battlefield initiative) 
may lead the target of such operations to assume they presage a major escalation 
by the PLA.124 Given the importance for the PLA of controlling the initiative, evi-
dence of Chinese computer-network operations in a crisis might be interpreted 
by the target as a more aggressive act than warranted by the crisis itself. This in-
terpretation, in turn, will make controlling escalation more difficult. In the case 
of the United States especially, fears of attack on critical infrastructure, against a 
backdrop of substantial offensive computer-network capability and policy guid-
ance, might produce a large-scale offensive response. Second, the difficulty in 
identifying culprits (attribution) in some cases can have an added escalatory 
effect, because, given the apparent centrality of computer-network operations 
in China’s conventional operations, adversaries may assume that false-flag or 
third-party attacks are in fact Chinese. Finally, asymmetry between Chinese and 
American (in particular) levels of confidence in attribution may also be escala-
tory. Compared with many American cyber-warfare experts, PLA cyber special-
ists appear to believe attribution is very difficult. This may lead them to more-
risk-acceptant behavior in cyber, (overly) confident that operations will not be 
attributed to the PLA. Conversely, the United States may be more risk-acceptant 
in preemptive cyber attacks or cyber retaliation against China, confident that it 
has identified the source of attack.125 
PROBLEMS IN CRISIS DECISION MAKING AND RESPONSE
China’s experts in the field are, on the whole, quite critical of what they see as the 
deficiencies in China’s crisis-decision-making process. Their criticisms basically 
fall into two categories: first, top-level decision-making processes and institu-
tions, and second, military command and operations.
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Inefficient Decision-Making Procedures
Prior to the recent establishment of the Central National Security Committee 
in 2013 (about which more below), there was somewhat of a consensus among 
Chinese experts that China’s crisis-management decision-making system was 
inefficient and in need of a major overhaul. As NDU specialists bluntly put it, 
China lacked an up-to-date national-security structure that could effectively 
prevent or warn of threats or command and coordinate responses to them.126 The 
danger of slow decision making was that crises could not be nipped in the bud 
with political and diplomatic tools. There could be major negative consequences 
—the longer a crisis festered, for instance, the more likely “hegemonic major 
powers” (e.g., the United States) would intervene to China’s detriment.127
The problems started at the very top. It was widely recognized that the post-
Deng collective senior leadership slowed decision making by searching for 
consensus, whereas the system had been designed to allow a stronger leader to 
coordinate and enforce policy.128 
In 2000, in an effort to streamline national-security decision making, the party 
set up the National Security Leading Small Group (NSLSG), led by the party gen-
eral secretary and comprising representatives of major national-security-related 
bureaucracies. The NSLSG was set up with considerable hope that it might im-
prove information flows and break down interbureaucratic barriers. However, it 
proved a disappointment in practice, according to crisis-management experts. It 
lacked legal standing and clear lines of authority. It was too slow, and insufficient 
for cross-unit coordination.129 It tended to lack detailed plans and response rules. 
In any case, as Chinese critics point out, “leading small groups,” although they 
often exist for long periods, are by nature temporary responses to pressing prob-
lems. They are not designed to preserve lessons learned.130 
In principle, policy options for the NSLSG to consider were to have come 
from the Communist Party’s Foreign Affairs Office, the Foreign Ministry, the 
General Staff Department, and specialized agencies, depending on the issue (e.g., 
the Taiwan Affairs Office).131 But crisis-management experts complained that in 
practice these options were not sufficiently staffed—issues were sent to the top, 
but options were not, with the result that China’s leaders had to debate the issues 
at stake and determine the credibility of the information sent to them before 
determining and then choosing between options.132 
Furthermore, it appeared that even when a decision was made by the Politburo 
Standing Committee (PBSC), there was no coordination mechanism to mediate 
among bureaucratic or organization of interests and ensure implementation. In 
a traditional military crisis, three basic groupings need to work closely together: 
the State Council system (that is, the national government, through the For-
eign Ministry) handles foreign-policy aspects; the party-affairs system handles 
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organizational issues (through the party Secretariat), propaganda (Propaganda 
Department), and relations with external ruling political parties (International 
Liaison Department); and the CMC system handles military affairs (through the 
GSD).133 Horizontal coordination between these entities is very difficult without 
explicit direction from the PBSC. The CMC will not accept direction from the 
State Council on foreign or military policy. Other institutions as well have cross-
system authority, but their authority does not extend to the PLA. For instance, 
the powerful National Development and Reform Commission, being at only the 
ministerial level, can coordinate the State Oceanic Administration (in charge of 
China’s coast guard) but not the navy. The Foreign Ministry too is not authorita-
tive enough.134 Also, the party’s International Liaison Department is not decisive 
in general foreign policy; it weighs in only on specific issues (e.g., it appears to 
have had a leading role in relations with the DPRK). 
In short, there has been a clear tension between the need for quick decision 
making and the multiplicity of organizational interests involved.135 In the decade 
and a half after the NSLSG was set up, Chinese crisis-management experts, 
including military ones, complained that China still lacked a powerful and au-
thoritative crisis-management leadership hub that could effectively coordinate 
military and civilian elements within a clearly defined legal framework of re-
sponsibilities.136 As one PLA study put it, citing internal critics, whether in terms 
of composition or function the NSLSG system was unable effectively to “protect 
national interest, preserve national security.”137
In light of all these problems, over the years many Chinese experts in the field 
proposed various crisis-management decision-making mechanisms to replace or 
reform the NSLSG. For example, in its 2003 study cited above, CICIR suggested 
that an ideal system needs a small, powerful decision-making hub served by a 
crisis-management general-staff mechanism.138 Diverse voices would need to be 
heard in the process. Beneath this decision hub, there should be, CICIR argued, 
an implementing agency composed of all relevant departments (national security, 
police, fire, medical, health, transportation, etc.). A third structure would supply 
timely, accurate intelligence; this information system would also be responsible 
for domestic information management, so as to ensure social stability and pre-
vent the loss of domestic control, thus giving the decision-making hub more 
flexibility in a crisis.139 One gets the impression that these were lessons drawn by 
CICIR from China’s own management of past crises, not just foreign examples.
PLA crisis-management experts also made suggestions for institutional re-
form. In 2008, Yu Qiaohua proposed a crisis-management “decision mechanism” 
that would integrate decision making, implementation, propaganda, intelligence, 
and “feedback.” It would be high level, small, and cross-bureaucratic.140 Some 
of the most-detailed openly available proposals, however, came from NDU.141 
6886_Johnston_Lead.indd   52 12/9/15   1:47 PM
56
Naval War College Review, Vol. 69 [2016], No. 1, Art. 21
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol69/iss1/21
 J O H N S T O N  5 3
Among their core elements was that China should build a “National Security 
Committee” on the basis of the existing NSLSG.142 Its membership would be 
established in law and include the whole PBSC and the heads of the leading 
military, diplomatic, intelligence, and economic organs. This committee would 
design, prepare, and deploy a national security strategy. In crisis it would be 
in charge of decision making. It would be served by a specialized intelligence 
analysis unit to ensure the coordination of military (PLA) and state (Ministry 
of State Security) intelligence and to eliminate the stovepiping of information.143 
Within this committee would be a specialized “small group” with direct respon-
sibility for development and execution of crisis-management contingency plans. 
Subcommittees would be specifically tasked to manage security, domestic/social, 
economic, and information/cyber aspects of a crisis. Beneath them would be 
an advisory group of experts and specialists on particular relevant topics, duly 
authorized to provide advice.
Providing further assistance, under the various NDU proposals, would be 
organizations in functional departments. These would provide detailed con-
tingency plans and feedback to upper levels. In particular, they would focus on 
reducing frictions and inefficiencies in the military/civilian leadership systems, 
in the military/civilian intelligence integration process, and in the lines of admin-
istrative control over homeland and border or frontier security. 
In the last few years, in light of the failure of the NSLSG to become efficient in 
crisis-management decision making, some experts suggested that the best that 
could be hoped for was for the PBSC to pick one of its members as the recog-
nized coordinator and implementer of national security decisions, since (as noted 
above) no one below that level had authority to coordinate the State Council, 
party, and PLA. But these experts recognized that to grant such authority to one 
individual would likely run into two problems right from the start. First, it would 
imply a diminution of the authority of other members of the PBSC, who would 
be unlikely to accept any marginalization. Second, the PLA would be unlikely to 
accept any arrangement that could downgrade its status and access, through the 
CMC, to the top leader.144
I raise all this history as context for the decision in 2013 to set up the Central 
National Security Committee (CNSC), headed by the party general secretary and 
reporting to the PBSC. Reports about its composition, functioning, and scope are 
still quite vague, and as of this date the CNSC has not interacted as an institu-
tion with another country’s equivalent decision-making units. In contrast to the 
“leading small group” system, the CNSC is supposed to be permanent, though it 
is not yet an unambiguously legally established national or party institution. The 
CNSC handles both internal and external security issues. Much of the official 
commentary on the institution stresses its internal security role;145 nevertheless, 
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some Chinese analysts believe among its tasks will be external crisis manage-
ment.146 Indeed, initial reports suggest that its main functional units are bureaus 
for strategy, intelligence, and crisis management, as well as a comprehensive 
bureau and an expert advisory group—elements intriguingly similar to the NDU 
proposals.147 
It remains to be seen, however, whether the CNSC can reduce the tension be-
tween the need during crises for centralized decision making at the very top and 
the diversity of actors and interests involved. On the one hand, the CNSC explic-
itly places national-security 
policy decision making in the 
hands of the party’s general 
secretary, who outranks the 
leaders of all security insti-
tutions and organizations, 
including the PLA members 
of the CMC. Moreover, in 
principle it moves the day-to-day management of national security policy up 
from the party’s Foreign Affairs Office to its Central Office, the current head 
of which, Li Zhanshu, is a member of the Politburo and thus outranks the state 
councilor in charge of foreign affairs, Yang Jiechi. Li holds the same institutional 
rank as the leading PLA members of the CMC but formally works on behalf of 
the CNSC, which is headed by the general secretary.148 That association may give 
him a degree of authority over the military members of the CMC. 
On the other hand, it is unclear at this point how the new CNSC will actually 
function once it is fully operational. Its first meeting did not occur until April 
2014, too recently to allow judgments as to how efficient it will be in a high-
stakes, short-time-horizon dispute involving a real possibility of military esca-
lation (e.g., a military crisis over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands). The functional 
bureaus were supposed to be up and running by the end of 2014, but that date was 
apparently missed. For another thing, the CNSC appears to be composed of the 
same fifteen or sixteen institutions and interests that made up the old NSLSG—
the PLA, the Foreign Ministry, the security services, and the institutions handling 
Hong Kong and Taiwan issues and minority affairs, among others.149 It is unclear 
that Li Zhanshu or his successor as head of the General Office will be all that 
involved in external crises, even though they are closer to the top leader than the 
state councilor in charge of foreign affairs. Indeed, as of this date, the Foreign 
Affairs Office continues to function, and some Chinese interlocutors believe the 
state councilor in charge of foreign affairs will remain, for the foreseeable future, 
a key interlocutor with foreign countries during a crisis.
A deeply held belief that could affect crisis-
management practice is the claim that Chi-
na’s people, history, and current policies are 
uniquely peaceful and defensive, traits that are 
rooted in ancient political philosophy, such as 
Confucianism.
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Finally, there are some unanswered questions concerning how the committee 
will operate. One expert on crisis management from the National College of Ad-
ministration has cautioned that the new CNSC will have to resolve the following 
four issues.150 First, will it be mainly a decision-making body or a coordinating 
body designed to ensure smooth coordination among military, diplomatic, and 
other bureaucracies without replacing those institutions? Second, how will its 
responsibilities be bounded, given it is supposed to balance “internal affairs and 
external security”? (Xi Jinping has listed eleven types of security that would fall 
under the CNSC: political, homeland, military, economic, cultural, social, science 
and technology, information, ecological, resource, and nuclear. Presumably crises 
in all of these areas would be analyzed and managed by the CNSC.)151 Third, what 
is the constitutional and legal status of the CNSC? It is currently defined as both 
a leadership organ directly under the authority of the party center and a state in-
stitution.152 Its legal status affects its legitimacy and thus its effectiveness. Finally, 
will the CNSC have a sufficiently large, professional, and specialized staff to im-
prove the flow of information inputs and decision outputs, and reduce parochial 
conflicts between participating departments and organizations?
That these are all still open questions well after the party stood up the CNSC 
suggests that it is unclear whether the new committee will fully fix the problems 
in decision making identified by China’s crisis-management specialists. As of this 
writing (mid-2015), Chinese interlocutors consistently state that the CNSC is 
neither fully staffed nor functioning as a decision-making institution.
Command and Control Problems
Another question at the heart of military crisis management is how to employ 
the PLA to send clear signals and, if necessary, to respond to low-scale military 
challenges. Some Chinese specialists think that the nation’s options for using the 
PLA in a crisis are underdeveloped. They contend that it has engaged in purpose-
ful military signaling almost solely on the Taiwan issue, raising the likelihood 
that should Chinese leaders try in other crisis situations to use the PLA to send 
political signals these will not be read correctly.153 
Moreover, given the lack of experience among current Chinese leaders in 
coordinating diplomatic and military actions in crises, some Chinese experts 
believe that they may overreact to initial military moves by the other side. When 
Chinese leaders believe that a crisis is mainly diplomatic in nature, they may be 
reluctant initially to use the PLA for signaling purposes. This means that if other 
states resort to military means early on, in a crisis, even if only symbolically—for 
instance, shifting from “white-hull” (coast guard) to gray-hull (navy) assets—
Chinese decision makers may believe the situation has evolved more quickly than 
they had expected to a serious military crisis and respond by escalating. 
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Beginning around 2005, there seems to have been some attempt to puzzle 
through how military power can be used in crisis management in ways that 
balance restraint (and thus downward pressure on escalation) with effective co-
ercion to get the other side to exercise restraint itself. The PLA’s Wang Yong, for 
instance, taking a close look at U.S. behavior in military crises, isolated a number 
of ways in which military power could be used by political leaders in prevent-
ing, or acting during, a military crisis. These modes ranged from using aircraft 
carrier groups (as signals of interest in particular areas or issues) to isolating or 
quarantining adversaries.154
Restrained employment of military power in crises, however, requires system-
atized and institutionalized analysis and planning in order to produce a useful 
set of rules, procedures, and templates for civilian leaders.155 As noted earlier, in 
2006 the CMC approved the Overall Contingency Plans for the Military’s Handling 
of Sudden Incidents, which specifically identified five crisis-management tasks 
for the PLA, the first being the handling of military crises including border and 
territorial disputes.156 The PLA has also set up an Emergency Response Lead-
ing Small Group, supported by the GSD Operations Department’s Emergency 
Response Office and its twenty-four-hour emergency-response duty office. The 
GSD Emergency Response Office is responsible for coordinating PLA responses 
and when necessary coordinating with civilian units in all types of sudden inci-
dents, domestic and external. 
In addition, according to the 2006 Overall Contingency Plans, under certain 
circumstances division- and regiment-level commands could skip over the next-
higher echelon in reporting on a crisis. Similarly, higher-level commanders could 
skip intermediate echelons to control forces. The point would be to have as flat a 
command structure as possible. In a crisis concerning national sovereignty, the 
purpose of this flexibility would be to reduce the intervening command nodes 
and speed up the response.157
That said, PLA crisis-management specialists are concerned that the PLA 
command structure is still primarily designed to fight and win more-traditional 
wars rather than to handle limited border crises. They fear that the PLA still 
does not train or arm itself in sufficiently diverse ways to respond to the myriad 
new operational scenarios that fall within international military crisis manage-
ment (under the rubric of nonwar military actions). NDU experts, for instance, 
complain that the PLA has insufficient reconnaissance, early warning, and po-
sitioning capabilities to operate effectively in defense of maritime interests. Its 
personnel, they hold, need more political and psychological training to deal with 
large-scale terrorist attacks and informational uncertainty and rumor-mongering 
in complex political crises. It needs to revise fighting methods and its concepts 
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for a broad range of land and sea border crisis operations (e.g., how to blockade, 
intercept, deter, control, or defeat enemy actions).158
Moreover, according to these PLA analysts, traditional wartime command 
structures make it difficult in a crisis situation to coordinate with all the non-
PLA units and organizations that are often involved (e.g., the various central, 
provincial, and local ministries, government agencies, and armed units involved 
in, say, border security, such as the People’s Armed Police [PAP], the Public 
Security Bureau, and the people’s militia).159 Some PLA planners have wor-
ried, for instance, that the response time for getting soldiers to crisis areas is 
too long and that plans for physically setting up command posts to coordinate 
operations, communications, intelligence, logistics, and security in local areas 
are underdeveloped.160 
Indeed, in recent years, the PLA has investigated different types of command 
models for handling NWMA including border or frontier crises.161 One model 
would rely on a two-tiered command structure comprising a high(er)-level 
department’s emergency management office and the local area command most 
directly affected—that is, the “key point.” The key point command organ would 
have authority to command forces from different branches and incorporate 
personnel from units in charge of land-, ocean-, or air-frontier defense manage-
ment (presumably including nonmilitary groups). If the crisis were large enough 
to involve two or more war zones, the higher-level command authority would 
be national. If, in contrast, the crisis were contained within one war zone, the 
highest-level command authority would be the emergency management com-
mand office for that zone. 
Another model for crisis command—for contingencies crossing two or more 
military regions or war zones—would have three layers. At the top would be the 
national-command emergency management or crisis response organization. 
Below it would be a joint military-region–level emergency management or crisis 
organization. Below that would be the local joint-command structure, compris-
ing PLA, PAP, and land-, ocean-, or air-frontier defenses.
Under either model, first-line forces would need to have clear functions, rules, 
and legal support so they can respond as quickly as possible. Command groups 
dispatched to the scene of the crisis would also need more autonomy than they 
currently have.162
Contingency Planning Problems
Regardless of level of command or how many layers of command there are, PLA 
specialists suggest that the emergency-response or crisis-management command 
organization at each level should fulfill a range of functions, foremost being 
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planning crisis contingencies.163 These contingency plans would range from 
overall contingency plans for border/frontier crises (for the national military 
leadership, the military region and branch headquarters, and corps-level units) 
all the way to localized plans distributed to units at the corps, division, brigade, 
regiment, battalion, and company levels.
PLA crisis-management analysts envision contingency plans for three types of 
responses or operations (see figure 5).164 The first is dealing with “armed intrusions 
and infiltration” by the enemy. Here, according to PLA writings, military crisis- 
management plans should focus on operations for interception, ambush, en-
circlement, and pursuit; confrontation and expulsion; and prevention of enemy 
landing, control of key points, cutting off of the enemy’s retreat routes, and sur-
rounding and elimination of the enemy. There should be limits, however, PLA 
analysts believe, to these kinds of operations. In all such cases, command has 
to pay special attention to the political implications of operations within and 
beyond China’s boundaries. For instance, if an enemy aircraft infiltrates Chinese 
airspace, it is better that it be shot down within the borders than just outside. Once 
the enemy plane is between China’s boundary and the high seas, pursuit and at-
tack should cease. Otherwise, should the enemy plane crash outside the border, 
diplomatic image problems could be created that put China in a more passive or 
defensive political position. 
In the case of foreign military forces operating in disputed areas where China’s 
control is weak and the foreign country is “nibbling” (canshi) away at Chinese ter-
ritory, the response should be to use bilateral channels to communicate China’s 
position, to engage in active military actions designed to deter further expan-
sion, and if necessary to use force to expel the enemy from the disputed territory. 
This might involve directly confronting enemy forces, mounting surprise flank 
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attacks, cutting off routes of retreat, retaking small but easily defended parts of 
disputed territory, cutting off enemy supplies, or grabbing a high-profile piece of 
territory to shock and awe (in U.S. parlance) the adversary. The goal is to stop the 
enemy from occupying territory and yet limit escalation.165 In this scenario, the 
PLA’s actions, its own analysts insist, should be strictly subordinated to higher-
level orders and to the overall border-defense policy.166
A second type of operation might involve responding to “armed harassment.” 
Here the key points of operations are gathering intelligence, warning of an attack, 
laying ambushes, attacking, blocking, and pursuing. The principle guiding the 
response should be, “Use firepower to strike; thoroughly eliminate.”167
A third type envisions sealing off or blocking access to the border. According 
to PLA research on crisis operations, relevant scenarios might include refugees 
fleeing domestic turmoil and trying to cross China’s border (e.g., a DPRK collapse 
scenario); terrorists, ethnic separatists, or religious extremists on both sides of 
the border trying to coordinate actions; or foreign “enemy forces” trying to enter 
the country to engage in provocations. The situation most likely to require careful 
coordination of diplomatic and military actions, however, would be an influx of 
refugees from neighboring countries, such as the DPRK. Here, according to PLA 
writing, the first goal would be to deter refugees from crossing the border, ideally 
putting them in camps on their home country’s territory. If this were not possible, 
China would set up camps just inside its border, well separated from local popu-
lations. The response would require a clear division of responsibilities between 
the people’s militia, the police, the PAP, and PLA units, all under the command 
of military region–level PLA staff but, owing to the political and diplomatic sen-
sitivity of such a crisis, under the guidance of the national command authority 
(tongshuai bu). Should there be among the refugees foreign military and political 
officials fleeing persecution or hoping to reorganize once in China, the command 
authorities would identify and disarm them, separate them from regular refugees, 
cut them off from any contact with forces inside their home country, and wait 
for higher-level political instructions. If these military and political officials were 
allowed into China, they would be put in isolated supervision and control zones 
(jianguan qu), in part to prevent foreign forces (such as from the United States) 
from trying to extricate or eliminate them.168 
It is unclear how far the PLA has gone in choosing among and implementing 
these various options for command models, contingency plans, and operational 
procedures. The material cited here on handling border crises suggests, however, 
that such planning is certainly under way, as the sources go into considerable 
detail, down to the tactical level, about how to handle foreign forces “nibbling” 
at Chinese territory (e.g., India and various maritime claimants), refugees and 
retreating military remnant forces (e.g., from a collapsed DPRK), or terrorists 
6886_Johnston_Lead.indd   59 12/9/15   1:47 PM
63
War College: Winter 2016 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2016
 6 0  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
and ethno-religious separatists trying to cross the border (such as into Xinjiang 
or Tibet).169
Chinese theorizing about international crisis management has evolved relatively 
quickly within the last two decades. It is well grounded in key military (CFISS, 
NDU, AMS, GLD) and civilian intelligence (CICIR) institutions. It accepts many 
principles first developed by 
American specialists. In addi-
tion, within the last ten years, 
both civilian and military 
decision makers appear to 
have been wrestling with how 
to set up decision-making mechanisms, planning procedures, and institutions 
for operational coordination and control in a crisis. Crisis-management experts 
have leveled considerable criticism at the structural (and ideational) obstacles 
to efficient decision making, including a top-level decision process that is slow 
and generally not especially well staffed or supported by an interagency policy 
process. 
That said, there is considerable tension between crisis-management princi-
ples, on the one hand, and some basic principles and orientations behind China’s 
security decision making and military operations, on the other. These tensions 
should not be surprising, and not all are unique to the China case: crisis manage-
ment does challenge, to some degree, traditional military operational thinking. 
It is likely that most militaries and national-security decision makers face similar 
tensions and contradictions. Crisis management requires willingness to settle for 
less-than-ideal outcomes. It requires restraint on issues that entail, by the defini-
tion of a crisis, high stakes. It requires very strict civilian oversight and control 
to ensure that military operational preferences do not undermine political goals. 
It requires a mind-set that is empathetic toward the concerns of the other side, 
and it requires decision-making procedures that ensure careful study of the other 
side’s interests.170 Related to empathy are institutionalized, high-level, protected 
channels of communication between political leaders and between military op-
erators of the two sides. 
China’s crisis-management experts understand all these requirements and 
have often advocated them in their writings.171 The key will be whether top ci-
vilian and military leaders can be convinced to incorporate crisis-management 
principles and mechanisms into a leaner and more efficient civilian national 
security decision-making system and whether that system can minimize the 
impact of parochial military and paramilitary interests, intra-elite political com-
petition, the ideology of territoriality, and Chinese exceptionalism. In this regard, 
The traditional wartime command structures 
make it difficult in a crisis situation to coordi-
nate with all the non-PLA units and organiza-
tions that are often involved.
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if crisis-management dialogues and mechanisms were given a more central and 
standard place in official U.S.-China military-to-military and political interac-
tions, it is possible that the ideas of China’s crisis-management experts would 
generate more attention at the top political levels in China. As a first step, China 
and its various interlocutors—the United States, Japan, the Philippines, and Viet-
nam—need to dialogue bilaterally at the track I (that is, formal and official) level 
about internal mechanisms and exercises, by which each side might discern more 
clearly the other’s redlines. They need further to engage each other about ways of 
institutionalizing rapid and transparent cross-national communications between 
the relevant military commands (e.g., U.S. Pacific Command and the General 
Staff Department’s Operations Department) and between political leaders (e.g., 
regularly exercised and used communication channels between the U.S. national 
security adviser and China’s equivalent). Finally, they must address the training 
and procedures needed to enable political leaders to understand clearly, and thus 
control, their respective militaries’ operational plans and rules of engagement.
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 Much has been written about the challenges posed by the Chinese adoption of what the U�S� military calls “A2/AD” (antiaccess/area-denial) in the 
western Pacific� Accordingly, the Pacific remains a key focus area for the U�S� 
Navy and Air Force, and more recently the Army, with the Navy promising to 
put 60 percent of its forces in that theater as part of the “Pacific pivot�” Yet as 
focus remains on the Pacific, the rest of the world is not standing still� This is 
exemplified in the eastern Mediterranean, where the Russians have begun laying 
the seeds to create an A2/AD zone in the region against the United States and its 
allies� If fully realized, an A2/AD envelope would put Western access to the Suez 
Canal, the Black Sea, and the resource-rich eastern Mediterranean at the mercy 
of an increasingly aggressive Russian regime�
LAYING THE SEEDS
Three interrelated elements make the development of an A2/AD zone in the 
eastern Mediterranean possible for the Russians� The first of these is the pros-
pect of a credible, present military force, which in this case would most likely 
be provided by forward deployments from the Russian Black Sea Fleet� Armed 
with three (six by later this year) new, enhanced Kilo-class diesel-electric sub-
marines, eleven thousand marines, and a surface 
contingent of forty-two ships as of 2014, the Rus-
sian Black Sea Fleet is certainly one of the most 
capable maritime forces in the region�1 In con-
trast, the U�S� Sixth Fleet has a single command 
ship and four destroyers (DDGs) permanently 
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RUSSIAN A2/AD IN THE EASTERN
MEDITERRANEAN
assigned to it as of 2015, and those DDGs are based at the other end of the Medi-
terranean, in Spain, with only occasional rotational presence from ships pass-
ing through its area of regard on the way to or back from the Middle East. 
Although the United States does have regional allies with credible maritime 
combat power, the Russians are working to drive wedges into these relationships 
—which, not coincidentally, is the second pillar of Russia’s regional strategy.
The Russian effort to decouple long-standing allies such as Greece, Turkey, 
and Egypt (and perhaps even Italy) from political and military alignment with the 
United States has been helped by U.S. policy choices as well as favorable circum-
stances the Russians can exploit.2 The case of Greece began with the formation 
of a coalition government, since reelected, comprised of far-left and right-wing 
parties that are deeply resentful of the European Union and its American allies.3 
This government is committed to breaking out of the fiscal austerity “straitjacket” 
imposed as terms for European Union loans, and is ideologically aligned with 
Russian “Eurasianist” geopolitical theory.4 This state of affairs has opened new 
opportunities for extending Russian influence, and the Russians have waded into 
this fray, supporting the Greek government politically, and publicly entertaining 
the possibility of assisting Greece with its debt issues.5 Greco-Russian relations 
have, not surprisingly, warmed considerably. 
In the case of Turkey, Russia has taken advantage of a decadelong trend by the 
Erdogan government away from democracy toward authoritarianism.6 As the 
West has criticized President Recep Tayyip Erdogan for imprisoning journalists, 
fabricating charges against political opponents, and repressing civil dissent, the 
Russians have remained supportive, to the point that Erdogan has praised Putin 
directly.7 This is not to say that areas of disagreement do not exist between these 
two nations, especially over policies with respect to Syria. Nevertheless, amid these 
disputes the Turks continue to promote a narrative of cooperation in other areas.8
The other Russian charm offensive in the region has been focused on Egypt. 
Faced with a virulent insurgency in the Sinai, and a U.S. administration that 
until recently was withholding military aid as punishment for the suspension of 
democracy, Egypt’s repressive military junta has instead turned toward the Rus-
sians for military equipment procurement for the first time since the mid–Cold 
War.9 The result of these actions has been increased goodwill for Russia from 
three countries that control choke-point access to and freedom of maneuver 
within the eastern Mediterranean, not to mention use of the eastern Mediter-
ranean to access the Black and Red Seas. Neutrality (or even a delay, if the crisis 
were fast developing) in contributing formal support to the United States by these 
countries could pose a major challenge to U.S. strategy in the event of a Russian-
American crisis or conflict.
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With access for Russia’s credible maritime combat power vastly improved, the 
final aspect of Russian regional strategy is to secure and expand basing agree-
ments� Limited by geography, the Russians have no port on the Mediterranean; 
any warships they might want to put in the region would likely come via the Black 
Sea (although assets could be deployed from their other fleets, assuming they 
could pass through Gibraltar or Suez)� Even though Turkey may be more cordial 
with Russia now than in the past, forward-basing agreements hedge against a risk 
of change in the political winds in Ankara that could bottle up the Black Sea Fleet� 
Additionally, forward basing allows a navy to keep more assets in theater without 
increasing fleet size, multiplying the impact of a smaller force� 
The Russians’ approach to expanding regional forward basing is simple: start 
with what already exists, then grow selectively, as permitted by relationships and 
favorable geography� Today, Russia’s only naval base outside the former Soviet 
Union is in Tartus, Syria, on the shore of the eastern Mediterranean� As the ad-
vance of anti-Assad rebels has increasingly pressured the Syrian regime, Russia 
has doubled down on both political and military support to the regime� Politi-
cally, Russia has provided a friendly voice at the United Nations to the otherwise-
pariah Assad government, and has worked within the United Nations and other 
international forums to blunt policies that could harm Assad�10 Militarily, Russia 
has since September of 2015 begun to commit regular military forces in support 
of the Syrian government, including ground-attack fixed- and rotary-wing air-
craft, naval vessels, and Russian marine infantry�11 However the Syrian civil war 
might turn out, it is clear that Russia is willing to invest to preserve its regional 
allies (and bases)� Lastly, the Cypriots, long prone to Russian sympathies, recently 
agreed to an expansion of Russian port calls, and even potentially an air base�12 
This could provide the Russians an additional strategic location to use in the 
region beyond Syria� 
BUILDING AN EFFECTIVE ENVELOPE
According to the Defense Intelligence Agency, the presence of Yakhont antiship 
cruise missiles (ASCMs) in Syria alone has been enough to create a surface naval 
A2/AD zone in the northeastern corner of the Mediterranean�13 Furthermore, 
rolling the three previously discussed aspects of Russian strategy together, it be-
comes clear how an expanded eastern Mediterranean A2/AD envelope could be 
established in the very near future� As Mahan famously wrote, the land features 
of a region can play a large role in determining maritime influence and access�14 
As part of its intervention in support of the Syrian government, Russia has es-
tablished a new air base in western Syria, giving it a second operating location 
in Syria beyond its naval station at Tartus�15 Russia has already deployed tacti-
cal aircraft and strategic airlift to its new air base, putting in place a key pillar 
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for any future establishment of an A2/AD envelope� In such a scenario, tactical 
aircraft would function as one part of the system, performing air interdiction, 
land attack, and potentially antiship attack of U�S� or NATO forces attempting 
to operate within the A2/AD zone� The preexisting deployment of land-based, 
Russian-supplied Yakhont ASCMs in Syria provides an additional boon to the 
area-denial aspect of Russia’s approach, which could be augmented by further 
sales or deployments of Russian forces equipped with ASCMs to other friendly 
countries�16 Additionally, Russia has deployed a number of unmanned aircraft to 
provide targeting information to its forces in Syria; many of these systems could 
be extendable to intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) operations 
within Syria’s periphery�17 Competent ISR is a major pillar of effective A2/AD 
operations, as these systems are essential for cueing attacks by other forces such 
as aircraft, ships, or land-based missile batteries against over-the-horizon (OTH) 
targets� Information gathered by these systems can be meshed with that from 
overhead imagery (which does not need a forward operating base) to increase 
overall targeting effectiveness� 
While the Russians have deployed many of the asset types needed for effec-
tive A2/AD in the eastern Mediterranean, they have not yet deployed other key 
A2/AD capabilities� One example is the failure to deploy advanced mobile long-
range surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) alongside existing Russian Yakhonts, tacti-
cal aircraft, and ISR assets in Syria, or perhaps to deploy such SAMs in notional 
locations in Cyprus� Much has been written about the capabilities of Russian 
“triple digit” SAMs, both the in-service S-300s and S-400s as well as the develop-
mental S-500� S-500s will have up to a 600 km antiair range, according to some 
Russian sources—enough to blanket the region from Crete east, assuming they 
are based in Cyprus (the same sources cite the S-400’s range as 400 km, with 
newer variants of the earlier S-300 at a more modest 200 km)�18 The Russians 
may also seek to adapt these systems to enable integration aboard surface ships 
beyond the existing S-300FM integration in Russian cruisers, further increasing 
SAM deployment flexibility�19 Advanced SAMs such as these would significantly 
improve Russian A2/AD capability in the region by enabling wide-area and 
highly responsive antiair coverage while simultaneously decreasing the demands 
on Russian fighters to maintain combat air patrols� 
To increase further the effectiveness of their targeting, the Russians could also 
consider deploying land-based OTH targeting (OTHT) assets in the region, most 
likely at one of their Syrian bases for those systems that require a fixed location� 
Examples of such OTHT systems could include signals intelligence collection 
sites and OTH surface-wave radars, both of which would increase Russian situ-
ational awareness� OTHT would moreover, by definition, increase Russian detec-
tion ranges, and could be interlinked with other ISR assets to form an integrated, 
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highly capable detection system� A Russian deployment of Black Sea–based 
Kilo-class submarines to the region would insert a further threat into the under-
sea domain at a time when more advanced but already overtasked U�S� nuclear 
submarines continue to decline within the force structure�20 If Russia could rely 
on Iranian irregular troops or proxies such as Hezbollah to provide material 
support for the imposition of an A2/AD zone—for instance, by assisting with lo-
cal ground defense and security in areas where such systems are deployed—the 
strength of the zone would be amplified� The degree to which U�S� and allied 
(especially Israeli, given the country’s proximity) surface and air access in the 
eastern Mediterranean would be imperiled by any single one of the potential 
deployments discussed, and especially by combinations of them, should be clear� 
Taking into account the technological and tactical considerations of the previ-
ous paragraphs, what else would the Russians need to do to establish formally an 
effective, militarily relevant A2/AD zone in the eastern Mediterranean? The first 
and most important action would be to attempt to ensure Turkish noninterfer-
ence (Greek and Egyptian noninterference would be desirable too, but much less 
important comparatively)� As touched on already, since Turkey controls access 
from Russian Black Sea ports to the eastern Mediterranean, Turkish noninterfer-
ence greatly simplifies the imposition of an A2/AD envelope� So long as Turkey 
allows Russian vessels to pass into the Mediterranean, resupply of forward Rus-
sian forces would be uncomplicated; reinforcements could flow in unabated as 
needed� To support this outcome, Russia might use its newly deployed forces in 
Syria plus its preexisting forces in the Black Sea and south Caucasus regions, or 
perhaps the threat of closer Russian political cooperation with Greece, to coerce 
Turkish passivity in the event of a Russian threat against other NATO allies� 
While Russian establishment of an eastern Mediterranean A2/AD zone could 
still work even if a neutral Turkey closed passages from the Black Sea to the Medi-
terranean during or surrounding a conflict, an openly hostile Turkey would almost 
certainly negate Russian plans�21 In that eventuality, any Russian forces in theater 
would be subject to a rear-column threat from a capable Turkish navy (along 
with land-based aircraft), and Russian bases would be threatened by Turkish 
offensive capabilities� Accordingly, for a Russian eastern Mediterranean A2/AD 
envelope to be feasible, at the very least Turkey must not actively oppose it with 
military force� 
In the event a neutral Turkey did seal access to the Mediterranean, one work-
around could be the use of an air bridge to resupply forward forces by ferrying 
supplies from Russia through Iran and Iraq into the region� Russia has already 
pursued this approach to deploy its forces in Syria when American allies did 
not permit Russian overflight of their territory�22 However, less matériel can be 
supplied via air than by sea, and the resultant volume might not be adequate to 
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maintain sufficient forces in theater over a longer period of tension or conflict� 
In such a case, Russia could also attempt to move matériel overland along the 
same route as the air bridge, although it is unclear whether the transportation 
infrastructure exists to support such logistical volume� Nor is it clear whether 
Iraq would grant such access� 
Beyond securing Turkish nonhostility, the next action needed to increase the 
chance of success in this endeavor is the prepositioning of forces and supplies in 
the region—which the Russians seem to be doing in Syria today, and may con-
sider in the future elsewhere, such as in Cyprus� There are many ways this could 
be accomplished in countries such as Cyprus, where the Russians lack a perma-
nent base, whether through announced “rotational” basing agreements or simply 
secretly stockpiling hardware with tacit Cypriot acceptance (perhaps in exchange 
for a favor, such as a generous loan or a discount on Russian oil)� However it 
is accomplished, having sufficient combat power and supplies in theater when 
a conflict starts would confer significant advantage on Russian forces by both 
eliminating the time needed to concentrate combat power and providing forward 
forces with several days, if not weeks, of warfighting supplies, regardless of other 
operational considerations (for instance, if Turkey closed the straits to nations 
involved in the dispute while remaining neutral)� The Russians could augment 
combat power further, assuming they knew when the conflict would start (not 
an unreasonable suspicion, given recent events in Ukraine), by staging a training 
exercise to concentrate additional forces in the area before the conflict began, as 
they did against Georgia in 2008�23 Using an approach like this, the Russians may 
be able to present the establishment of an effective A2/AD zone as a fait accompli 
by the time a recognized conflict has emerged� 
If the Russians wanted to delay further a potential response in a crisis scenario, 
they could couple their establishment of an A2/AD zone with limited strikes on 
select hostile forces in theater (perhaps after some nominal period during which 
any forces would be allowed to flee—ideally designed to be too short to allow all 
hostile assets to leave) to solidify their credibility and force any opponents to fight 
their way into the A2/AD zone with forces brought in from other theaters� While 
this approach would be very likely to ensure a response from the nations whose 
assets were attacked, and would necessitate openly admitting their involvement 
(in contrast to their recent Ukraine interventions), the Russians may be willing to 
gamble that the delays and confusion caused by these strikes (especially if com-
bined with their recent diplomatic charm offensive in the region) would ultimate-
ly undermine the political will of some NATO, or other potentially NATO-allied, 
nations to respond� The goal of such an attack would be to raise the level of com-
mitment needed to respond and to dissuade other nations, especially those whose 
forces were not attacked (and who therefore might not yet be militarily involved), 
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from joining the effort. The more this line of thinking permeates among potential 
responding nations, the less potent a response the Russians would likely receive. 
Nevertheless, limited opening strikes like these are more of a consideration than 
an outright requirement for success.
PUTTING THE SCHEME TO WORK 
Assuming the Russians have at least some capability to establish an A2/AD zone 
in the eastern Mediterranean, it provides numerous geopolitical advantages. 
From a peacetime perspective, once local actors believe the Russians have a 
capability to establish an A2/AD zone at will, Russian influence in the region 
will increase further. While not all nations in the eastern Mediterranean are 
ideologically aligned with the Russian worldview, they will need to acknowledge 
that such a Russian ability—to deny other nations’ forces entry into and freedom 
of maneuver within the region—makes cordial relations with Russia essential. 
Accordingly, analysts should expect neutral countries or even nominal oppo-
nents of Russian interests (such as Jordan, Israel, and Bulgaria) to refrain from 
criticizing Russian actions on the whole, and to take a more deferential approach 
to bilateral relations as this reality materializes. Nations already leaning toward 
the Russian orbit may not only highlight their ties with Russia more openly but 
seek to deepen them. Over time, this will turn Russian power in the region into a 
norm—at the expense of U.S. and Western European influence, much in the same 
way that U.S. commitment of resources and combat power kept parts of Europe 
(Italy and Greece are prime examples) from succumbing to Soviet influence fol-
lowing the Second World War. 
To take this argument further and expand its time horizon, the combination 
of eastern Mediterranean pressure and aggressive Russian political messaging 
and military posturing both in Central Europe and in the Baltics could play into 
a larger effort to erode NATO.24 Assuming that southern Europe remains NATO’s 
“weak flank,” a long-term campaign to keep southern European nations from 
supporting diplomatic or other efforts to counter Russia’s goals out of fear of Rus-
sian power or desire for Russian friendship would erode NATO’s credibility, if not 
also its combat effectiveness. This could feasibly be part of a longer-term plan to 
break the alliance, as the more NATO seems unable to maintain the internal co-
hesion necessary to confront challenges, the less credible it becomes. This incre-
mental approach fits with recent Russian actions in Crimea and eastern Ukraine, 
whereby Russia slowly ratcheted up its aggression (combined with extensive mis-
information) to achieve a fait accompli before it could be effectively challenged.
If some sort of confrontation were to occur, the ability to establish, or even 
to threaten plausibly to establish, an eastern Mediterranean A2/AD zone could 
confer distinct warfighting advantages as well. Consider if the Russian aim in a 
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campaign were to reclaim some part of the Baltics� To slow NATO’s ability to re-
spond to such a provocation, the Russians could use their SAM capabilities to de-
clare a no-fly zone in the eastern Mediterranean, and declare military aircraft of 
any NATO or NATO-supporting nations to be legitimate targets� The most likely 
reaction to this threat by those nations close by would be to seek support imme-
diately from NATO, which would distract from a response elsewhere� The mere 
confusion caused by such a move could delay NATO action long enough to allow 
the Russians to create a fait accompli in the Baltics� Once they are entrenched, the 
prospect of forcibly evicting Russian forces from the Baltics becomes much more 
daunting, and many NATO nations would likely not have the domestic political 
support necessary for a potentially large campaign� 
Of course, the “second front” approach described here could also be used in 
ways less focused on warfighting, such as to break the resolve of regional NATO 
nations to continue resisting Russian policies� As an example, Russia could es-
tablish an air-defense identification or maritime exclusion zone in the region 
and claim that such an action was needed to “prevent the delivery of weapons to 
terrorists threatening the Syrian people�” In the case of an air-defense identifica-
tion zone, any aircraft could be denied this airspace if its leadership were work-
ing against Russian aims (by supporting sanctions, opposing the Assad govern-
ment, etc�), and diverting aircraft around it consistently could be expensive and 
time-consuming� The Russians could similarly take this campaign to the seas by 
insisting that any vessel with a NATO flag passing through the area be subject 
to additional searches� These searches could be imposed concurrently with the 
“preventative” no-fly zone described above for added effect� For those NATO na-
tions that seemingly are removed from the threat of Russian confrontation except 
with respect to a NATO Article 5 breach, it could become tempting to relieve 
themselves of these headaches by acceding to Russian influence�
COUNTERING RUSSIAN PLANS
Fortunately, there are options available to mitigate the risks of such an outcome� 
Starting at the geopolitical level, the most straightforward counter to the Russian 
establishment of an eastern Mediterranean A2/AD zone would be to break the 
nascent bond between Russia and Turkey�25 For reasons already described, an 
openly hostile Turkey would prove a fatal bar to Russian aspirations� Practically 
speaking, there are a number of pressure points that could be leveraged by Amer-
ican policy makers seeking to fracture the Russian-Turkish relationship� Perhaps 
most immediately, the conflict in Syria provides an opening� While the Russians 
continue to support the Assad government against all rebel forces, including 
through active aerial bombardment, Turkey remains fundamentally opposed to 
Assad’s continued presence and provides support to some of those same forces 
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seeking to overthrow him�26 This discord could be highlighted to increase domes-
tic pressure on President Erdogan to back off from supporting Russia� American 
officials could also consider more robustly supporting some Turkish-backed 
Syrian rebel groups to gain a more favorable perception from Erdogan� There are 
additional avenues that could be pursued to undermine Russian-Turkish bilateral 
relations as well, such as publicizing past historical enmity or Russia’s harsh treat-
ment of Muslims in its Caucasus region� 
Another nonmilitary option for countering Russian plans can be found in 
defense policy� Specifically, NATO nations could individually, in groups, or pref-
erably as one voice issue a strong statement of maritime declaratory policy with 
respect to Russian expansionism in the eastern Mediterranean� Such a statement 
would aim to show the Russians that the alliance is united in opposition to the 
Russian threat and that Russian moves are not going unnoticed� Of course, to be 
effective—to avoid being seen as hollow—this statement would need to be sup-
ported by military demonstrations� One such example could be the announce-
ment and visible media coverage of a NATO-wide war game in the Mediterra-
nean in which the alliance would practice its abilities to cooperatively respond 
to regional A2/AD challenges� The effect of this war game would be amplified if 
NATO forces were seen to be often practicing, as part of their normal routines, the 
planning and joint naval exercises needed to operate in an A2/AD environment�
Beyond geopolitical and defense-policy solutions, there are three broad, 
Navy-focused options that could be pursued� The first but least desirable of these 
would be transferring forces from other theaters to increase U�S� Navy (and by 
consequence NATO) capability in the eastern Mediterranean� The issues in the 
eastern Mediterranean are fundamentally a symptom of a U�S� Navy that is un-
dersized for the global tasks assigned to it and a NATO maritime force that no 
longer provides sufficient deterrent effect� To redeploy existing U�S� forces to the 
Mediterranean would merely exacerbate these symptoms in another part of the 
world� A second option—which from a navalist’s perspective is the most desir-
able, but simultaneously the most politically challenging—is to grow the size of 
the U�S� Navy� During the Cold War, carrier and amphibious group deployments 
to the eastern Mediterranean were routine, assuring U�S� allies of our commit-
ment to their defense while deterring potential Soviet aggression� By contrast, the 
Navy’s current supply of day-to-day deterrence through credible combat power 
and presence is far outstripped by worldwide demand� 
Acknowledging this issue, and taking the current fiscal-policy conflict be-
tween Congress and the administration into account, expanding the credibility 
and relevance of regional NATO forces may be the quickest and most feasible 
way to push back against the Russian A2/AD threat� There are two reinforcing 
actions that could be taken in this area, starting with reinvigorating Standing 
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NATO Maritime Groups� Currently NATO operates two Standing Maritime 
Groups, although between them both only seven ships are combatants (and three 
of those are recent augmentations above normal force structure)�27 Given that 
no allied submarines and only a handful of helicopters are included within the 
groups combined, this force is highly vulnerable to Russian submarine attack or 
coercion� This could be addressed by augmenting the standing group assigned 
to the Mediterranean with allied undersea forces� Furthermore, the allocation 
of dedicated land-based airpower and additional surface combatants to NATO 
maritime forces would increase their credibility in the region� To be maximally 
effective, these reinvigorated standing groups should ensure their proficiency 
in key training and warfare areas critical to defeating A2/AD networks� This 
should include fielding advanced electronic warfare (EW) capabilities and train-
ing personnel to employ countersurveillance techniques that can together defeat 
any OTHT systems supporting Syria-based Yakhonts or potentially other ASCM 
threats� Other areas of emphasis could include increased focus on antisubmarine 
warfare (ASW) techniques and amphibious raid support (to deal with potential 
inland Russian SAM threats)� Additionally, standing groups have the deterrent 
benefit of tying nations together, as an attack on the group would affect at least 
a half-dozen different countries� To add further effect, NATO leadership should 
work to ensure Greek and Turkish participation (although perhaps not concur-
rently, for historical reasons) in a Mediterranean Standing Maritime Group and 
cycle it through the eastern Mediterranean regularly, if not base it there�
The second action that would help to increase the credibility and relevance of 
regional NATO forces is to focus future acquisitions on capabilities that either 
fill current operational gaps or enable deployment of systems most likely to 
deter Russian aggression�28 Given previous coverage of Russian strengths in the 
region, one obvious area for technological improvement is ASW� Besides new 
Italian-variant European multipurpose frigates, or FREMMs, no other regional 
navy deploys ASW missiles or rockets (and even the FREMMs only have four 
per ship)�29 This oversight should be rectified in future surface-ship acquisitions, 
and an evaluation of the ability to backfit this capability onto current platforms 
should be undertaken� Similarly, a renewed commitment to ASW would be rein-
forced by consistently designing NATO and NATO allies’ surface ships intended 
to perform an ASW mission with a double hangar for ASW helicopters, which 
greatly increases their effectiveness over those with a single one�30 This is all the 
more critical given that, due to the aforementioned general lack of ASW missiles 
or rockets, most NATO navies can only attack enemy submarines organically 
through the use of a helicopter�
Another area where smarter procurements could fill an operational gap is 
EW� If NATO maritime forces are to operate credibly against the described 
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Russian A2/AD envelope, they will need to overcome potential threats from both 
land- and sea-based ASCMs� Having more sophisticated EW suites on board 
(preferably at or near the level of U�S� Navy capability) will make regional NATO 
maritime forces more survivable, and complicate holding them at risk� Prioritiz-
ing investments in unmanned systems (air, surface, and subsea) is another area 
to consider� Unmanned aerial systems, for instance, could help with a number 
of issues that current NATO maritime forces face, from improving communica-
tions resiliency in a denied environment (through line-of-sight linkages using 
unmanned aerial vehicles to pass data between platforms), to OTH targeting and 
sensing�31 Improved sensing would also be augmented by incorporating more 
unmanned undersea systems, which could help detect enemy submarines or 
perform reconnaissance of surface-denied areas� 
As a final consideration, doing more to integrate U�S� and NATO naval tacti-
cal data networks could pay large dividends from a warfighting perspective� This 
might include expanded testing efforts to ensure that developmental datalink 
management and naval combat system baselines across the alliance are interoper-
able and that defects are identified and corrected early� This might also include 
instituting more-efficient approaches to electronically “sanitizing” situational 
information originating from allies’ respective higher-classification resources to 
help facilitate a common force-level “picture�” This would allow ships of differ-
ent navies to pass tactical information back and forth easily, greatly improving 
each individual platform’s operating picture, and consequently the whole force’s 
as well� Closer integration of allies’ respective tactical data networks would also 
enable a more robust sensor picture that could be used for distributed fire control 
(i�e�, one platform fires weapons using sensor data provided by another platform) 
and more-efficient air defense (assuming a common set of rules of engagement 
could be agreed on and the requisite cooperative technical efforts were pursued)� 
However, given the information-assurance issues that could come with linking 
U�S� networks to those of another nation, the potential risks of such an approach 
and possible technical approaches to mitigating them should be well understood 
before pursuing this course�
Whatever course of action the United States and NATO ultimately pursue, it 
is important for policy makers and strategists alike to recognize the serious stra-
tegic implications of a Russian A2/AD envelope in the eastern Mediterranean� 
Such an envelope would present grave challenges to U�S� influence in the region 
and would imperil the free flow of commerce that is essential to U�S� and global 
prosperity� It would be wise to take steps now to prepare for this threat rather 
than attempting to address it after it becomes realized�
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The marketing of our productions will be at the mercy of any nation 
which has possessed itself exclusively of the means of carrying them; and 
our policy may be influenced by those who command our commerce.
PRESIDENT THOMAS JEFFERSON, MESSAGE TO CONGRESS
To the spread of our trade in peace and the defense of our flag in war, a 
great and prosperous merchant marine is indispensable. We should have 
ships of our own and seamen of our own to convey our goods to neutral 
markets, and in case of need, to reinforce our battle line.
PRESIDENT THEODORE ROOSEVELT, LAST ANNUAL MESSAGE TO CONGRESS
To speak plainly we have grossly erred in the way in which we have 
stunted and hindered the development of our merchant marine. . . . It is 
necessary for many weighty reasons of national efficiency and develop-
ment that we should have a great merchant marine. . . . It is high time 
we repaired our mistakes and resumed our commercial independence on 
the sea.
PRESIDENT WOODROW WILSON, MESSAGE TO CONGRESS
 The epigraphs that open this article are but three of a vast number of quotes from U.S. presidents, members of Congress, and military leaders calling for 
support of a U.S.-flag merchant marine.1 Throughout American history, dozens 
of laws have been proposed and passed that have, in varying degrees, supported 
the operation of U.S.-flag ships in both coastal and international trade; no law 
ever passed has called for a reduction in or the elimination of U.S.-flag ships. 
And yet, despite periods of great growth at various times in U.S. history, the U.S. 
Merchant Marine, once again, is in serious decline today. 
In keeping with so many of our nation’s political, military, and maritime lead-
ers throughout American history, this article contends that relying substantially 
on foreign-flag shipping for either strategic or commercial purposes places the 
Back to the Future? 
Christopher J. McMahon
THE U.S. MERCHANT MARINE
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United States in an extremely vulnerable position. Our history has proved this re-
peatedly through the centuries. Once again today, it is in the interest of the United 
States to take serious and comprehensive steps to reverse the declining trend of 
the U.S. Merchant Marine. Through various tax incentives and other innovative 
promotional programs (notably, not involving additional direct subsidies to the 
industry), it is possible to do this—and for America’s merchant marine, yet again, 
to regain its position as a leader in maritime commerce.
This article will trace the highlights of America’s commercial shipping history 
and present the reasons why the U.S. Merchant Marine engaged in international 
trade is in steep decline. It will provide reasons why support for a U.S.-flag mer-
chant marine is still critical to the economic prosperity of the country despite its 
reliance for the past several decades on foreign-flag shipping. It will also explain 
the critical role that U.S.-flag shipping plays in America’s ability to project mili-
tary power around the world.
In other words, the article will provide the “why” a U.S.-flag merchant marine 
is a strategic industry that is crucial to national security. By congressional man-
date (the Howard Coble Coast Guard and Marine Transportation Act of 2014), 
the Maritime Administration is developing a National Maritime Strategy that (at 
this writing) will be available for review in late 2015 or early 2016. This strategy 
will provide the “how” to revitalize the U.S. Merchant Marine so that it can, once 
again, become a healthy and viable commercial industry.
THE U.S.-FLAG MERCHANT MARINE IN THE EARLY YEARS OF 
THE REPUBLIC
There is little question that the founding fathers of America understood the 
importance of U.S.-owned, -operated, and -flagged commercial ships. Early U.S. 
presidents were concerned that a lack of U.S.-flag ships could disrupt America’s 
vital trading economy in times of international conflict. After approval of the 
Constitution, when the first Congress convened in 1789, one of its first acts was 
to pass a law that, among other things, provided for a 10 percent reduction in 
tariffs on imported goods carried aboard U.S.-flag ships. As a result, American-
flag shipping began to expand almost immediately in the new Republic.2 In 1789, 
U.S.-flag vessels carried 23 percent of American imports and exports; by 1800, 
this number had jumped to 89 percent.3 
To support the U.S.-flag shipping industry further, Congress enacted cabotage 
laws during the first decade of the 1800s.4 Today some critics of the Merchant 
Marine Act of 1920 (commonly known as the Jones Act) believe the restrictions 
placed in the law to support U.S.-flag shipping—expressly prohibiting the move-
ment of goods between U.S. ports aboard foreign vessels—are of relatively recent 
6679_McMahon.indd   88 12/9/15   1:51 PM
92
Naval War College Review, Vol. 69 [2016], No. 1, Art. 21
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol69/iss1/21
 M C M A H O N  8 9
vintage; but they were originally passed in 1817� Congress and the president 
passed the 1817 law because they understood the importance of having a U�S�-
flag merchant marine to carry the nation’s trade� The law was briefly suspended 
during World War I because the U�S� Merchant Marine had so atrophied that it 
could not support U�S� trade, foreign or domestic� In 1920, cabotage laws were 
reestablished in the Jones Act�5 
For the first sixty years of the American Republic, the U�S� Merchant Marine 
enjoyed substantial benefits provided by the federal government� Cabotage laws 
and tariff duties on foreign vessels carrying U�S� imports and exports promoted 
U�S�-flag shipping� Perhaps more important, U�S�-flag ships could compete 
against other flags because there were very few competitors� Another advantage 
was that U�S�-flag vessels were constructed of wood in U�S� shipyards; easy access 
to the raw materials made the ships relatively inexpensive to build� For these rea-
sons, during the first half of the nineteenth century U�S�-flag shipping enjoyed a 
so-called golden age� During this period, U�S�-flag ships carried 75 to 80 percent 
or more of America’s foreign commerce�6 
THE DECLINE OF THE U.S.-FLAG MERCHANT MARINE, 1850– 
WORLD WAR I
The advent of the industrial age, with its development of iron ships and steam 
engineering, ended the glory days of the U�S� Merchant Marine� In the second 
half of the nineteenth century, European countries emerged as the first industrial 
powers, with Great Britain in the lead, and it was the merchant ships of Great 
Britain, and later other European industrial powers, that captured the world lead 
in number of cargo ships and their cargo-carrying capacity and efficiency�
Other important factors contributed to the continuous decline of the Ameri-
can merchant marine from the 1850s to World War I� By the 1860s, it was clear 
that the time of wooden sailing ships was over and the era of steam and steel had 
arrived� U�S�-flag operators sought permission to purchase foreign-built steam-
ships for their fleets, hoping that, in time, U�S� shipyards would adopt the new 
technologies� Unfortunately, the U�S� shipbuilding industry—still constructing 
only wooden vessels—strongly opposed this measure, so it failed to gain suf-
ficient political support�7 As a result, many U�S�-flag shipping companies went 
out of business�
The American Civil War added to the problem� When the Confederate states 
sank Union commercial vessels, Northern shipowners sought protection for their 
vessels from the Union Navy, but the federal government was unwilling or unable 
to provide it� So, to protect their investments, many owners reflagged their vessels 
to neutral states� 
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Despite the wartime reflagging of many U�S�-flag vessels, the American mer-
chant marine was still carrying 32�2 percent of the reunified country’s imports 
and exports after the Civil War�8 By the war’s end, however, many merchant ships 
were in poor physical condition� To make matters worse, those shipowners who 
had reflagged their vessels to neutral flags during the war were considered trai-
tors, and Congress passed a law specifically forbidding the retransference of these 
vessels back to the U�S� flag�9 
By 1914, the U�S� Merchant Marine was carrying less than 8 percent of the na-
tion’s commerce� Another major factor contributing to this decline was absolute 
apathy on the part of most of the American public and politicians concerning the 
demise of America’s sealift capabilities�
Such apathy is perhaps understandable, given the context of the times� Prior to 
the 1860s, America was a commercial maritime power� The nation and its people 
thought in maritime terms� Most Americans lived near the sea� The nation was 
huge in comparison to those of Europe, yet the interior of the country was only 
sparsely settled, still largely in the hands of native peoples� Roads were poor or 
nonexistent, and railroads were few and far between� People mostly traded and 
traveled by sea or on inland waterways� Even the 1840s Gold Rush to California 
was essentially a maritime event: only a tiny percentage of “forty-niners” traveled 
west by wagon train� Instead, the vast majority went by sea, either transferring 
overland via Panama from an American ship to another American ship, or tak-
ing the long voyage around Cape Horn aboard one of the famed American-flag 
California clipper ships�
After the Civil War, however, America turned inland and forgot its maritime 
roots� There was a continent to explore and settle� The explosive growth of rail-
roads crisscrossed the entire country with new rail lines� Vast numbers of im-
migrants arrived from inland parts of Europe; their only understanding of the 
maritime world was their often-terrifying North Atlantic crossing in steerage 
aboard an overcrowded sailing or sail-assisted steam vessel� As inland territories, 
far from the sea, developed into states, their elected representatives brought to 
Washington a limited understanding of all things maritime� As a result, public 
interest in and knowledge of maritime affairs—including a U�S�-flag merchant 
marine—waned, becoming much more limited than in the early decades of the 
Republic�
Despite the overall lack of support for a U�S�-flag merchant marine in the 
decades following the Civil War, there were many political leaders, including 
members of Congress and officials in various presidential administrations, 
who understood that the decline in the number of U�S�-flag ships placed the 
country in jeopardy� This danger became particularly evident in the decades 
after the 1860s as America became a major industrial power and an exporter of 
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manufactured goods, slowly emerging onto the world stage as a military power as 
well� For these reasons, mail-subsidy and tariff legislation was enacted to support 
the operation of U�S�-flag shipping in international trade� Policy makers hoped 
that these efforts would reverse the ongoing decline in the number of U�S�-flag 
ships� Unfortunately, competing political interests caused most of these efforts to 
fail, and several scandals related to mail-subsidy payments caused other efforts to 
falter as well� Nothing worked, because the political will in Washington did not 
exist to support a U�S�-flag merchant marine, and the American public at large 
perceived no particular value in a U�S�-flag fleet�10
Curiously, it was an American, Alfred T� Mahan, who dramatically energized 
global powers, including, eventually, the United States, about the critical im-
portance of commercial flag-state merchant shipping and accompanying naval 
power� In his seminal work The Influence of Seapower upon History (based on a 
series of lectures given at the U�S� Naval War College, in Newport, Rhode Island, 
and published in 1890), Captain (later Rear Admiral) Mahan, USN, concluded 
that merchant shipping was both a source of maritime power and something 
navies needed naturally to defend� Geoffrey Till, in his Seapower: A Guide for the 
Twenty-First Century, observes that “Mahan even came close to saying this was 
the reason navies existed in the first place�”11
The necessity for a navy springs from the existence of peaceful shipping and disap-
pears with it, except in the case of a nation that has aggressive tendencies and keeps 
up a navy merely as a branch of the military establishment.12
Mahan’s reasoning was that maritime trade (and thus a flag-state merchant ma-
rine) arises in a natural manner, as nations are inclined to create trade in order 
to obtain wealth� A nation wishing to protect its ships and trade lanes needs a 
navy� In a world filled with competing nations and empires, the nations with the 
largest and most powerful battle fleets will be the wealthiest and most powerful�13
That Mahan’s theories influenced maritime nations is an understatement� The 
British Empire at the turn of the twentieth century seemed to be proof positive of 
Mahan’s assertions� Maritime nations in Europe and the Japanese in Asia strove 
to build up their merchant fleets and their navies and to develop and expand 
their empires further� America, too, seemed to listen to Mahan—but only as far 
as naval power was concerned� The U�S� Merchant Marine was still allowed to 
languish, and dependence on foreign-flag merchant shipping to carry America’s 
commerce expanded even as America’s exports increased during the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries�
America’s lack of commercial shipping capability manifested itself dramati-
cally during the Spanish-American War in 1898� While the U�S� Navy had by then 
built several modern warships and was prepared to challenge the much weaker 
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Spanish fleets in Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines, there was a severe short-
age of military or commercial sealift to support the fleet away from American 
shores. In fact, during the war it was necessary to charter and purchase foreign 
ships to resupply the fleets, which caused long delays in military operations. 
Frankly, it was only because of the weakness of the Spanish fleet that the United 
States prevailed, and it was coincidental that the U.S. Navy was able to procure 
the necessary foreign shipping at all.14
While the Spanish-American War clearly demonstrated the inability of the 
United States to support naval operations offshore, the following year the Boer 
War in South Africa demonstrated the commercial vulnerability of the United 
States due to its dependence on foreign-flag shipping. As a result of its war with 
Dutch settlers in South Africa, the British government requisitioned British ships 
that had been carrying American commerce. Intended U.S. exports sat on the 
docks in U.S. ports or shippers paid exorbitant freight rates. A major disruption 
in trade resulted, causing serious damage to the U.S. economy. The absence of 
U.S.-flag shipping during this period caused consternation in public and private 
circles. Congress conducted a number of hearings that highlighted the vulner-
ability of the American economy because of its dependence on foreign-flag ship-
ping. Despite this, little or no action was taken to correct the problem or develop 
support for the U.S. Merchant Marine.15 
While America failed to grasp Mahan’s insistence on the importance of con-
trolling commercial shipping, it did, however, expand its Navy under the leader-
ship of President Theodore Roosevelt. The famed “Great White Fleet” consisted 
of sixteen battleships and escorts. In a show of rising American naval power, 
Roosevelt sent the fleet on a one-year around-the-world voyage from December 
1907 to February 1909. However, once again, the scarcity of U.S.-flag commercial 
and strategic sealift manifested itself. During the battle fleet’s circumnavigation, 
the Navy was forced to charter a hodgepodge fleet of numerous foreign-flag ves-
sels from many nations to replenish and support the fleet—a situation that was 
not only embarrassing but indicative of strategic weakness. The vulnerability of 
the U.S. Navy having been made obvious yet again, several congressional com-
mittees took note—but still no concerted effort was made to promote U.S.-flag 
shipping.16
In the years leading up to World War I, American agricultural and indus-
trial exports continued to increase substantially. America became an economic 
superpower even while the U.S. Merchant Marine continued to decline. Then, 
as now, Americans and American-owned businesses were confident that inex-
pensive foreign-flag shipping was sufficiently bountiful that it would be readily 
available if needed. This proved—again—to be a false assumption. With the out-
break of war in 1914, the American economy, dependent on international trade, 
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experienced a lack of availability of commercial ships. The European nations 
that had previously provided the commercial sealift for the American economy 
withdrew their vessels for wartime purposes. This caused widespread disruption 
in trade; manufactured products piled up on American docks, in railcars, and in 
warehouses, and agricultural goods spoiled because they could not be conveyed 
to overseas markets. The American economy suffered greatly owing to a lack of 
commercial shipping.17
WORLD WAR I TO THE PRESENT
The extent of the damage to the American economy caused by the shortage of 
U.S.-flag shipping in 1914 was so serious that Congress finally decided to act. But 
this took time, and the insufficiency of commercial shipping continued to imperil 
the economy. Following numerous and lengthy hearings, the Shipping Act of 
1916 was finally passed. It created a Shipping Board that was specifically designed 
to promote and assist the U.S. Merchant Marine. By the time the board was fully 
established, however, it was apparent the United States would soon enter the 
war, and the board was placed on a wartime footing. In October 1917, the board 
requisitioned the entire U.S. Merchant Marine.18 In 1917, the Shipping Board ini-
tiated a huge shipbuilding program through the creation of an Emergency Fleet 
Corporation. Eventually, the board contracted for over 1,700 merchant vessels, 
an unprecedented effort. But American participation in the war was so short that 
only 107 ships were delivered before the armistice in November 1918.
However, the remaining vessels were completed by 1922, in hopes that U.S.-
flag companies would purchase them, and some did. So—at least in numbers of 
potentially available merchant ships—the United States ranked number one in 
the world following World War I. But the country never followed through on 
this advantage.19
Unfortunately, the period 1920–36 saw the U.S.-flag merchant marine dra-
matically decline once again. Although the federal government now included a 
Shipping Board designed to support U.S.-flag shipping, the board had no author-
ity or funding to provide direct aid to the ailing industry. A Merchant Marine Act 
in 1928 established subsidies in the form of mail contracts, but this program, like 
its predecessors, was a failure; mail subsidies were awarded without regard to the 
needs of U.S. commercial shippers or the postal service.20 
By the mid-1930s, the condition of the U.S. Merchant Marine was dire. The 
Great Depression had wreaked havoc on U.S. trade. Nearly all U.S.-flag ships in 
international trade were old and obsolete. The numbers and types of vessels were 
totally inadequate to handle even a tiny portion of U.S. trade, let alone sustain 
the nation or its military in a national emergency. However, the Roosevelt ad-
ministration and leaders in Congress instinctively knew this, and with war clouds 
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looming on the horizon in Europe and Asia they decided to take decisive action� 
The result was watershed legislation: the Merchant Marine Act of 1936�21
The relevant text of the 1936 act opens as follows (emphasis added):
SECTION 101� It is necessary for the national defense and development of its foreign 
and domestic commerce that the United States shall have a merchant marine (a) 
sufficient to carry its domestic water-borne commerce and a substantial portion of the 
water-borne export and import foreign commerce of the United States and to provide 
shipping service on all routes essential for maintaining the flow of such domestic 
and foreign water-borne commerce at all times, (b) capable of serving as a naval 
and military auxiliary in time of war or national emergency, (c) owned and oper-
ated under the United States flag by citizens of the United States insofar as may be 
practicable, and (d) composed of the best-equipped, safest, and most suitable types 
of vessels, constructed in the United States and manned with a trained and efficient 
citizen personnel� It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to foster 
the development and encourage the maintenance of such a merchant marine�22
The Merchant Marine Act of 1936 recognized that it was more expensive to con-
struct vessels in a U�S� shipyard and that operating costs of U�S�-flag ships were 
higher than those of many foreign-flag operators� Accordingly, the act authorized 
both construction and operating subsidies� The law also established or expanded 
existing cargo preference programs, requiring that all military cargoes and a 
portion of other government cargoes be carried aboard U�S�-flag vessels� The 
law created the Maritime Commission, the predecessor to the current Maritime 
Administration (MARAD)� Still another major aid contained in the act was the 
creation of a Construction Reserve Fund (CRF)� According to MARAD:
The Construction Reserve Fund (CRF), authorized by 46 U�S�C� Chapter 533 (the 
Act), is a financial assistance program which provides tax deferral benefits to U�S�-
flag operators� Eligible parties can defer the gain attributable to the sale or loss of a 
vessel, provided the proceeds are used to expand or modernize the U�S� merchant 
fleet�23
The effects of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 were both immediate and pro-
found� By the time America entered World War II, U�S� shipyards were building 
large and ever-increasing numbers of commercially viable ships� After America 
entered the war it began building commercial ships in record numbers� In total, 
more than 5,500 merchant ships were built to support the war effort� By the end 
of World War II, the United States controlled 70 percent of the existing merchant 
shipping tonnage in the world�24
Once again, however, the United States did not capitalize on this investment or 
its potential for the U�S�-flag merchant marine� In 1946, Congress passed the Ship 
Sales Act� This act set up a priority system for the sale of the “surplus” commercial 
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vessels built in U�S� shipyards for the war effort� Buyers included domestic and 
foreign shipping companies that had lost part or all of their commercial fleets 
during the war� The intent of the Ship Sales Act was to enable allied countries 
to recover from the war� They could use these ships, purchased at low cost, to 
reestablish their trade by carrying cargo in global trade, thereby earning hard 
currency (dollars)�
Ultimately, some of the ships sold under the Ship Sales Act ended up flagged in 
Panama and Liberia� Companies and individuals created “flags of convenience” 
(FOCs)—a system that guaranteed U�S�-flag vessels could not compete against 
FOC ships� Profits from vessels registered in FOC nations were tax-exempt; crew 
wages were kept extremely low; and vessel inspection, safety, and maintenance 
standards were minimized�25
While, in the eyes of many, the Ship Sales Act of 1946 achieved many of its 
goals, the act also limited the ability of the U�S�-flag merchant marine to capitalize 
on the massive investment America had made during World War II in creating 
the world’s largest merchant fleet�26
Not surprisingly, during the 1950s and 1960s the U�S� Merchant Marine slowly 
declined from its postwar size and capacity� Federal aid to U�S�-flag shipping con-
tinued as outlined in the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, but this was insufficient 
to prevent the dramatic and sustained rise of FOC shipping� Slowly but surely the 
majority of the world’s merchant ships became flagged in FOC nations or states 
whose national fleets were government owned�
The last major piece of legislation promoting the U�S� Merchant Marine (and 
the U�S� shipbuilding industry) was the Merchant Marine Act of 1970, signed into 
law by President Nixon� The main purpose of the 1970 act was to promote the 
construction of U�S�-flag ships in U�S� yards by providing construction subsidies 
to traditionally nonsubsidized U�S�-flag carriers� The act also authorized carriers 
to establish “capital construction funds” (CCFs) into which they could deposit 
earnings earmarked for the construction of new vessels, thereby making them 
tax-exempt�27
According to MARAD—
CCF vessels must be built in the United States and documented under the laws of the 
United States for operation in the Nation’s foreign, Great Lakes, Short-Sea Shipping or 
noncontiguous domestic trade or its fisheries� Participants must meet U�S� citizenship 
requirements�28
In the 1970s, there was a substantial shift in attitude toward the U�S�-flag 
merchant marine, strategic sealift, and the government’s role in promoting both� 
From a strategic perspective, military planners were concerned about the con-
tinuing decline of the U�S� Merchant Marine� To compound their concern, the 
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U�S�-flag companies that were still financially healthy at the time were convert-
ing, or had already converted, their fleets to containerships, which limited their 
presumed military usefulness in strategic sealift emergencies� To address these 
concerns, in 1976 the Ready Reserve Force (RRF) was created� 
As MARAD notes, 
The Ready Reserve Force (RRF) program was initiated in 1976 as a subset of the 
Maritime Administration’s (MARAD) National Defense Reserve Fleet (NDRF) to 
support the rapid worldwide deployment of U�S� military forces� As a key element of 
Department of Defense (DOD) strategic sealift, the RRF primarily supports transport 
of Army and Marine Corps unit equipment, combat support equipment, and initial 
resupply during the critical surge period before commercial ships can be marshaled� 
The RRF provides nearly one-half of the government-owned surge sealift capabil-
ity� Management of the RRF program is defined by a Memorandum of Agreement 
(MOA) between DOD and Department of Transportation (DOT)�
The program began with 6 ships in 1977, peaked at 102 in 1994, and now consists of 
46 ships including: 35 roll-on/roll off (RO/RO) vessels (which includes 8 Fast Sealift 
Support vessels (FSS)), two heavy-lift or barge carrying ships, six auxiliary crane-
ships, one tanker, and two aviation repair vessels� Two RRF ships are homeported in 
the NDRF anchorage in Beaumont, Texas� The balance are berthed at various U�S� 
ports� Layberth facilities are leased from commercial sources and by negotiating for 
government owned facilities� These outported locations are coordinated with military 
planners and chosen to minimize sailing time to strategic loadout ports� Outported 
RRF ships are also used as training platforms for cargo handling by Navy and Army 
units and for homeland security training by various law enforcement agencies�
RRF ships are expected to be fully operational within their assigned 5 and 10-day 
readiness status and sail to designated loading berths� Commercial U�S� ship man-
agers provide systems maintenance, equipment repairs, logistics support, activa-
tion, manning, and operations management by contract� Ships in priority readiness 
have Reduced Operating Status (ROS) maintenance crews of about 10 commercial 
merchant mariners that are supplemented by additional mariners during activations� 
Readiness of the RRF is periodically tested by DOD directed activations of ships for 
military cargo operations and exercises�29
In the years leading up to the passage of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 it 
had been politically accepted that a U�S�-flag commercial fleet was critical to the 
economic health of America� (The wording of the 1936 act proclaims this�) It 
was also believed to be essential for the federal government to support the U�S�-
flag merchant marine for both commercial and military purposes� However, 
after World War II support for the U�S�-flag merchant marine gradually waned 
over the decades� By the early 1980s, current political thinking considered fed-
eral subsidies to the industry an anathema� As a result, in 1980, construction 
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subsidies were suspended, and operating subsidies were withdrawn as existing 
subsidy contracts expired� The outlook for the U�S� Merchant Marine engaged 
in international trade was again dire� By 1990, as operating subsidies did expire, 
numerous ships were withdrawn from U�S� service� Many U�S�-flag companies 
filed for bankruptcy and ended their services� The U�S�-flag international fleet 
was headed for extinction�
In response, military, congressional, and other government leaders noted that 
while MARAD’s RRF offered an effective and rapid source of ships for strategic 
deployment, even the RRF and the sealift capabilities of Military Sealift Com-
mand together could not sustain a serious and prolonged U�S� military deploy-
ment overseas� As later sections of this article explain, further support from a 
commercial U�S�-flag merchant marine was and is essential for strategic sealift 
requirements, as was proven in all American wars of the twentieth century, in-
cluding Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM� Accordingly, in 1996, 
Congress passed and the president signed the Maritime Security Act of 1996 
(MSA), which established the Maritime Security Program (MSP)� 
The [National Defense Authorization Act] of 2013 requires � � � the Secretary of 
Transportation, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, to establish a fleet of 
active, commercially viable, militarily useful, privately-owned vessels to meet nation-
al defense and other security requirements� Authorized annual funding � � � support[s] 
the operation of 60 U�S�-flag vessels in the foreign commerce of the United States� � � � 
Participating operators are required to make their ships and commercial transporta-
tion resources available upon request by the Secretary of Defense during times of war 
or national emergency�
The MSP maintains a modern U�S�-flag fleet providing military access to vessels and 
vessel capacity, as well as a total global, intermodal transportation network� This 
network includes not only vessels, but logistics management services, infrastruc-
ture, terminals facilities and U�S� citizen merchant mariners to crew the government 
owned/controlled and commercial fleets�30
TODAY’S U.S.-FLAG MERCHANT MARINE AND AMERICA’S  
ATTITUDE TOWARD THE INDUSTRY
The U�S� Merchant Marine today is a “tale of two fleets�” On the one hand, the 
cabotage laws restricting intra-U�S� shipping to U�S�-flag vessels have ensured 
that the so-called “Jones Act fleet” is in a relatively healthy position, because 
potentially lower-cost foreign-flag shipping is excluded from this transportation 
market� On the other hand, the U�S� Merchant Marine engaged in international 
trade is essentially on life support� All the ships in international trade rely on the 
MSP or cargo preference� With fewer than eighty-five U�S�-flag ships engaged 
in international trade, the U�S� Merchant Marine carries less than 2 percent of 
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America’s import and export commerce� In other words, taken as a whole, the 
U�S� Merchant Marine would not exist without the protection and incentives 
provided by law—some of which have been in place since the early years of the 
Republic� So how does this sit with the American public?
As was noted earlier, during the colonial period in America and during the 
first several decades after the founding of the Republic, America thought and 
acted as a maritime nation� Americans largely lived near the sea or major inland 
rivers; they thrived because of waterborne trade; and they knew they must have 
unfettered access to ships and shipping� This meant possessing a U�S�-flag mer-
chant marine� As America grew in the nineteenth century, so too did its merchant 
marine—by midcentury it carried over 80 percent of America’s commerce�31 
But as America settled the continent in the latter half of the nineteenth century, 
Americans and America’s economy as a whole turned inward from the sea and 
essentially lost their international maritime focus� Today, although the United 
States is, physically and geopolitically, a maritime nation (surrounded by the sea 
on three coasts; with a fourth coast on the Great Lakes; with its newest states— 
Hawaii and Alaska—accessible primarily by water; and possessing common-
wealths and territories on the sea), Americans are not maritime-minded people; 
they are continentally minded people� Lest anyone think differently, conduct a 
quick survey of just about any group of Americans with questions such as these:
1� What is the merchant marine? 
2� How did your new flat-screen TV, manufactured in Japan, get to your 
local store? 
3� What is strategic sealift?
The point will quickly be made� This situation is strange given that, excluding 
trade with Mexico and Canada, over 90 percent of America’s international trade 
travels by sea on merchant ships�
The result of America’s lack of a maritime psyche means the nation as a whole 
does not comprehend the value and need for U�S�-flag shipping� To be sure, the 
nation does in general understand the importance of its Navy� In the last century 
and this one, the U�S� Navy has been engaged in so many wars and conflicts that 
most Americans clearly see it as a vital American asset, one that protects the 
security of America and its allies and projects national power abroad� As noted 
earlier, the great naval theoretician Alfred Mahan believed that maritime nations 
should support, in every way possible, their navies and their merchant fleets in 
order to develop, expand, and defend their power and wealth� But in America, 
except for a small number of military, political, and maritime leaders, we have 
lost appreciation for the second part of what it means to be a maritime power: 
both navies and merchant fleets are critical components�
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Maintaining a navy costs money, and because of standards of living and labor 
rates it costs more to build and operate U�S� Navy ships than it does navy vessels 
in other countries� Yet relatively few question the need for these federal expendi-
tures because the public clearly understands the mission and purpose of the U�S� 
Navy� Building up and operating a U�S�-flag merchant marine—one that, in the 
words of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, is “sufficient to carry its domestic 
water-borne commerce and a substantial portion of the water-borne export and 
import foreign commerce of the United States”—would require similar federal 
assistance in terms of funding and other support programs� Simply put, it costs 
more to build and operate U�S�-flag ships because foreign-flag vessels, particu-
larly FOC vessels, can operate with very-low-cost labor and pay little or no tax 
on revenues�
That Americans in general do not understand the critical importance of U�S�-
flag ships to the strategic and economic health of America is clear� Some even 
suggest that Mahan was wrong when he stated that a commercial merchant fleet, 
flagged within the country, is an essential component, along with a strong navy, 
of maritime power� This line of thinking suggests that maritime power can be 
based solely on the strength of a country’s navy� In other words, these commenta-
tors suggest that “Mahan is in need of revision�”32 
Numerous books and articles have been written not only deriding federal sup-
port for a U�S�-flag merchant marine but going further, to suggest that a U�S�-flag 
merchant marine isn’t even necessary for either economic or military reasons� A 
recent Heritage Foundation article, for example, suggests that “[t]he Jones Act 
drives up shipping costs, increases energy costs, stifles competition, and hampers 
innovation in the U�S� shipping industry�” The article also, curiously, suggests 
that “[t]he Persian Gulf conflict in the early 1990s proved that the Jones Act was 
not a necessary element in supplying and sustaining a military operation�” The 
article further asserts that “the Jones Act and its supporters inadvertently hinder 
national security�”33 While it may have been written in the spirit of free-market 
competition, this article fails to consider the economic and strategic roles of U�S�-
flag shipping, and critical analysis does not support the report’s conclusions�34
People and organizations who call for exclusively free-market competition 
argue that, along with all other economic sectors, marine transportation (in-
cluding both international and domestic shipping) should operate completely 
within the free market� “Let the lowest-cost operator provide the service,” the 
reasoning goes� “If we allowed this to happen, transportation costs for American 
exporters and consumers related to importing and exporting goods would be 
reduced—right?” In a perfect world, the answer would be yes� However, con-
sider this: Should we eliminate the “Jones Act–like” provisions that limit service 
on domestic air routes to American air carriers? Perhaps we should also allow 
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foreign trucking companies and railroads unrestricted access to our territory? 
Let international air carriers offer services to and from all American airports� Let 
foreign trucking companies and railroads have complete access to the American 
transportation network� Wouldn’t this lower the cost to American consumers? It 
probably would�
But what would the picture eventually look like if, in keeping with free markets 
and in pursuit of cost efficiencies, we dispensed with all laws that protect U�S�-flag 
shipping, U�S�-flag air carriers, U�S� trucking, and U�S� railroads, as well as those 
laws that restrict employment to U�S� labor? In time, American skies, waterways, 
roads, and rails would be dominated by foreign carriers, because services in 
the transportation industries can be performed more cheaply by some foreign 
competitors� Quite possibly there would be no American transportation carriers 
—they would be driven out of business� While this might seem an unlikely sce-
nario, in a purely free-market situation it would in fact be quite likely to occur�
Most readers of this publication will quickly understand the danger in which 
this would place the American economy, to say nothing of the threat to Ameri-
can security and the loss of American jobs� Yet opening maritime shipping to 
international carriers for domestic as well as foreign commerce does not seem to 
concern most Americans� Americans, being largely not maritime minded, do not 
understand how critical the American shipping industry is to the strategic and 
economic health of the nation�
SO WHY IS A U.S.-FLAG MERCHANT MARINE IMPORTANT?
To begin with, in simple terms, the U�S� Merchant Marine matters because U�S�-
flag ships in international trade guarantee reliable access to shipping for exports 
from and imports to the United States� The more U�S�-flag ships there are, the 
more reliable the access; the fewer U�S�-flag ships there are, the less reliable that 
access might be� This applies to both economic and strategic sealift� 
Regarding strategic/military sealift, most—although admittedly not all— 
people with knowledge of the industry understand that a U�S�-flag merchant 
marine is critical� The performance of the U�S� Merchant Marine in the twentieth 
century in two world wars, Korea, Vietnam, the Gulf wars, and several other 
global conflicts has clearly highlighted the reliable and efficient nature of our 
merchant marine in times of national conflict� Those who suggest that the mili-
tary can rely in part or in total on foreign-flag ships to carry military supplies 
in a U�S� national emergency do not understand two key points (laid out below, 
with subpoints)�
First, foreign-flag vessels and crews cannot be counted on to sail into harm’s 
way during a “hot war” in which merchant ships may come under fire because 
they are supporting the U�S� military� Despite the relatively benign military 
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environment of the Persian Gulf during the Gulf wars, foreign-flag ships char-
tered by the U�S� military did, on occasion, refuse to deliver cargoes;35 in an 
environment in which merchant ships are actually being fired on, it is unlikely 
foreign-flag ships could be relied on at all� This would be particularly true if mer-
chant shipping were being sunk by enemy action� During the Falklands War, in 
the aftermath of the sinking of the U�K�-flagged commercial containership M/V 
Atlantic Conveyor, the British would have been severely challenged to charter a 
foreign-flag vessel for sealift� In today’s world, with a widening array of antiship 
missiles, the proliferation of conventional diesel-powered submarines, and other 
antiship capabilities, the sinking of merchant ships in an armed conflict would be 
very likely� The fact that this has not occurred in recent conflicts is pure happen-
stance� In conflicts involving military sea lines of communication and logistics 
involving merchant shipping, destruction of shipping is still a priority for military 
planners in all countries�
Second, for political or economic reasons, there may be no available foreign-
flag ships to support U�S� military deployments or sustainment� Because of the 
circumstances of particular conflicts, flag states (including FOC nations) may 
refuse to allow their vessels to enter a war zone so as not to offend an ally or 
related business interest� In war zones, risk—and the resultant marine insurance 
rates—may rise to a level at which vessel operators and flag states are unwilling to 
allow their vessels to enter therein� Additionally, there may be no foreign-flag ves-
sels available because operators do not wish to charter vessels to the U�S� military 
because they will lose market share from their regular, existing customer base and 
trade routes� In the highly competitive world of ocean shipping, market share is 
important� From a foreign operator’s perspective, carrying U�S� military cargoes, 
even at premium rates, may be a poor business decision in the long term, which 
may discourage foreign-flag owners and operators from even considering such 
an option� In any case, for some or all of these reasons, the U�S� military could 
find itself in a situation in which foreign-flag shipping is not an option to support 
U�S� military operations�
WHAT CHINA HAS LEARNED
With U�S�$3�82 trillion in imports and exports (in 2013), the United States ranks 
just behind China as the largest trading nation on earth�36 Less than 2 percent 
of America’s overseas imports and exports are carried aboard U�S�-flag vessels� 
While some Americans with knowledge of the industry support a U�S�-flag 
merchant marine for military strategic sealift reasons, many of these same folks 
believe America can rely solely on foreign-flag shipping for the nation’s normal 
commercial imports and exports� After all, hasn’t history shown this to be true? 
Well, actually, it hasn’t, as noted earlier in this article� Granted, the circumstances 
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have been rare, but twice around the turn of the twentieth century (during the 
Spanish-American and Boer Wars), at a time when America relied heavily on 
foreign-flag shipping for its international trade, foreign-flag countries and com-
panies withdrew their ships from U�S� service, resulting in a calamitous situation 
for the American economy� It is certainly possible for this same situation to mani-
fest itself in the globalized world in which we live today�
For a major importing and exporting nation to rely completely on third coun-
tries to provide and control its logistics supply chain, including ships, creates a 
proven vulnerability� History has demonstrated this too often� China’s history 
during the past three centuries provides a clear example� 
Six hundred years ago China was the world’s first major manufacturing nation� 
As the West industrialized, the Chinese developed very little interest in Western 
manufactured goods� Therefore the Chinese had no particular desire to control 
what would be described in modern terms as their “transportation and logistics 
supply chain�” Instead the Chinese left the matter to others; but ultimately this 
cost them dearly, as they gradually lost control, or even influence, over their 
trade� Certainly naval power had a hand in this power shift, but so too did the 
absence of Chinese commercial maritime shipping capability and the Chinese ba-
sic lack of understanding of the importance of controlling commercial sealift and 
maritime trade�37 This lesson was not lost on the Chinese after they established 
the People’s Republic of China in 1949�
Since 1980, China has become an industrial heavyweight, recently eclipsing 
the United States in at least one metric as the largest economy on earth� This 
time around, however, the Chinese have not neglected their maritime industry� In 
fact, quite the opposite has occurred: the Chinese have developed their maritime 
industry, including commercial shipping, to the point where they have become 
the dominant maritime power in the world� With 5,313 oceangoing ships, China 
has become the number one owner and operator of commercial deep-sea mer-
chant vessels�38 China is also one of the top three shipbuilders in the world—by 
some metrics number one� In addition, China controls more ports and terminals 
around the world than any other nation, including terminals on both sides of the 
Panama Canal�39 And in recent years, China—in true “Mahanian tradition”—has 
dramatically expanded its blue-water navy to protect its trade routes and com-
mercial shipping, particularly in Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean� 
In other words, China now has military and commercial control over its trans-
portation, logistics, and supply chain—its “sea lines of communication�” The 
Chinese learned from their history that a powerful trading nation, to protect its 
economy and its strategic independence, needs not only to possess a capable navy 
but to have substantial control of its maritime industry and commercial shipping� 
This is a lesson that needs to be understood in the United States�
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U.S. RELIANCE ON FOREIGN-FLAG SHIPPING
To say that the United States is overwhelmingly dependent on foreign-flag ship-
ping for commercial trade is an understatement� As noted previously, U�S�-flag 
vessels carry less than 2 percent of the nation’s overseas commerce� The United 
States today would also be dependent on foreign-flag shipping for military and 
strategic sealift purposes should America face another long-term military con-
flict� This is particularly true for the strategic transportation of petroleum-related 
products� There are only two U�S�-flag petroleum-product tankers in interna-
tional trade, and most of the U�S�-flag tankers that do exist are either crude oil 
tankers in the Alaska trade or tankers needed for domestic transportation needs�
The lack of U�S�-flag containerships is also a serious concern economically 
and strategically� Where once there existed a large and diverse number of cargo-
shipping companies around the world, the container-shipping industry has con-
solidated dramatically in recent years� Today, 60 percent of all cargo container 
shipments are handled by just ten companies�40 As a 2014 article noted, according 
to the rating agency Fitch, the trend in the container-shipping industry is toward 
further consolidation, meaning that even fewer companies are likely ultimately 
to carry an even higher percentage of the world’s—including America’s—cargo 
containers�41 Relying on a small number of companies for a critical service creates 
dangerous dependence in any situation� For this to happen to American shippers 
is potentially disastrous, as American history has proved� To make matters even 
worse, large numbers of containerships under construction are megaships with 
deep drafts exceeding the capacity of U�S� ports, meaning these ships will not be 
physically able to serve them�42
In summation, the availability of containerships to serve U�S� ports will be 
restricted if only a small number of companies exist, and if these companies are 
unable or unwilling to provide service to America for political, military, or physi-
cal reasons� 
Another damaging possibility facing American shippers is the potential for 
soaring freight rates� Recall that both of these scenarios—lack of available ship-
ping and high shipping rates—unfolded several times in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries and prior to both world wars� The economic theory 
that assumes that if existing containerships are not available to serve U�S� ports 
new companies will be established to offer the service doesn’t work for the ship-
ping world� The significant capital, long lead times, and specialized expertise 
and infrastructure necessary to enter the seagoing shipping business do not lend 
themselves to the entrance of new suppliers into the industry� This state of affairs 
is evident already in peacetime, with the industry consolidating into a relatively 
few companies worldwide�
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EFFECTIVELY CONTROLLED U.S. SHIPS
Some refer to ships owned by Americans and U�S� interests but flagged in other 
countries—particularly FOC countries—as “effectively U�S�–controlled ships,” or 
“EUSC ships�” Over the years, the conjecture has been that these vessels would be 
available to the United States in times of national emergency� In fact, reliance on 
the availability of EUSC shipping has been a long-standing policy of the armed 
forces’ Joint Chiefs of Staff� In 1989, for example, President George H� W� Bush 
signed a National Security Sealift Policy that reiterated an expectation of support 
from EUSC shipping�43
The problems with relying on EUSC shipping are twofold� First, while owners 
of EUSC shipping might theoretically be willing to support the United States in 
a national emergency, there is no guarantee the flag states of EUSC vessels would 
allow their vessels to be used to support U�S� interests or objectives� For example, 
the Chinese have numerous business interests in Panama, the country with the 
largest number of merchant vessels under its flag� China owns 534 vessels under 
Panamanian flag�44 A Chinese company operates the two major marine termi-
nals on either end of the Panama Canal�45 For these reasons, the Panamanian 
government might be reluctant to allow the United States to use any vessel under 
Panamanian registry in a conflict between the United States and China� Further, 
EUSC vessels are crewed by foreign nationals, not Americans, and there is cer-
tainly no guarantee that foreign crews would be willing to serve on EUSC vessels 
in a U�S� conflict�
In any case, because of U�S� tax laws passed in 1979 and 1986, American own-
ers of EUSC ships can no longer avoid paying taxes on their income� As a result, 
the number of EUSC ships has dwindled dramatically during the past two de-
cades� Simply put, there are fewer American citizens involved in EUSC shipping 
than in past decades, to the point where it is no longer a viable source of ships for 
America in times of national emergency�46
THE U.S.-FLAG MERCHANT MARINE IS A STRATEGIC INDUSTRY
This article has briefly outlined the history of the U�S� Merchant Marine, and it 
has shown that without a sizable U�S� Merchant Marine capable of carrying “a 
substantial portion of the water-borne export and import foreign commerce of 
the United States,” as prescribed in the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, America is 
vulnerable both economically and strategically� This has been borne out in nu-
merous cases over the past 150 years, and it has been noted many times through 
the years by administrations and members of Congress from all parties and by 
military and maritime leaders� 
Although some may not consider it to be such, the American merchant marine 
is a strategic industry� Our economy, more than ever, is dependent on reliable 
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commercial shipping for import and export commerce� Our military is reliant 
on commercial sealift to ensure it can project American power around the world� 
Without available shipping, America would be in a serious situation—as we have 
been several times in the past two centuries� The impact on our economy of a 
lack of commercial shipping could be very serious� Accordingly, the American 
merchant marine should be viewed as a strategic industry�
There are numerous other American industries that, because of their impor-
tance to the nation, are understood to be strategic industries, and most if not 
all receive federal support in one form or another� The agricultural industry, 
for example, receives various subsidies to ensure that farming remains a viable 
profession—so America can feed itself� The energy industry receives subsidies, tax 
deductions, credits, and land leases that encourage companies to find new sources 
of energy and develop more efficient and economical means of energy produc-
tion, and pipelines receive grants for safety and infrastructure improvements 
—so America can power itself� The transportation industry receives many sub-
sidies: highways and roads receive billions of dollars a year for construction and 
maintenance; railroads receive subsidies through land and infrastructure grants 
and loans; passenger rail (Amtrak) receives operating subsidies; transit systems 
receive federal funding for construction and operation; the aviation industry 
receives large grants to support airport construction and maintenance, safety sys-
tems, and air traffic control—so America can keep its economy moving� A review 
of the General Services Administration’s Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance 
provides details on the 2,277 federal assistance programs to industries—many of 
which are considered strategic�47
The maritime industry does receive limited federal funding through the 
Maritime Security Program and various grants to ports and domestic operators� 
Some federal support is also provided through a limited number of tax incentives� 
MARAD is funded to provide for a fleet of forty-six strategic sealift vessels in 
the RRF� However, in total, the U�S� Merchant Marine receives only a minuscule 
amount of federal support� It is certainly not enough to encourage the expansion 
of the U�S�-flag fleet� In fact, the reverse is true� Federal support to the U�S� Mer-
chant Marine engaged in international trade is so limited that the fleet continues 
to shrink to levels that are unacceptable from the standpoint of America’s strate-
gic and economic sealift security� This is a serious problem, considering the criti-
cal importance of commercial shipping to the American economy and military, 
and the present vulnerability created by reliance on foreign-flag shipping, with 
its potential for service disruption�
America doesn’t necessarily require a U�S�-flag merchant marine capable of 
carrying a majority of U�S� imports and exports; but if the language of the Mer-
chant Marine Act of 1936 were upheld, and the U�S�-flag merchant marine carried 
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“a substantial portion” of U�S� commerce (emphasis added), this would reduce 
economic and military reasons for concern regarding potential disruptions in 
shipping, thereby improving America’s security�
Ways of promoting the U�S� Merchant Marine and substantially increasing the 
number of U�S�-flag ships in international trade are available� One is to provide 
additional tax incentives to U�S� carriers, perhaps along with shipper tax incen-
tives� Existing laws and regulations that discourage operators from flagging their 
ships in the United States could be revised� None of these efforts would require 
additional appropriations� As far as tax incentives are concerned, the U�S� Trea-
sury is not currently benefiting from foreign-flag operators paying taxes, so hav-
ing similar tax breaks for a larger number of U�S�-flag operators would have no 
significant impact on tax revenues�
CONCLUSIONS
During the past two years, MARAD has undertaken a major effort to create a 
National Maritime Strategy designed to promote the U�S�-flag shipping indus-
try, particularly that part of the industry engaged in international trade� The 
MARAD effort has been conducted in an inclusive way that has involved listen-
ing sessions and meetings with industry, military, government, and congressio-
nal leaders� As noted previously, Congress also mandated the development of a 
new National Maritime Strategy in the Howard Coble Coast Guard and Marine 
Transportation Act of 2014�
It is clear that, since the founding of our nation, political, military, and mari-
time leaders have understood the importance of the U�S� Merchant Marine and 
realized its strategic and economic importance to America� A survey of Ameri-
can history reveals periods when the industry was supported, and it thrived; in 
contrast, during periods when the industry was not fully supported, it languished 
and declined� Like those of any maritime nation, America’s economy and military 
power are, in part, based on our ability to control and manage commercial sealift�
Alfred Mahan was right: a substantial and capable U�S�-flag merchant marine 
and a powerful navy are equally important components of maritime power� This 
is a lesson that has been reinforced time and time again in American history� 
Simply put, America’s national security depends on both� It is time to commit 
to a new and comprehensive National Maritime Strategy to rebuild America’s 
merchant marine� We must learn from our maritime past, for, as the eighteenth-
century Irish statesman Edmund Burke once said, “Those who don’t know his-
tory are destined to repeat it�”
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 Successful organizations can be extraordinarily persistent and creative in denying the obvious, ignoring signals that suggest a need to challenge key 
strategic assumptions� The U�S� military has been the world’s unrivaled force for 
twenty-five years, even lacking a peer competitor in some domains—naval op-
erations, for example—since 1943� A danger of such sustained success is that the 
military might come to view these strategic assumptions not as ideas requiring 
continual reassessment but as enduring laws� The current and future strategic 
environments demand that the military innovate and question its strategic as-
sumptions, not because we know that they are wrong, but because every theory of 
competition eventually succumbs to new facts�1 The military should be extremely 
sensitive to the risks of believing things that are 
no longer (or may never have been) true; yet it is 
particularly vulnerable to persistent denial, and 
the wartime consequences of such errors are dire� 
These assertions are not ours� The 2014 Qua-
drennial Defense Review (QDR) mandates that 
innovation within the Department of Defense 
(DoD) be a central line of effort� In his assessment 
of the QDR, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
General Martin Dempsey states, “With our ‘ends’ 
fixed and our ‘means’ declining, it is therefore 
imperative that we innovate within the ‘ways’ we 
defend the Nation� Successful innovation, particu-
larly for an organization as large and complex as 
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the U�S� military, is difficult�”2 DoD leaders are also concerned about the align-
ment of current military concepts and capabilities with a dynamic environment�
This article explores how successful organizations focus organizational energy 
and attention on refining their dominant theories of competition, often result-
ing in dysfunctional organizational responses, or systems of denial, to strategic 
anomalies—inconvenient information—that contradict assumptions� Our goal 
is twofold� First, we apply a novel theoretical approach in seeking to make lead-
ers more aware of a persistent strategic vulnerability—that is, how organizations 
ignore or dismiss strategic anomalies (events, ideas, or technologies that con-
tradict core strategic assumptions) through three systems of denial: “killing the 
messenger” by questioning the source of the anomaly; questioning the validity 
or relevance of the anomaly; and revising the competitive theory to make it more 
vague and less testable� Second, we describe six ways leaders can create condi-
tions that increase recognition of anomalies, by creating opportunities to see 
things that are contrary to strategic expectations, as well as to protect anomalies 
from the organization’s systems of denial� Organizations have a mixed record 
on both tasks, and dominant organizations, such as the U�S� military, are almost 
universally bad at the second� Developing appropriate and effective responses is a 
strategic leader responsibility and a fundamental requirement for leading change 
and innovation�
INNOVATION VERSUS SYSTEMS OF DENIAL
The U�S� military seeks a sustainable competitive advantage—it wants to win 
now and in the future� An organization sustains success when its strategy and 
resources align with the opportunities of the competitive environment� In a 
stable environment, dominant organizations (e�g�, the U�S� military) succeed by 
becoming better at executing their existing strategies, focusing on increasing 
efficiencies and improving core capabilities� When the environment changes, 
however, organizations succeed through innovation—developing and experi-
menting with novel strategies, and shifting resources to new approaches� These 
two organizational competencies have been called exploitation and exploration�3 
Yet this presents a paradox: organizations that are good at one tend not to be 
good at the other� 
Dominant organizations have systems that focus organizational energy and 
attention on exploitation—that is, sustaining the status quo and continuing to 
improve what they already do� This is a reasonable result of success� However, 
efficient exploitation often comes at the expense of continued learning and in-
novation� The ironic effect of systems of exploitation is that they generate dys-
functional organizational responses to inconvenient information, what we call 
systems of denial�
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Unlike a business, most of the time military organizations are not actually en-
gaged in competition; they must manufacture competitive conditions� The wars 
that the U�S� military imagines and the competition that it manufactures through 
its scenarios, war games, and simulations reflect its prevalent theories of the secu-
rity environment and the uses of military force� These theories tend to reflect the 
military’s successes in conflicts that may be of dubious relevance to the current 
and future security environments� For example, we believe the experiences of 
Iraq and Afghanistan have been insufficient (perhaps because they were painful) 
to challenge the military’s core assumptions about its required capabilities� After 
these distractions, the U�S� military has reengaged the exploitation behaviors� It 
knows what it does well and is determined to continue to do those things� This 
is good, as long as the things it does well now correspond to the things it actually 
needs to do� But competitive systems change� The danger for a successful orga-
nization is that, absent a significant competitive threat, it tends to fall back on 
comfortable assumptions and ignore, misrepresent, or manipulate information 
and innovations that contradict its most-cherished strategic beliefs� 
For the U�S� military, sustaining dominance will require significant explora-
tion of the emerging competitive environment� The crucial point is not whether 
the military has the correct competitive theories right now but what it does 
when confronted with innovations that suggest its theories may be incomplete 
or wrong� In peace, the military has the luxury to be wrong for a limited but un-
known time, and it is difficult to conclude whether any theory is right or wrong� 
What does the military do with that time? How does it seek new information? 
How does its strategy evolve in response to change and innovation? Continued 
dominance depends on the ability to subject theories of competition to contin-
ued, relentless scrutiny� Unfortunately, competitive dominance tends to frustrate 
this honest exploration� 
When something arises that is contrary to our theoretical expectations, it is an 
anomaly� Though anomalies appear to be failures, they are the essence of prog-
ress, because they provoke further inquiry, lead to new discoveries, and may yield 
new and better theories� Yet organizations often respond to anomalies not by 
subjecting them to honest examination but by ignoring them, suppressing them, 
or manipulating the learning process to protect familiar assumptions�
CHALLENGING THEORIES AND CHANGING MINDS
There is no more venerable military tradition than a healthy skepticism regarding 
new ideas� But such skepticism must be accompanied by openness to new infor-
mation that would lead us to change our minds and, in the case of strategic lead-
ers, to create conditions in which those discoveries can happen� Furthermore, 
when information suggests that assumptions supporting the status quo should 
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be examined, we must be equal opportunity skeptics—we cannot spare the old 
simply because it is comforting�
The assumptions that guide strategies have achieved that status because they 
have worked in the past, doing an excellent job of producing expected results, 
connecting hypotheses to corroborating findings� Theories are discarded when 
two conditions are met: first, the community of inquiry accumulates a sufficient 
number of observations contrary to core theoretical expectations (or anoma-
lies); and second, an alternative theory replaces the old system of explanation�4 
Anomalies arise at various points in the process popularly known as the scientific 
method: observing; theorizing; deducing testable hypotheses from theory; creat-
ing conditions to test those statements (experimentation); observing the results; 
and refining, revising, or rejecting the theory depending on the outcome�5 Once 
the facts no longer accord with expectations, a theory is discredited, and a theory 
that better accords with observation replaces it� 
What does theory mean in the military context? Theories of military competi-
tion are reflected most clearly in operational concepts and doctrine, usually built 
on what has worked in the past� These theories give us the means to organize 
and filter the limitless data of the environment� Without them, the world is just 
disconnected facts� Theories also provide a logical structure from which we 
can derive predictions, and those predictions guide strategic choice� The early 
twentieth-century theory of strategic bombing and the Mahanian concept of 
naval warfare are examples of powerful theories of military competition that al-
lowed military leaders to organize a myriad of information (about technology, 
force structure, and so on) and to derive predictions that drove strategic and 
operational decisions� 
Yet theories are not simply organizing frameworks� The predictions of a good 
theory should be testable or verifiable� Finally and crucially, all theories are 
provisional; a theory is never proven true, but it can at any time be refuted, and 
just one anomalous result may be sufficient to do it (though more anomalies are 
usually required)� Progress in any field depends on the acceptance of the idea 
that theories may be wrong—that the conditions that gave rise to a theory can 
and will change� 
Therefore, theories should be expected to die and be replaced on a regular 
basis, and (in the long term) this appears to be the case� Knowledge increases 
over time� But the short term (which in scientific history can mean decades or 
even centuries) seldom conforms to the rational ideal of the scientific method�6 
Although theories should be subject to the facts, they can survive long after 
the evidence has contradicted their fundamental assumptions� Why? Theories 
shape our understanding of the world� The evolutionary biologist Stephen Jay 
Gould wrote, “Facts do not ‘speak for themselves’; they are read in the light of 
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theory�”7 In other words, “facts” only become facts when we decide, and the tim-
ing and content of our decision depend on our theories� We want to learn the 
right lessons from the past and present, and we want to be prepared for future 
competition and conflict� Yet “right” is not a fixed concept� The process of learn-
ing and anticipation is highly subjective� We seek and interpret facts about the 
past and the present on the basis of theories of the way the world works� The 
past and present are not preselected sets of unambiguous facts with transparent 
causal connections to the present and future� They are more like a gigantic buffet 
of information, and the gathered facts on our little plates depend very much on 
tastes and appetites�
For a scientist who reaches the pinnacle of the geology community by describ-
ing a world in which the continents do not move, the notion that they do move 
(plate tectonics) is not simply a different theory; it is a repudiation of his life’s 
work and the work of his closest colleagues� Impassive acceptance of this kind 
of change is contrary to human nature� We are social and emotional creatures, 
preferring to make inconvenient facts (anomalies) subject to our theories� We do 
this as individuals, and we do this even more in organizations� 
These tendencies are particularly important when the theories of a profession-
al community involve competitive systems in which human beings make strategic 
choices� An organization is a social system with purpose, culture, structure, and 
resources built around a theory (or theories) of competition� In such complex 
and adaptive systems, there is no equivalent to the natural laws of the sciences, 
and therefore theories are much more likely to be wrong� Actors in a competi-
tive system adapt according to the actions of others, changing the behavior of 
the system as a whole�8 Because of these adaptations, all theories of competition 
must be provisional�
 
Successful organizations are marked by an almost single-minded adherence to 
a few core assumptions and are built on an organizational structure and culture 
that both shape and are shaped by a powerful theory of competition� In the con-
text of sustained success, organizations’ theories of competition can be extremely 
resistant to new and inconvenient facts� This is even more pronounced for a 
dominant military, which must imagine or synthetically produce competitive 
forces in peacetime�
Theories of competition are filters that exclude facts that do not fit the com-
petitive model� Such filtration of relevant and irrelevant phenomena is a core 
(and necessary) function of theory—no one can pay attention to everything at 
once� Biologists are unconcerned with gravitational singularities, and economists 
do not worry about the breeding habits of the mayfly� Problems arise when the 
theories exclude phenomena that should be core to strategic choice� Military and 
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business history demonstrates this troublesome legacy of success—that is, when 
theories that were once the basis for dominance become barriers to innovation 
and frustrate adaptation, decision makers become structurally blind to signifi-
cant changes in the environment� The fall of the Polaroid Corporation is a stark 
example of this� 
Through sixty years, Polaroid’s business was built on two powerful assump-
tions: consumers wanted a physical photographic print to preserve a moment, 
and they valued instant gratification�9 Polaroid was served well by these theories� 
In the world of instant photography, there was Polaroid and nothing else� And 
then Polaroid was gone, destroyed by the advent of digital photography� The digi-
tal photography revolution corroborated one of Polaroid’s strategic assumptions 
—the value of instant gratification—but it completely refuted the notion that 
consumers needed a physical print� Curiously, Polaroid pioneered some key 
digital imaging technology and was an early developer of a highly capable digital 
camera� Yet these innovations were ignored and misunderstood, as they did not 
conform to Polaroid’s theory of competition� Polaroid’s final investment in digital 
photography was a compact ink-jet printer to produce the physical print from 
the digital camera, demonstrating the firm’s continued adherence to the dubious 
assumption that consumers needed a physical print�
Similarly questionable assumptions have provoked crises for militaries� 
Consider the following, apparently unobjectionable statements: victory at sea 
depends on the destruction of an enemy’s fleet; freed from a tyrant, a liberated 
people will welcome and cooperate with its liberators�
The first concept was the guiding assumption for Royal Navy strategy at the 
start of both world wars� In both conflicts, the German navy circumvented the 
Royal Navy, avoiding direct engagement and focusing its efforts on building U-
boat force structure and antimerchant operations�10 The Royal Navy’s slowness in 
recognizing the German submarine threat to merchant shipping, and its delay in 
adopting convoy tactics, nearly brought the British war effort to ruin twice within 
a twenty-five-year span�11 These crises were rooted in the Royal Navy’s view of 
the protection of commerce as a mission unworthy of its attention and resources�
The second statement describes the core assumptions of American military 
operations during preparation for the Iraq war and throughout the first three 
years of the conflict� During the crescendo of violence against coalition forces 
in Iraq from 2003 to 2006, U�S� military and civilian leaders insisted that attacks 
were carried out by foreign fighters or that there was no Iraqi insurgency�12 Amer-
ican policy makers and military leaders could not effectively respond to rising 
violence in Iraq until they recognized its sources� Why did they take so long to 
do so? In the absence of discovering weapons of mass destruction, the most im-
portant justification for the war was the liberation narrative, which included the 
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assumption that a liberated people does not kill the liberators� Acknowledgment 
of the insurgency contradicted the dominant theory of the political situation in 
the country and, as a result, delayed changes in American strategy for three years�
In both military cases, the organizations persisted in their erroneous assump-
tions as they followed a path of systematic denial, despite evidence that their 
assumptions were wrong� This persistence is destructive, yet avoidable� It is one 
thing to suffer catastrophe because of the unforeseeable�13 It is another to suffer 
it because we—repeatedly, over an extended period—refuse to see what is right 
in front of us�
In highlighting how an excessive commitment to the dominant current theory 
perverts organizational learning, we do not argue for reflexive abandonment of 
key strategic assumptions� Chaos results from the instantaneous abandonment 
of core assumptions in response to contradictory information� The key is to do it 
right� We now turn to what “wrong” looks like�
THE SYSTEMS OF DENIAL AT WORK
The U�S� military does not have a monopoly on the stubborn adherence to an 
erroneous theory� The history of science is rich with examples, and the methods 
by which scientific communities resist theoretical innovation are instructive� 
Philosophers of science, such as Karl Popper, Thomas Kuhn, and Imre Lakatos, 
have examined the social dynamics of scientific communities and theoretical 
progress�14 Kuhn’s work on scientific revolutions and paradigm shifts has been 
imported to the social sciences� However, Popper’s and Lakatos’s influential 
frameworks for examining how theories are refuted have been largely ignored�15 
Adapting to the military context what Popper called conventionalist strategies 
for defending existing theories against contrary evidence helps us identify three 
dysfunctional responses, or systems of denial, that occur when organizations 
are confronted with information that challenges their core competitive assump-
tions�16 That is, organizations tend to do the following:
• Question the intentions, authority, or legitimacy of the source (colloquially, 
“killing the messenger”)�
• Question the validity, generalizability, or applicability of the information 
(“that doesn’t apply to us”)�
• Revise the theory to make it less testable (and more resistant to refutation)� 
These responses are not in themselves bad� Indeed, each is a fundamental part 
of legitimate inquiry� But they can be misapplied, as often happens in the defense 
of established theories and concepts against an onslaught of information that 
undermines them� Such dysfunctional responses to anomalies are predictable, 
destructive, and preventable� 
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Killing the Messenger: Questioning the Source of the Anomaly 
All inconvenient facts come from some source� If the source of an anomaly is not 
believable, then we are freed from the burden of dealing with the anomaly itself� 
Successfully undermining the source of an anomaly requires that we not only 
convince ourselves of the unreliability of the source but also persuade other key 
stakeholders of that fact�
Lieutenant Colonel Douglas Macgregor’s 1997 book, Breaking the Phalanx, 
criticized U�S� Army structure, culture, and strategy, and recommended sig-
nificant change�17 Macgregor was subsequently dismissed as a complainer with a 
myopic worldview (at best), or treated as a heretic (at worst)�18 “Killing the mes-
senger” can be accomplished in three ways: attack his legitimacy by questioning 
his credentials; attack his credibility by asserting that the source has bad inten-
tions; or make ad hominem attacks� 
When attacking a source’s legitimacy, we question his qualifications in mak-
ing statements or presenting data, based on professional credentials, experience, 
seniority, etc� This approach is preferable to assaults on credibility or ad homi-
nem attacks, because it seeks to discredit someone on the basis of impersonal 
considerations� Convincing people that the messenger does not have the required 
expertise or knowledge fully to understand the phenomenon ends the conversa-
tion� Failing that, we can usually argue that the messenger is not privy to the 
critical information that enables us to understand the situation more fully� In 
the military, a hallmark of this tactic is invoking classification restrictions—for 
example, “If he knew what we knew, he would agree with us�”
A second approach to undermining a source is to question his credibility, cast-
ing doubt on trustworthiness or intentions� We may assert malice of intent, self-
interest, mixed loyalties, or conflicts of interest� Contending that a source wants 
to undermine the organization or that a source benefits from actions taken as a 
result of a change makes it easier to dismiss the source’s criticisms� Questioning 
credibility suggests corruption in the source’s specific motivations—for example, 
“John Doe is criticizing the Army because John Doe hates the Army�”
A third means of discounting a source is a simple ad hominem attack� As 
defined here, ad hominem attacks suggest corruption in the source as a whole� 
Whereas in a credibility attack, we question motive, in an ad hominem attack, 
we seek to undermine the source completely—such as “John Doe is criticizing 
the Army because John Doe is an idiot�” Ad hominem attacks generally take one 
of two forms: abusive or circumstantial�19 Abusive attacks, such as “John Doe is 
an idiot,” involve unambiguous statements that question a source’s mental com-
petence, character, honesty, etc�; in circumstantial attacks we indirectly suggest 
corruption in a source� Because preserving and propagating ambiguity are one 
of the core principles of resisting anomalies (clear statements can be refuted), 
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circumstantial attacks are more devious (and effective) than directly abusive at-
tacks� Guilt by association, in which we note that a source is part of a community 
or organization widely regarded in a negative light, is a classic circumstantial 
attack� For example, saying, “He gets most of his ideas on the role of the military 
from his State Department friends,” may convince many in the military that the 
messenger is not to be trusted� 
While questioning the source is the easiest way to dismiss an anomaly, it also 
incurs risks� When a large, powerful organization is perceived to attack a less 
powerful outsider or a maverick within the organization, the sympathies of key 
stakeholders may be swayed by the natural tendency to root for the underdog� 
For this reason, when effective proxies are available to question a source’s legiti-
macy or credibility, or to attack the source’s character, they tend to be used� Those 
who allow others to do their dirty work for them are more likely to appear to be 
impartial observers�
“But They’re Not Us”: Questioning the Data
Having failed to reject the anomaly on the basis of the messenger, we may ques-
tion the validity of the data� Three classic strategies for challenging data, in order 
of difficulty, are, first, question the results on procedural grounds (“they did 
it wrong”); second, question the generalizability of the data (“it doesn’t apply 
to us”); and third, dismiss the results on the basis of contradictory replication 
studies (“we tried it ourselves, and it didn’t work”)� All three of these arguments 
may be legitimate challenges to inconvenient information, but they may also be 
abused�
Procedural challenges to data involve questioning the way in which the data 
were gathered—focusing on the conduct of the experiment, simulation, war 
game, etc� They free organizations from the necessity of analyzing the results of 
an experiment or the character of the phenomenon� If the outcome is the result 
of nonstandard inputs, then we have an easy escape: “They did it wrong, so the 
results don’t matter�” The complexity of the inputs in competitive environments 
provides myriad opportunities to dismiss data on procedural grounds� Look hard 
enough, and a leader can always find something objectionable in the way that a 
result was produced� The list of excuses is long� 
Even in wartime, when current operations should provide unambiguous 
evidence of failure, militaries have a great capacity for denial� In the first years 
of World War II, the U�S� Navy Bureau of Ordnance refused to acknowledge 
that its Mark 14 torpedo was fundamentally flawed, despite submarine crews’ 
repeated reports of failures� The torpedoes ran too deep and were equipped 
with a flawed magnetic exploder, and “the contact exploder was so fragile that a 
direct hit was sufficient to destroy it without causing the torpedo to explode�”20 
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In the meantime, the bureau blamed the crews, concluding they must be using it 
improperly—a procedural objection to the data� When the bureau finally sent an 
officer to observe whether the error indeed lay with the crews, he was unable to 
find a single fault with the crews’ actions; yet his report still placed all the blame 
for the torpedo problems on the personnel�21 Not until the summer of 1943 would 
a new design resolve the torpedo problem� If this is what military organizations 
can do in a time of war, when lives are being lost, what are organizations capable 
of explaining away in less dire competitive contexts?
Failing to dismiss the data on procedural grounds, we can question the gen-
eralizability of the data themselves; that is, we must demonstrate that the data do 
not apply to us, usually by arguing against an analogy� The potential arguments 
against an analogy are too numerous to catalog here; we highlight two broad 
objections�
First, we may argue that the competitive context—the time, the place, the 
product market, the economic conditions, etc�—is too different for a valid com-
parison� For example, American car manufacturers could have glimpsed their 
own future in the near bankruptcy of Harley-Davidson motorcycles in the early 
1980s� From 1972 to 1982, Harley-Davidson’s U�S� market share in motorcycles 
with an engine displacement exceeding a thousand cubic centimeters dropped 
from 100 percent to 14 percent, as Japanese imports offered better performance, 
fuel efficiency, and reliability—all at lower cost� But motorcycles are not cars, and 
Harley-Davidson’s brush with corporate death was little noted by auto manufac-
turers, except in its demonstration of the appeal of protective tariffs�22 
Second, we may argue that a difference in one of the key actors makes a 
comparison invalid� In this case, we acknowledge that the competitive context 
is comparable, but one of the competitors is not� For example, when a Southeast 
Asian guerrilla force defeats a European ally armed with American weapons and 
fielding an army with veterans of the 1944–45 European campaign in key posi-
tions, we dismiss it because the French are a colonial power in decline, lacking the 
righteous purpose and military strength of the United States�23 The French expe-
rience in Vietnam is therefore judged as irrelevant to American strategy� Arguing 
against the generalizability of an anomaly is easy; the complexity of competitive 
environments provides numerous candidates� 
The final means of questioning data is through a replication study that is engi-
neered to fail—that is, to try to reproduce an anomaly in an environment that we 
control, to demonstrate that the anomaly is not real� Although the spirit of a rep-
lication study is (not surprisingly) to seek to replicate the result of someone else’s 
study or experiment to corroborate a finding, an organization often uses one to 
get the result that it wants� In the early twentieth century, a young American naval 
officer named William Sims sent the Bureau of Ordnance reports documenting 
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astonishing feats of naval gunnery that were based on modifications to equip-
ment and training that he adopted from the Royal Navy� The U�S� Navy initially 
ignored his reports, but Sims persisted� Finally, he was told that his reported 
results were simply impossible� The Navy, it turned out, had conducted a replica-
tion study using Sims’s suggested modifications and had concluded that Sims’s 
results were impossible, because the gun crew could not elevate and depress the 
gun fast enough� 
The failed replication study reveals the power of organizations to deceive 
themselves� The Bureau of Ordnance had conducted the trials on land, mean-
ing that gunnery crews were attempting to elevate and depress the gun without 
the assistance of the compensating roll of the ship; that is, the experiments did 
not replicate conditions at sea, where the gun is elevated on the down roll and 
depressed on the up roll� (As one side of a ship moves downward or upward, its 
motion reduces the force required to elevate or depress the gun at a given rate�) 
Intentionally or not, the bureau ensured that it would arrive at the answer it 
wanted�24
The Shape-Shifting Theory: Resisting Refutation through Constant Theoretical 
Change
It is possible that none of the aforementioned systems of denial will work� The 
source may be reliable (or assaults against him may fail)� The data may be im-
possible to ignore� Does this necessitate abandonment of core assumptions? No� 
In the event that we start to lose the game, we can always change the rules� The 
last refuge of a weak theory is the revision of the theory, usually to make it less 
testable� 
Theoretical revision is not necessarily a bad thing—revising a theory in the 
face of disconfirming information may be exactly the right thing to do� A single 
meaningful result that is contrary to expectation may be sufficient to refute a 
theory, but mature theories are seldom abandoned on the basis of just one anom-
aly� Instead, when an anomaly is accepted as a legitimate challenge to the theory, 
we prefer to revise the theory first—replacing it with another theory as a last 
resort� A successful theory makes predictive statements (if x, then y; or [x → y])� 
Theory revisions modify these statements (while preserving the core theory) 
in one of three ways: redefine the outcome, redefine the phenomenon, or add 
auxiliary hypotheses� 
The distinction between the right and wrong ways to revise a theory is simple: 
proper revisions to theory yield hypotheses that are more testable than they were 
prior to the revision; improper revisions yield hypotheses that are less testable�25 
Indeed, “last refuge” revisions often result in changes that make testing the theory 
extremely difficult, if not impossible� 
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Redefining outcomes and redefining the phenomenon are ways to reframe 
the success or failure of a theory and produce moderate reductions in test-
ability� These tactics capitalize on the complexity and ambiguity of the strategic 
environment—the more complex a phenomenon, the greater the potential for 
disagreement regarding basic concepts such as success and failure, or the essen-
tial characteristics of the phenomenon itself� 
When we redefine the outcome, we change our definition or interpretation 
of success and failure (changing our definition of y in [x → y])� If a theory does 
not produce its predicted result, or if some other theory challenges it, we simply 
change the desired outcome to make the dominant theory appear once again suc-
cessful, or to make the challenging theory appear unsuccessful� For example, dur-
ing World War I, the British defeated the German submarine threat by adopting 
convoy tactics� After the war, the Royal Navy was eager to forget this experience 
and focus on the kind of naval warfare it liked, epitomized by the battle of Jut-
land�26 When naval planners reflected on the effectiveness of convoy operations, 
they emphasized that the convoy escorts had sunk just twenty out of 178 total 
German submarines destroyed during the war� This amounts to changing the 
rules of the game� As Holger Herwig observes, “They refused to recognize that 
what counted was not the number of submarine ‘kills,’ but rather the number of 
merchantmen safely in port�”27 Under the new performance measure, convoys 
appeared ineffective and were therefore easier to forget� Redefinition of outcomes 
may delay refutation by forcing a theory’s opponents to justify prior definitions of 
success or failure, or to seek to refute the theory under the new definitions (and 
therefore execute another round of observation and experimentation)� 
The testability of a theory is also reduced if the new outcomes resist clear mea-
surement or observation� Sometimes an outcome is only partially observable or 
cannot be observed at all, or it cannot be observed under the desired conditions� 
This is almost always true of strategic outcomes� Even with a consensus regard-
ing the definition of success or failure, there may be disagreement about what 
actually happened� What was the outcome of the Iraq war? Who lost? Who won? 
These are simple questions without simple answers� Many theories of that con-
flict can find some justification in historical evidence� The potential for redefini-
tion of what “winning” means and for reinterpretation of the actual outcomes is 
almost limitless�
Redefining the phenomenon (changing our definition of x in [x → y]) offers 
another potent means of resistance to refutation� We do not just change the defi-
nitions or interpretations of success and failure; we change the entire framework 
for measurement� If a review of the utility of the aircraft carrier reveals that its 
core role as the instrument of attack for the Navy has been rendered obsolete 
by the combination of low-end adversaries that offer few worthwhile targets for 
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aerial strikes and high-end adversaries who make carriers too difficult to protect 
within their effective strike range, we may defend the carrier by broadening our 
definition of what it is: not only an attack platform but also a symbol of American 
power� Thus, the carrier’s symbolic value becomes a key measure of performance� 
Testing this proposition requires that we measure how effective the carrier is as 
a symbol, but the concept is so fuzzy that it defies measurement� This makes it 
particularly appealing as a theoretical defense for the carrier concept�
A third approach to theory revision is the modification of the theory itself� We 
say that x is going to result in y, but when we do x, something unexpected (dif-
ferent from y) happens� In such circumstances, the concept may yet be preserved 
by adding auxiliary—literally, “helping”—hypotheses to explain y� An auxiliary 
hypothesis adds conditions to our predictions when our predictions turn out to 
be incorrect—that is, changing the prediction from (x → y) to (w & x → y)� It is 
not inherently wrong to do this� Indeed, auxiliary hypotheses are a central aspect 
of the refinement of existing theories� 
One of the best examples of proper theory revision comes from nineteenth-
century astronomy, when scientists noticed that the planet Uranus’s orbit failed 
to follow the path predicted by Newtonian physics� Instead of abandoning New-
ton’s laws and searching for a better alternative, astronomers postulated that an 
undiscovered, more distant planet was affecting the orbit of Uranus� Using the 
actual path of Uranus’s orbit, two mathematicians told astronomers where to 
look, calculating both the probable mass and position of the unknown planet� 
Neptune was soon discovered very close to the predicted position� Newton’s 
theory was corroborated, but our model for the structure of the solar system had 
to be revised�
The story of Neptune’s discovery illustrates the key characteristic of a good 
auxiliary hypothesis: it imposes a higher experimental or observational test� Pos-
tulating not only the existence of an undiscovered planet but also its mass and 
position was a precise and highly improbable prediction (i�e�, the random chance 
of finding a planet in that part of space was extremely—almost infinitesimally 
—low)� That the planet was found was a great achievement of the theory of New-
tonian physics� Note that we may lack the technical capability to perform the test; 
for example, it took centuries for astronomers to verify the distances of the stars 
that were postulated by the adoption of the Copernican system� The key is that an 
effective auxiliary hypothesis postulates something that drives further inquiry� In 
resisting innovation, however, organizations often employ auxiliary hypotheses 
in a way that hinders learning�
The main indicator of a bad auxiliary hypothesis is that it cannot be unam-
biguously measured or verified, and therefore cannot be refuted� In the years 
leading up to World War I, the theory of warfare favored by the British and the 
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French was what historian Tim Travers calls “the cult of the offensive�”28 However, 
when the British army suffered terrible losses in assaults in the early battles of the 
Boer War, European observers were disturbed� Why would a continental army 
trained and hardened by years of colonial warfare and equipped with the latest 
weaponry struggle so much against an irregular force? The advent of modern 
firepower (mobile, rapid-firing artillery; accurate, rapid-loading rifles; and ma-
chine guns) meant that an advancing force could no longer protect itself with its 
own fires� At least it appeared that way� To preserve the theory of the offensive, 
strategists needed to come up with an alternative explanation for why the Brit-
ish failed� A widely articulated auxiliary hypothesis was that the British army 
lacked the proper spirit to carry out effective offensive operations on the modern 
battlefield� This explanation arises from procedural objections to the anomaly; 
in essence, the British did not do it right (“it” being the offensive)�29 The beauty 
of this auxiliary hypothesis is that it has the quality most essential to defensive 
revisions of a weak theory: it cannot be refuted� 
Auxiliary hypotheses can be very effective in providing a theory with an im-
penetrable barrier to refutation� If we propose, “An attacking force with a ratio 
of at least five to one within the area of assault will be successful in the assault, 
regardless of the defensive fortifications and firepower,” we have the potential 
to be refuted� The ratio is verifiable� A single example of a sufficiently superior 
force failing in the assault will contradict the hypothesis� However, if we revise the 
prediction as follows, “An attacking force with high morale and a ratio of at least 
five to one within the area of assault will be successful in the assault, regardless 
of the defensive fortifications and firepower,” we have compromised the theory� 
The addition of three small words has made our statement impervious to refuta-
tion� Any time an assault fails, we can dismiss it as a failure not of the concept (or 
training, equipment, etc�), but of morale, a conveniently unmeasurable quality� 
Irrefutable statements are the hallmark of a bad theory� As the scientist Richard 
Fortey observes, “The theories that can cause much more trouble are those that 
can twist and turn in a breeze of new facts without ever fracturing completely�”30
We have described three organizational tendencies that form a powerful system 
of denial in response to inconvenient information� How can the military avoid 
making common mistakes in responding to data that contradict its theories of 
what does and does not work? What can a leader do to discourage these behav-
iors and encourage the right responses? While there is no simple solution, in the 
following section we describe six practices that will improve a leader’s chances to 
“beat the system” of denial, to identify anomalies and follow up with a balanced 
and thoughtful exploration of what they mean� 
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SIX WAYS TO BEAT THE SYSTEM (OF DENIAL)
Building organizational skill in recognizing and analyzing novel phenomena is 
the means by which we seize control of strategic innovation� If we fail to alter our 
theories in the absence of dangerous competition—when we have the time and 
luxury to do so—we will be compelled to do it through painful experience, under 
less appealing conditions� Effective military leaders must create an environment 
in which organizations identify anomalies in the external environment; seek 
anomalies through their own exploratory activities; and revise their strategic as-
sumptions (theories of competition) to make them more testable or replace them 
with alternatives� For these three tasks we recommend six practices and explain 
them in approximate order of the required commitment in time and resources 
(low at the beginning, high at the end)�
Identify Anomalies in the External Environment
Military organizations must develop sensitivity to anomalies as they arise in the 
external environment� Yet organizations function by channeling and filtering 
information, and by directing leaders’ attention� These processes are necessary 
to the normal functioning of organizations; without channels, filters, and direc-
tion, we would be overwhelmed by unstructured data� But leaders must develop 
mechanisms for recognizing important changes that arise outside these channels� 
Conduct Formal Thought Experiments with the Help of a Team. On a regular 
basis, leaders must specify what new information or changes in environmental 
conditions would cause them to question or abandon their core assumptions� In 
essence, leaders need to imagine when they would change their minds� This is 
perhaps the most fundamental of all skills required in leading innovation�
We like to believe that when the facts change, we change our minds� But the 
recognition of such changes depends on whether we are looking for them, and we 
find them more readily when we seek them in response to a question that we have 
already asked� We recommend that at regular intervals, leaders work with a team 
built specifically for this purpose�31 The product of the team’s work is a formal 
description of core strategic assumptions (at least three, no more than five) and 
events or facts that would invalidate those assumptions� What signals would sug-
gest that assumptions are at risk? At these meetings, leaders and other team mem-
bers make “reputational bets” about the environment and their strategic assump-
tions�32 For example, the force structure of the Air Force reflects the technological 
limitations of munitions� Fighter jets exist not for their own sake but because 
small, numerous platforms are required to get close enough to strike enemy air 
and ground forces� Efficient directed-energy weapons would potentially upend 
this framework, favoring the development of large, “mother ship” platforms that 
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would destroy targets from great distances using energy traveling at the speed of 
light� At some point, Air Force modernization and force structure would need 
to change radically to realize the potential of these weapons� What events in the 
environment would signal a need to begin such change? A thought experiment is 
a commitment to reexamine core assumptions when the facts change�
A structured thought experiment serves four important purposes� First, it 
helps us to identify core assumptions; the principles that lie at the heart of our 
theories are often so familiar to us that they are invisible� We treat them as laws of 
nature, never to be questioned, not as assumptions that are inherently provision-
al� Second, it forces us to make formal commitments to reviewing our theories� 
Refutation is a matter of degree, not absolutes, and we can always reconcile facts 
to our chosen theories� Nevertheless, if we say that we shall change our minds 
if x happens, and x actually happens, then we must either change our minds, 
or explain how we have adjusted our assumptions to accommodate x. Third, in 
identifying conditions that would prompt us to change our minds, we become 
more likely to recognize those conditions if they arise� This is a crucial point: 
the simple act of naming something makes us more likely to see it� Finally, the 
thought experiment highlights the parts of our system of assumptions that are not 
subject to facts� We do not wish to denigrate the role of faith (or its close cousin, 
intuition) in strategy development� However, wherever faith becomes the main 
support of an assumption, a leader should create mechanisms in the organization 
through which those who do not share that faith have the freedom, the power, 
and the resources to challenge the status quo�
Don’t Succumb to the Tyranny of Expertise; Institutionalize Brokerage. Leaders 
must have the wisdom to separate the messenger, however abrasive, from the 
message� Challenges to orthodoxy are more likely to come from sources that 
stand outside the dominant strategic system for the very reason that they are 
outside the system� They are not captured by our theories and are more likely to 
see emergent inconsistencies between our core assumptions and strategic reality� 
First, we must overcome the tyranny of expertise� We may believe that only 
the experts are qualified to comment on a theory’s soundness� However, those 
who have the strongest credentials under an existing theory also tend to be cre-
dentialed by a system that has arisen around that theory� That is, their status as 
experts is not independent of the theory; it is a product of the theory’s success to 
date� Those we trust the most as experts are often the least likely to recognize and 
identify anomalies� For instance, Air Force pilots were not the early proponents 
of unmanned aerial systems�33
Second, the perspective and openness required to identify potential anoma-
lies, the willpower to create a context for revealing them, and the moral courage 
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to point them out may be correlated with personality characteristics that make 
such sources more susceptible to messenger-killing tactics� Those with the con-
fidence and imagination to propose anomalies frequently lack the social intelli-
gence and savoir faire required to persuade audiences of the importance of their 
insights� Iconoclasts like American military-aviation pioneer Billy Mitchell and 
British strategist Basil Liddell Hart often fail to differentiate between potential 
allies and enemies within the organization, alienating those who would support 
their positions� Anomalies are likely to come from sources that are vulnerable to 
questions of credibility and legitimacy� Leaders must serve as advocates for such 
challenging perspectives�
Leaders can foster the development of officers who are sensitive to external 
viewpoints by institutionalizing brokerage� In social networks, a broker is a node 
in the network that connects groups that are not otherwise connected� The social 
theorist Ronald Burt has argued that brokers are more likely to have good ideas 
because they see actual and potential combinations that others cannot�34 The 
highly cohesive and almost cloistered networks of military personnel do not lend 
themselves to creating mental and organizational environments that challenge 
conventional wisdom� 
Institutionalizing brokerage means creating opportunities for members of the 
organization to work with other entities, particularly those with different theories 
of competition� This requires that military organizations reward officers with 
high-quality “broadening” experiences, including not only joint and interagency 
work but also exchanges with foreign militaries and meaningful service in think 
tanks, universities, laboratories, and even private firms� Brokerage is about build-
ing ties to communities that are more likely to see the environment differently� In 
this way, the organization is more likely to perceive changes that would usually 
be filtered out or ignored, and to be exposed to different theories of competition� 
Deliberately Seek and Explore Anomalies
Leaders should use internal organizational resources to seek out and explore 
anomalies, to anticipate and drive change� The two recommendations above seek 
to increase the probability that organizations will recognize anomalies in the 
external environment� Yet leaders are not only at the mercy of events—they can 
shape events, as well�
Experiments are one of the most powerful tools available to organizations, yet 
strategic leaders seldom take advantage of them, because they lack understand-
ing of experimental design and how to operationalize experimental principles in 
nonscientific contexts�35 A good experiment must have at least three character-
istics: it must vary from normal organizational practices in some fundamental 
way, and the variance must be isolated to allow for measurement or comparison; 
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it must have the potential to produce a surprising result; and it must be relevant 
to the theory—it must have the potential to call into question the existing theory, 
or to suggest that a new theory offers a better explanation of the phenomenon�36 
We recommend the following two practices to leverage the learning opportuni-
ties in experimentation�
Create Space for Planned and Unplanned Variance. The more variance we toler-
ate, the more likely we are to learn� This fact must be weighed against the risks 
that accompany experimentation� Where we introduce different treatments and 
how much variance we tolerate are questions requiring serious consideration� We 
cannot perform experiments that jeopardize lives or undermine public trust, for 
example� But without variance, there is no experiment�
Leaders are responsible for creating and fostering both formal (planned) and 
informal (unplanned) variance� Pilot programs, war games, simulations, and 
experimental units are examples of mechanisms for planned variance� Strategy 
development is well suited to simultaneous implementation and evaluation of 
several different experimental interventions—rapid prototyping� Not everything 
will be fruitful, but what works and what does not work are both learning op-
portunities� Persistent and widespread experimentation increases the probability 
that you will find a subset that improves your understanding� Clearly, the wars in 
Iraq and Afghanistan created opportunities (and necessities) for constant experi-
mentation� The question left unanswered is, to what extent did the results of these 
experiments change the deeply held assumptions of any of the military services?
A second means to introduce variance is through informal experimentation� 
The potential for learning from user innovation is tremendous, though it pre sents 
its own set of difficulties� Linus’s law of software debugging, as interpreted by Eric 
Raymond, posits, “Given enough eyeballs, all bugs are shallow�” By “shallow,” 
Raymond means that a problem is susceptible to solution� More people dealing 
creatively with problems of discovery “increases the probability that someone’s 
toolkit will be matched to the problem in such a way that the bug is shallow to 
that person�”37 User innovation leverages a similar community of exploration and 
experimentation, and it requires that leaders tolerate unplanned variance�
Create Conditions in Which Surprising Experimental Results Are Not Just 
Possible—but Desired. When organizations are biased in favor of confirming 
their strategic assumptions, experimentation is concerned with validating ex-
isting concepts, which may be done through highly engineered exercises that 
only fail to produce the expected result when somebody makes an error� This 
is a gross misuse of the term experiment. For example, the 2002 U�S� military 
MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE war games and joint exercises illustrated some effective 
aspects of experimental design and procedure� The opposing force in MILLENNIUM 
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CHALLENGE introduced battlefield conditions that varied considerably from nor-
mal practice, and the results of this variance were surprising� In these two re-
spects, the experiment was well conceived and executed� Instead of interpreting 
this information as a signal that the organization should scrutinize its conceptual 
assumptions, it responded to the surprise by resetting the game, eliminating the 
problematic variance, and producing the validating result that it desired�38 This 
was a squandered opportunity� Avoiding this error requires a shift of mind in how 
we assess success and failure in experimentation� We need to recognize that some 
failure is noble, and some success is empty� 
The challenge for innovative leaders is engineering the competitive context in 
a way that reveals problems with the organization’s dominant theories� In war, the 
enemy provides that context� In peace, the military must manufacture it artifi-
cially through war games, simulations, exercises, etc�39 Effective experimentation 
requires reframing “winning” in strategy development�40 When the goal of explo-
ration and experimentation is innovation, objectives should emphasize outcomes 
that test established strategic concepts and challenge existing assumptions� In this 
context, failure in an experiment, whether a war game or a product pilot, should 
be valued for the opportunity that it provides to revise and refine the concept 
under examination or to suggest a viable alternative� A leader must persuade the 
organization that a surprising outcome in a war game or simulation is not just 
acceptable but desirable� Such surprises are the means by which we identify new 
problems, create an impetus for change, and develop a structure for innovation� 
By reframing the objectives of experimentation, organizations will be more likely 
to discover those new problems�
Experiments should create variance in areas that pertain to meaningful stra-
tegic assumptions� In the event that a result contradicts expectations, the experi-
ment should provoke theoretical revision and further experimentation� Leader-
ship owns the strategic assumptions in a military service, and leaders should be 
intensely interested in challenging those assumptions�
Revise the Theory the Right Way, or Replace It with Something Better 
In our first recommendation, we proposed a thought experiment for identifying 
the conditions that would prompt us to change or modify our assumptions� But 
what happens when those conditions arise? Our final two recommendations 
concern how leaders can foster the development of new theories and turn those 
theories into operational reality�
Make the Old Theory Work for a Living. The way in which we articulate ideas 
influences our subsequent search for the truth� Recognizing an anomaly and 
supporting innovation do not require that we abandon established ways of do-
ing things; we always have the option of modifying our current theories with an 
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appropriate auxiliary hypothesis� The key is to use auxiliary hypotheses not to 
shore up established theories by making irrefutable statements but to refine theo-
ries by increasing their testability, or to develop alternative theories� For example, 
“All weapons-release decisions require a human input” is a universal statement of 
a principle governing the use of drones� It expresses a theory about the limits of 
full autonomy, and it creates a condition in which the theory will be challenged� 
If we identify a case in which we would accept a fully autonomous kill decision, 
we have invalidated the principle of universally limited autonomy� At this point, 
we have two valid options for reformulating our theory�
First, we can add a testable auxiliary hypothesis to the old theory: “All weapons- 
release decisions require human input when conditions a, b, and c hold�” This cre-
ates conditions in which the revised theory is still falsifiable, as will occur when 
we show that a drone can be fully autonomous under conditions a, b, and c� This 
is crucial to learning�
The second option is that we scrap our old theory and begin to develop a new 
theory to explain full autonomy� Innovation becomes a matter of building a new 
and vaguely defined theory of automation, not a defensive withdrawal to protect 
the old theory of human control� The move from a theory of human control of 
kill decisions that has auxiliary hypotheses to a preliminary theory of full au-
tomation may take a long time, or it may be swift� Much depends on whether 
change begins during peace or war�
If we modify a theory in response to anomalies, the modification should 
always be in the direction of greater testability—that is, the statements that we 
derive from our modified theory should be more refutable� As noted earlier, or-
ganizations tend to do the opposite, making theories impervious to refutation by 
layering on untestable statements� Leaders set the tone for organizational inquiry� 
When it comes to challenging our assumptions, the Fabian approach (a military 
strategy that avoids decisive conflict) to theory defense should not be tolerated� 
We must be relentless in subjecting our old assumptions to new tests�
Build Organizational Units That Succeed with a New Theory. At the individual 
level, it is almost impossible to review evidence without bias; our theories are 
powerful lenses that distort our reading of the facts� Yet leaders can guide explo-
ration at the organizational level to ensure that someone seeks in good faith to 
verify, reproduce, and expand on the findings of anomalies� Essentially, the leader 
needs to engineer competition such that at least one alternative theory competes 
with the established view, and that the two (or more) theories have a level playing 
field� Adjudicating a theoretical competition is hard, but not having any competi-
tion at all is worse� 
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The creation of organizations that are free to construct a new culture based 
on new ideas about what works is a powerful leadership tool� In his theory of 
disruptive innovation, Clayton Christensen describes how established firms can 
overcome resistance to innovations by creating semiautonomous units that suc-
ceed by finding a viable business for a new product� 
Established firms are often driven out of business later by new, smaller firms 
that develop what appear to be inferior or irrelevant technologies in new markets� 
The smaller firms move into the dominant firms’ core market when the innova-
tion improves enough to meet customer requirements in the core business� To 
avoid this fate, Christensen recommends that established firms spin off an inde-
pendent organization that lives or dies by the new (and for the time being, infe-
rior) technology� He writes, “Creating an organizational context in which this ef-
fort can prosper will be crucial, because rational resource allocation processes in 
established companies consistently deny disruptive [innovations] the resources 
they need to survive, regardless of the commitment senior management may 
ostensibly have made to the program�”41 
Successful organizations usually excel at innovating in areas that are relevant 
to core strategic concepts� However, when an innovation does not conform to 
the organization’s dominant concept, leaders can create organizational structures 
that support the new approach� This involves creating and resourcing organiza-
tions that survive by doing things that meet current market needs and, in the 
process, identify new markets for their products� Such organizations must do 
more than just produce good ideas� They must find a market (in military terms, 
a valid/current mission) for the innovation, an application that demonstrates—
even on a small scale—the effectiveness of the innovation sufficient to guarantee 
a flow of financial resources� Absent this demonstration, the innovation will be 
deprived of resources, resulting in underinvestment (if not abandonment)� It 
is not enough to create new organizational structures around innovative ideas� 
Markets are what organizations resource, and the leader must create a structural 
context in which potentially disruptive innovations are linked to current mission 
requirements�
We need not highlight how difficult it is to execute these ideas� There are no 
simple answers to the key questions� Who will be assigned to the new organiza-
tion? What implications will that assignment have for their careers? Who will 
fight for resources in the budget for the new entity, especially after its creator or 
advocate retires or is reassigned? These are challenging problems, but a support-
ive organizational design is a powerful tool for developing strategic alternatives, 
as Admiral William Moffett demonstrated in setting conditions for the develop-
ment of the naval aviation community in the 1920s�42
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None of This Works without Educated Officers
Underlying all of these recommendations is an inescapable reality: we need intel-
ligent, open-minded leaders—men and women who understand the fundamental 
principles of logic and evidence, are nimble enough to recognize the significance 
of strategic anomalies, and have the mental tools to think of what to do next� 
At each level of officer development, we must demand that officers learn and 
relearn core principles of epistemology: logic, scientific reasoning, and research 
methods� Instruction on logic should include deductive (rational) and inductive 
(empirical) reasoning, as well as inference to the best explanation� Instruction 
on scientific reasoning should review the basics of the philosophy of science� 
What is a theory? What are the characteristics of a good theory? How do we 
choose among competing theories? What is the scientific method and how 
much does it correspond to science as practiced? What constitutes scientific 
proof or contradiction? What are the prominent historical models of scientific 
discovery? Instruction on research methods should include both inferential and 
Bayesian statistical approaches, probability, measurement, experimental design, 
and natural experiments� We do not argue that this material must be covered in 
great depth� But at present the overwhelming majority of senior officers have no 
background in these concepts�
Sustaining dominance requires significant exploration of the emerging com-
petitive environment� The crucial point is not whether the U�S� military has the 
correct competitive theories right now but what it does when confronted with 
innovations that suggest its theories may be incomplete or wrong� 
Systems of denial cause organizations to persist in their comfortable assump-
tions, despite evidence that the world is changing and that these changes may be 
dangerous� The systems of denial—killing the messenger, questioning the data, 
and resisting refutation through constant theoretical change—are powerful ways 
in which organizations ignore inconvenient information� Overcoming them de-
mands that a leader focus on the counterfactual work of organizational change—
understanding what is not happening and which possibilities are not being 
discovered, explored, developed, evaluated, or implemented—and why it is not 
happening� This requires understanding how inconvenient facts are resisted and 
developing a strategy for overcoming that resistance� As military leaders pursue 
initiatives that increase sensitivity to new conditions in the external environment, 
as they encourage experimentation, and as they invest attention and resources in 
developing new theories, they will find that the system of denial gives way to a 
different system—one of learning, of insight and foresight, and of change� This 
is the way of progress�
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 As the world’s only superpower, the United States of America finds itself chal-lenged by adversaries who know they cannot confront it directly, toe to toe, 
on traditional battlefields, or on or under the world’s oceans�1 In their attempts to 
follow Sun Tzu’s instruction to “subdue the enemy without fighting,” potential ad-
versaries of the United States continuously assess and probe American strengths 
and weaknesses to identify vulnerabilities for military, political, and industrial 
exploitation� It is not fully appreciated, assessed, or addressed by American policy 
makers and warfighters how vulnerable the U�S� military is to the threat of “law-
fare,” both international and domestic environmental� 
The leading expert on lawfare, Brigadier General Charles J� Dunlap, Jr�, U�S� 
Air Force (Ret�), defines it as the use or abuse of law and legal processes as a 
substitute for traditional military means to achieve military objectives�2 Both in-
ternational environmental-protection political processes and American domestic 
environmental-protection laws and judicial processes offer tempting targets for 
exploitation by weaker adversaries willing to engage in political and legal lines of 
operations against superior U�S� military technologies and capabilities�3 
The authors believe that it is possible for a competitor or potential enemy to 
use systemic American vulnerabilities to wage a campaign of misinformation and 
legal challenges to reduce U�S� military and antisubmarine-warfare readiness� In 
particular, this article focuses on how adversaries could use environmental law-
fare covertly to wage war against the use of active sonar during testing, training, 
Can the U.S. Navy Fall Victim to This Asymmetric Warfare Threat? 
Michael T. Palmer and J. Michael Johnson
The supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting. 
SUN TZU
A federal judge has ruled in favor of environmentalists who assert the 
Navy has vastly underestimated the threat to marine mammals posed by 
its use of sonar and explosives during training off Southern California 
and Hawaii.
LOS ANGELES TIMES, 1 APRIL 2015
UNDERSEA LAWFARE 
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and operations� Allowed to proceed unchecked heretofore, this use of undersea 
lawfare may already be providing potential adversaries an inexpensive way of 
reducing the antisubmarine-warfare capabilities of the U�S� Navy and its allies� 
This article is intended to stimulate action by warfighters and policy makers to 
identify, assess, and address this threat� 
The article begins with an overview of asymmetric warfare, an introduction to 
lawfare as a form of warfare, and some historical examples of international law-
fare� It then analyzes the potential military lawfare vulnerabilities to international 
environmental bodies and political processes as well as to American domestic 
environmental-protection laws and judicial processes� The article concludes with 
some lawfare threat-assessment indicators and possible courses of action� 
ASYMMETRIC WARFARE / LAWFARE
Asymmetric warfare threats are nothing new�4 Noting that “at the dawn of the 
21st century, the United States of America faces a broad and complex array of 
chal lenges to our national security,” the White House’s 2010 National Security 
Strategy stated, “In addition to facing enemies on traditional battlefields, the 
United States must now be prepared for asymmetric threats�”5 Reiterating the 
domestic threat posed by this mode of warfare, the Department of Defense’s 2013 
Strategy for Homeland Defense and Defense Support of Civil Authorities states, 
“Potential nation-state adversaries will continue to refine asymmetric attack 
plans against the homeland as part of their concepts of operation and broader 
military strategies of confrontation with the United States�”6 It now becomes a 
matter of identifying and neutralizing these threats�
By their very nature, asymmetric nontraditional threats come in myriad forms 
and are especially difficult to conceptualize and combat� Knowing this, policy 
makers and warfighters must engage in rigorous and comprehensive strategic, 
operational, and tactical vulnerability self-assessments to identify and mitigate 
future challenges� In the past, these self-assessments have focused almost exclu-
sively on a limited number of more traditional asymmetric threats (e�g�, cyber 
and terrorist)� Unfortunately, as the 9/11 attack and the recent North Korean 
cyber attacks more than amply demonstrated, asymmetric threats are often not 
identified in time to prevent damage; more-effective and more-meaningful as-
sessments must account for creative and novel attacks� Consideration of the entire 
spectrum of potential asymmetric threats requires truly imaginative thinking� 
Such thinking cannot simply ignore previously unidentified threats to U�S� 
military capabilities and the changing nature of warfare� In their 1999 book Unre-
stricted Warfare, Colonels Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui of the Chinese People’s 
Liberation Army address some mechanisms a nation such as China can use to 
defeat a technologically superior adversary, such as the United States�7 Noting 
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the narrow American focus on technology, Qiao and Wang argue that the United 
States is particularly vulnerable to attack along nontechnological legal, economic, 
and terrorist lines.8 The U.S. Department of Defense in its 2005 National Defense 
Strategy acknowledged the issue: “Our strength as a nation state will continue to 
be challenged by those who employ a strategy of the weak using international 
forums, judicial processes, and terrorism.”9 Thus, an adversary’s use (or misuse) of 
international political processes, domestic laws, and judicial processes constitutes 
a recognized and potentially feasible asymmetric threat. 
INTERNATIONAL LAWFARE
The term “lawfare” may be of recent vintage, but its practice in international 
forums is not new. Weaker nation-states have long used international legal pro-
cesses, world opinion, and domestic political support to try to level the playing 
field and neutralize an adversary’s technological or other advantages. Qiao and 
Wang describe international law warfare as “seizing the earliest opportunity to 
set up regulations.”10 This initiative allows an adversary to define the “problem,” 
control the agenda, force adverse responses, and achieve desired results. 
Historically, weaker parties have attempted to achieve such leveling by as-
serting that a stronger party’s technology, weapons, or doctrines violate the 
international law of armed conflict. When successful, these efforts achieve an in-
expensive, asymmetric, nonkinetic impact that restricts a stronger nation-state’s 
military capabilities while undercutting its strategic or operational advantage. A 
historical example of the use of an international agreement to obtain and secure 
a strategic advantage is the attempt at the 1856 Congress of Paris to set limits to 
naval warfare by closing the Black Sea to all warships.11 Other instances, involving 
operational or tactical advantages, are Pope Urban II’s ban on the use of the cross-
bow against Christians in 1097; the Saint Petersburg Declaration of 1868, which 
prohibited explosive bullets under forty grams in weight; and the Convention of 
1899, which banned the use of expanding (“dumdum”) ammunition.12 
Modern examples of parties using international bodies, other forums, and the 
Internet to limit U.S. military capabilities include efforts to shut down the deten-
tion facility at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba; to ban the testing of nuclear weapons; 
and to prohibit land mines, cluster munitions, space weapons, blinding lasers, 
drones, etc.13 An excellent illustration of international lawfare is the ongoing at-
tempt to blunt superior U.S. military technological capabilities by arguing that 
laser-guided “smart bomb” munitions render traditional “dumb bomb” kinetic 
munitions impermissibly indiscriminate under the law of armed conflict.14 The 
above cases may be motivated solely by humanitarian concerns, but they make 
clear how malevolent or hostile actors could exercise lawfare for military and 
national strategic advantages.15 
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All of this appears to have been given only limited consideration by historians, 
policy makers, or warfighters, and that usually focused on an adversary’s use or 
misuse of international law, mostly the law of war or of armed conflict� Nothing 
limits the exploitation of international or domestic laws and legal processes to 
achieve strategic, operational, or tactical advantage� The option to exploit Ameri-
can environmental-protection processes and laws is particularly attractive, given 
their particular susceptibility to abuse and manipulation� 
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAWFARE 
The environmental subset of lawfare is the use or misuse of environmental-
protection laws and legal processes as a substitute for traditional military means 
to achieve objectives�16 What would such a campaign against the United States, 
specifically against the Navy’s antisubmarine capabilities, look like? To follow the 
Unrestricted Warfare playbook: adversaries, operating through activist environ-
mental organizations—their knowing or unknowing proxies—would manipulate 
influential international forums, conferences, or governing bodies in a multi-
pronged strategy to neutralize particular U�S� military superiorities, whether 
technological, tactical, or strategic�
An adversary’s first need is for a proxy� Failing to co-opt an authentic well-
intentioned environmental group, it must create an entity that appears to be one, 
that closely parallels the structure and operations of such successful nongov-
ernmental organizations (NGOs) as the Natural Resources Defense Council or 
Greenpeace�17 These organizations’ activities would include fund-raising, press 
conferences, press releases, blogs, websites, social media campaigns, lobbying, 
meetings, conferences, and symposia, as well as partnerships with other respect-
ed NGOs and influential organizations, universities, and individuals and spon-
sorship of “research�” To the public, these activities would appear to be legitimate, 
if not noble, aimed solely at the protection of marine mammals or the promotion 
of other oceanic environmental causes� In these ways proxy environmental NGOs 
would achieve significant leverage, building on the infrastructure, strategic com-
munications, and other achievements of the scores of legitimate groups� Ideally, 
from the adversary’s viewpoint, they could perform as self-funded, self-sufficient, 
and perpetual “launch and forget” weapons� 
Next would be the development and execution of an effects-based, multime-
dia, external strategic communications plan� This plan would be centered on a 
comprehensive, well-resourced, and emotion-based public relations campaign 
that attempts to create both an “environmental crisis” and an “international con-
sensus�” That consensus would point to a predetermined solution that only the 
proxy group can provide and that is, not coincidentally, inimical to targeted U�S� 
military capabilities� 
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Recent efforts by (doubtless genuine) environmentalists demonstrate the po-
tential effects of international strategic communications campaigns on military 
readiness� For example, environmentalists have expended significant effort and 
expense in public relations and strategic communications campaigns to “corre-
late” military active-sonar use with worldwide marine-mammal mass strandings� 
These events include, but are not limited to, the Canary Islands (1985, 1988, 1989, 
2002, 2004), Greece (1996), the U�S� Virgin Islands (1998, 1999), the Bahamas 
(2000), Madeira (2000), the northwest coast of the United States (2003), and the 
coast of North Carolina (2005)�18
Let us set aside the emotional message of the environmentalists and look at 
the facts� The Navy has been using active sonar for testing and training for over 
eighty-five years in the waters listed above and in other waters under the same 
conditions� Despite millions of dollars’ worth of dedicated research, NGOs and 
other groups have been unable to present a single persuasive, peer-reviewed, 
empirically based, scientific study that definitively links military sonar use to sig-
nificant long-term adverse physiological impacts on marine mammals� At best, 
opponents of military sonar have “correlated” worldwide antisubmarine training 
and active-sonar employment with the stranding of approximately fifty marine 
mammals during the period 1996–2006, an average of five per year� The loss of 
five marine mammals per year to military sonar use pales in comparison to the 
estimated six hundred thousand marine mammals killed each year in the same 
period by commercial fisheries�19 In the meantime, countries such as Iceland, 
Norway, and Japan continue to hunt whales, Japan alone accounting for nearly 
two thousand whale deaths a year under its controversial “research” and other 
treaty exemptions�20 
Despite these facts, the campaign against Navy training activities and active 
sonar use has been, by any measure, spectacularly successful� Given the relative 
lack of meaningful natural-resource-protection benefit to be gained by either 
eliminating or reducing antisubmarine-warfare training worldwide, the prudent 
response is to ask, Where’s the crisis? Even better questions are, How and why 
did this become a crisis? How are these efforts affecting U�S� military capabilities? 
Granting for argument’s sake the highest motivations for the current anti-active-
sonar strategic communications campaign, it should be clear that an adversary 
could mount a similar campaign to obtain comparable or more damaging results� 
This possibility is relevant for any asymmetric-threat assessment� 
Another avenue of attack using international lawfare is targeting influential 
international forums, conferences, and governing bodies in aggressive and so-
phisticated lobbying and “educational” campaigns� A potential adversary’s initial 
attempt will be to use or modify existing international treaties, conventions, or 
regional agreements to obtain statements, resolutions, or other endorsements for 
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significant reductions in the use of, for example, military sonar testing, training, 
and operations� 
Again, consider the effectiveness of environmental-group efforts� For more 
than a decade coalitions of environmentalists and others have lobbied and in-
fluenced numerous international bodies against the use of military active sonars 
because of the alleged harm caused to marine resources in general and marine 
mammals in particular� Table 1 lists some of the major “wins” by these groups 
during the last decade� They represent diversions of time, effort, and resources on 
TABLE 1
INTERNATIONAL SONAR ACTIONS
Legal Body / Document Purpose Action
1994, United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea 
UNCLOS, with 157 signatories, is 
the seminal document governing 
international maritime activities, in-
cluding environmental protection�a
Generally codifying customary 
international law, UNCLOS, among 
other things, assigns member states 
an affirmative obligation and re-
sponsibility to protect and preserve 
the marine environment as well as 
requires member states to assess and 
communicate the potential impacts 
of their activities on the marine 
environment�b UNCLOS regulates 
“pollution of the marine environ-
ment,” defined, in relevant part, as 
“the introduction by man, directly 
or indirectly, of substances or energy 
into the marine environment�”c
2004, International Convention for 
the Regulation of Whaling 
The ICRW is an international 
agreement signed in 1946 to ensure 
the protection and conservation of 
worldwide whale stocks by establish-
ing a system of international regula-
tion of the members and contracting 
governments’ commercial, scientific, 
and aboriginal whaling practices�d
Its June 2004 International Whaling 
Commission’s Scientific Committee 
Report claimed that “compelling 
evidence” implicates ocean noise as a 
threat to marine mammals�e
2004, European Parliament The EP is the directly elected parlia-
mentary body of the member states 
of the European Union�f Together 
EP and the Council of the European 
Union form the bicameral legislative 
branch of the EU’s institutions�
In October 2004, the EP overwhelm-
ingly adopted a resolution calling for 
a moratorium on military sonars�g
2004, International Union for Con-
servation of Nature
In November 2004, its World 
Conservation Congress passed 
Resolution 3�068 calling for interna-
tional action to address the problem 
of ocean noise, including military 
sonars�h
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Legal Body / Document Purpose Action
2006, Agreement on the Conserva-
tion of Cetaceans in the Black Sea, 
Mediterranean Sea and Contiguous 
Atlantic Area (ACCOBAMS) / 2006, 
Agreement on the Conservation of 
Small Cetaceans of the Baltic, North 
East Atlantic, Irish and North Seas 
(ASCOBANS) 
Aimed at preserving and protect-
ing the numerous small migratory 
cetacean species native to the seas 
bordering Europe, including dol-
phins, whales, and harbor porpoises, 
the ACCOBAMS and ASCOBANS 
are regional cooperative agreements 
“to reduce threats to cetaceans, 
improve knowledge, and conserve 
marine diversity�”i
In December 2006 ASCOBANS 
parties passed Resolution 4, 
“Adverse Effects of Sound, Vessels 
and Other Forms of Disturbance 
on Small Cetaceans,” calling for the 
development of effective mitigation 
measures to “reduce disturbance of, 
and potential physical damage to, 
small cetaceans�”j
“The European Cetacean Society 
resolution adopted during the 23rd 
Conference (2009), requests to ur-
gently adopt and enforce regulations 
for effective mitigation of active so-
nar use� This Resolution particularly 
urges competent authorities to take 
into account the conservation status 
and the potential and known effects 
of sonar on beaked whales�”k
2008, Convention on the Conserva-
tion of Migratory Species of Wild 
Animals 
CMS is an intergovernmental treaty 
concerned with the conservation 
of terrestrial, marine, and avian 
migratory wildlife and habitats on a 
global scale�l
Meeting in Rome in December 2008, 
the CMS Conference of Parties ad-
opted a resolution entitled “Adverse 
Anthropogenic Marine/Ocean Noise 
Impacts on Cetaceans and Other 
Biota” (Resolution 9�19)�m Resolution 
9�19 recognizes anthropogenic ocean 
noise as a form of energy “pollution” 
and reaffirms that “the difficulty of 
proving negative impacts of acoustic 
disturbance on cetaceans neces-
sitates a precautionary approach in 
cases where such impact is likely�”n 
Notes:
  Acronyms used in tables 1 and 2 are expanded in table 3.
 a. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10 December 1982, 1833 UNTS 3 [hereafter UNCLOS]. An overview and copy of the full text is 
available at United Nations, www.un.org/. See Elena M. McCarthy, “International Regulation of Transboundary Pollutants: The Emerging Challenge 
of Ocean Noise,” Ocean and Coastal Law Journal 6, no. 2 (2001), pp. 275–77.
 b. UNCLOS, arts. 192, 204–206.
 c. Ibid., art. 1(1)(4) [emphasis added].
 d. International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling. A copy of the convention is available at International Whaling Commission Key Documents, 
iwc.int/convention. The list of the ICRW members and contracting governments is available at International Whaling Commission, iwc.int/.
 e. International Whaling Commission, Scientific Committee (IWC-SC) Report Annex K: Report of the Standing Working Group on Environmental Con-
cerns (Cambridge, U.K.: May 2004). A copy of the report is available at The Acoustic Ecology Institute, www.acousticecology.org/.
 f. European Parliament, www.europarl.europa.eu/. 
 g. European Parliament, Resolution on the Environmental Effects of High-Intensity Active Naval Sonars, B6-0089/2004, available at awionline.org/. The 
resolution called on the EU and its member states to “adopt a moratorium on the deployment of high-intensity active naval sonars until a global 
assessment of their cumulative environmental impact on marine mammals, fish and other marine life has been completed.”
 h. International Union for Conservation of Nature World Conservation Congress, Resolution 3.068, “Undersea Noise Pollution,” in Resolutions and 
Recommendations: World Conservation Congress, Bangkok, Thailand, 17–25 November 2004 (Gland, Switz.: 2005), available at cmsdata.iucn 
.org/.
 i. Agreement on the Conservation of Cetaceans in the Black Sea, Mediterranean Sea and Contiguous Atlantic Area (ACCOBAMS). Text available at 
ACCOBAMS, www.accobams.org/. There are currently twenty-eight contracting-party governments; a complete list as of September 2011 is at ibid. 
ACCOBAMS was established under the auspices of the United Nations Environmental Programme’s 1979 Convention on the Conservation of Migra-
tory Species of Wild Animals; see Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals, www.cms.int/en.
 j. 5th Meeting of the Parties to ASCOBANS, the Netherlands, 18–20 September and 12 December 2006, Resolution 4, Adverse Effects of Sound, Vessels 
and Other Forms of Disturbance on Small Cetaceans, available at www.ascobans.org/.
 k. Fifth Meeting of the Parties to ACCOBAMS, Tangier, 5–8 November 2013, Anthropogenic Noise and Marine Mammals: Review of the Effort in Ad-
dressing the Impact of Anthropogenic Underwater Noise in the ACCOBAMS and ASCOBANS Areas, p. 16, available at www.cbd.int/. 
 l. Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals.
 m. Convention on Migratory Species, Ninth Conference of the Parties, Rome, 1–5 December 2008, Adverse Anthropogenic Marine/Ocean Noise Impacts 
of Cetaceans and Other Biota, UNEP/CMS/Resolution 9.19, available at www.cms.int/.
 n. Ibid., p. 2.
INTERNATIONAL SONAR ACTIONS CONTINUED
NWC_Winter2016Review.indb   141 12/3/15   11:47 AM
145
War College: Winter 2016 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2016
 1 4 2  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
the part of the U.S. Navy, to the detriment of readiness and national defense. The 
long-term impacts, if any, have yet to be fully assessed and quantified. But these 
actions succinctly illustrate how strategic communications campaigns can seize 
effective control of processes and achieve desired end states. The proponents of 
the activities listed in table 1 are presumably at least willing to accept degrada-
tion of both antisubmarine-warfare capability and overall readiness. It is not 
difficult to imagine the assimilation of similar processes, to obtain comparably 
adverse impacts, by actors who specifically desire to target military capability or 
technological superiority. 
A logical extension and continuation of international environmental lawfare 
would be new international treaties, conventions, or agreements directly reduc-
ing or banning particular technologies or warfighting capabilities. Suggestive of 
what such efforts would look like, were it in the hands of an actual adversary, is 
Greenpeace International’s proposal for a global network of marine reserves cov-
ering 40 percent of the world’s oceans, including international waters.21 If enact-
ed, the implications for military readiness and operations are painfully obvious. 
It should be noted that a significant constraint on an adversarial international 
lawfare arises from one of the limitations of international law itself: the general 
lack of meaningful enforcement mechanisms. Since all nation-states are sover-
eign, each unilaterally decides whether to commit itself to given international 
conventions, treaties, or agreements. Even when a nation-state does so, compli-
ance remains voluntary and effectively immune from enforcement in case of 
alleged or real violations. 
DOMESTIC ENVIRONMENTAL LAWFARE
This situation changes dramatically, however, when a potential adversary shifts to 
the arena of American domestic environmental law. The United States proclaims 
itself a world leader in environmental and natural-resource protection. The Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency is a cabinet-level entity, and Congress has enacted 
over a hundred environmental laws since 1899 establishing programs to improve 
air and water quality; handle solid, hazardous, and toxic wastes; clean up land-
fills; and protect endangered species, as well as natural and cultural resources. 
In the United States, environmental-protection laws differ from most other 
federal statutes in that Congress has intentionally waived U.S. sovereign im-
munity. The majority of American environmental-protection laws mandate 
federal-agency compliance and apply injunctive, civil, and criminal sanctions 
to the government’s employees, officers, and officials. For the most part, these 
waivers of federal sovereignty do not exempt the Department of Defense. Ac-
cordingly, the Navy, like other federal agencies, is subject to myriad federal and, 
in some cases, state, territorial, and tribal environmental laws and regulations. 
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These include, but are not limited to, the “big four” affecting maritime readiness: 
National Environmental Policy Act requirements for preactivity environmental 
impact statements; Marine Mammal Protection Act requirements for incidental 
take authorizations; Endangered Species Act requirements for consultation prior 
to any activities that “may affect” a threatened or endangered species or habitat; 
and Coastal Zone Management Act requirements for federal agency “consis-
tency” with state coastal-zone management�22 
To take midfrequency active sonar as an example, the Navy is required to as-
sess the potential impacts of its use on the environment and maritime resources� 
To start with, it must conduct requisite preactivity environmental planning, in-
cluding documented impact analyses to determine whether the intended sonar 
use will adversely affect marine resources� If expected impacts exceed certain 
statutory or regulatory thresholds, the Navy is required to consult federal and 
state regulatory and coastal-resource agencies� It may also be required to obtain 
federal authorization� These consultations, authorizations, approvals, and noti-
fications often produce detrimental restrictions of time, place, and operational 
mode, such as prohibition of sonar use at night�
U.S. EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT 
Increasing the attractiveness to potential adversaries of encumbering U�S� Navy 
military readiness with burdensome agency approvals processes (and the possibil-
ity of civil damage awards and court injunctions) is the 1980 Equal Access to Jus-
tice Act (EAJA)�23 The EAJA authorizes U�S� federal courts to award (aside from 
injunctions and civil damages) costs and attorney fees “in any civil action brought 
by or against the United States or any agency or any official of the United States�”24 
These “civil actions” include environmental and resource-protection compliance 
challenges� Originally intended to assist small businesses to defend themselves 
from governmental agency actions, the EAJA also extends to 501(c)(3) nonprofit 
organizations, including environmental NGOs and other private groups� 
Under the EAJA, plaintiffs, if they prevail, are entitled to reimbursement for 
their attorney fees, up to $750 per hour, and other allowed costs incurred in bring-
ing the lawsuit (e�g�, expert witness fees, costs of scientific studies, mailings)� In 
some cases, costs and attorney’s fees are payable even to plaintiffs who ultimately 
lose their legal challenges� Exact costs to the federal government and American 
taxpayers are apparently unknown, untracked, and unreported by most federal 
agencies� One Government Accountability Office study tracked 525 reimburse-
ments during 2001–10 resulting in $44�4 million in legal-fee reimbursements�25 
Some examples to date from recent federal lawsuits by environmental groups and 
others challenging U�S� Navy active sonar include approximately $1�7 million for 
a 2002 lawsuit challenging low-frequency sonar use in the Pacific; approximately 
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$400,000 for the five-day injunction on U�S� midfrequency active sonar during 
the 2006 Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) multinational training exercise; and over 
$500,000 in attorney fees and costs alone related to an injunction in the Navy’s 
Southern California Operating Area� 
The EAJA “fee shifting” mechanism provides both an incentive and a steady 
source of income to law firms willing to litigate environmental compliance chal-
lenges against U�S� military departments and its officials, even on behalf of poten-
tial adversaries engaging in an asymmetric lawfare campaign� From the perspec-
tive of lawfare vulnerabilities, judicial enforcement of federal agency compliance 
provides adversaries an effective, essentially cost-free means to engage in legal 
lines of attack against U�S� military readiness�
U.S. DOMESTIC SONAR LITIGATION
For over a decade the Navy has been challenged in federal court by environmen-
tal NGOs and other groups seeking court orders enjoining active-sonar use, test-
ing, and training� While their specifics vary slightly, these legal challenges have 
commonalities� They all allege violations of American domestic environmental- 
planning and natural-resource-protection laws, and they all seek judicial in-
tervention to reduce or end, temporarily or permanently, Navy midfrequency 
active-sonar testing and training� Finally, the lawsuits target almost exclusively 
the Pacific theater antisubmarine warfare training areas off the coasts of Califor-
nia, Hawaii, and the Pacific Northwest�26 As one example, on 3 July 2006 the U�S� 
District Court for the Central District of California issued an injunction barring 
the Navy from training with midfrequency active sonar during RIMPAC 2006 off 
the Big Island of Hawaii�27
Table 2 summarizes the major domestic legal challenges against the Navy since 
2002� Like table 1, it shows clearly how an adversary could capitalize on Ameri-
can domestic environmental laws and federal judicial processes to eliminate or 
degrade military capabilities� 
LAWFARE THREAT-ASSESSMENT INDICATORS
The authors understand the inherent difficulties of identifying and assessing 
nontraditional asymmetric threats as a whole or of legal lines of operations in 
particular—hence the appeal of lawfare to potential adversaries� The following 
considerations may help separate actual threats from the background “noise” of 
legitimate challenges� 
What Is the Target? 
Is the international effort, strategic communications campaign, or lawsuit 
aiming at an increase in environmental or natural-resource protection or at 
something else? Does it seek rather to limit military-readiness activities, such as 
NWC_Winter2016Review.indb   144 12/3/15   11:47 AM
148
Naval War College Review, Vol. 69 [2016], No. 1, Art. 21
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol69/iss1/21
 PA L M E R  &  J O H N S O N  1 4 5
TABLE 2
U.S. DOMESTIC SONAR LITIGATION EXAMPLES
Case Court Claim Result
Natural Resources Defense 
Council v. U.S. Navy
U�S� Federal Dist� Court 
(C�D� Cal� 2002)
NEPA, ESA, MMPA, and 
MSA violated by U�S� 
Navy’s LWAD program, 
including active sonar
Dismissed
NRDC v. Evans U�S� Federal Dist� Court 
(N�D� Cal� 2002)
MMPA, ESA, and NEPA 
violated by U�S� Navy’s 
peacetime use of low-
frequency active sonar 
systems (SURTASS-LFA) 
for training, testing, and 
routine operations in the 
world’s oceans
Permanent “tailored” 
injunction granted to 
plaintiffs limiting U�S� 
Navy’s use 
Cetacean Cmty. v. Bush U�S� Federal Dist� Court 
(D� Haw� 2003)
ESA, MMPA, and NEPA 
violated by U�S� Navy 
use of SURTASS-LFA 
for training, testing, and 
routine operations in the 
world’s oceans
Dismissed—whales and 
dolphins were not “per-
sons” under the acts and 
therefore lacked standing 
to bring claims
NRDC v. Winter I U�S� Federal Dist� Court 
(C�D� Cal� 2005) 
NEPA, APA, and ESA 
violated by all U�S� Navy 
uses of midfrequency ac-
tive sonars 
Injunction sought
NRDC v. Winter II U�S� Federal Dist� Court 
(C�D� Cal� 2006) [amend-
ed complaint]
MMPA, NEPA, ESA, 
and CZMA violated by 
U�S� Navy’s use of MFAS 
during its international 
RIMPAC exercises off 
Hawaii
Preliminary injunction 
granted prohibiting U�S� 
Navy use of MFAS for 
training
NRDC v. Winter II U�S� Federal Dist� Court 
(C�D� Cal� 2007) [amend-
ed complaint]
MMPA, NEPA, ESA, 
and CZMA violated by 
U�S� Navy’s use of MFAS 
during exercises in the 
Southern California 
Operating Area February 
2007–February 2009
Preliminary injunction 
granted, later vacated 
for tailored injunction 
measures
NRDC v. Winter II U�S� Supreme Court 
(2008)
U�S� Navy alleged lower 
courts erred in granting 
injunctions
Lower courts reversed
NRDC v. Gutierrez U�S� Federal Dist� Court 
(N�D� Cal� 2008)
MMPA, NEPA, and ESA 
violated by U�S� Navy 
SURTASS-LFA use on the 
world’s oceans
2002 injunction contin-
ued; case settled 
Ocean Mammal Inst. v. 
Gates
U�S� Federal Dist� Court 
(D� Haw� 2008)
NEPA, ESA, CZMA, and 
MSA violated by U�S� Na-
vy’s use of MFAS in twelve 
undersea warfare exercises 
in the Hawaiian Islands 
Operating Area January 
2007–January 2009
Preliminary injunction 
ordered requiring U�S� 
Navy implementation 
of restrictive mitigation 
measures
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development, testing, training, and operation? For example, does the group target 
only U�S� Navy active sonar but not other maritime activities potentially equally 
harmful to marine resources, such as commercial shipping, fishing, natural-
resource exploration, air-gun arrays, or recreational boating?28
Analysts should also consider what other activities groups are targeting� Illus-
trative are two separate lawsuits, filed in 2003 and 2004, in which environmental 
NGOs sued the Department of Commerce’s National Marine Fisheries Service to 
stop it from issuing scientific research permits to determine the impacts of active 
sonar on marine mammals�29 In one case, the court issued a temporary injunction 
against scientific experimentation in the northern Pacific Ocean to test whale-
finding high-frequency sonar on grey whales�30 Again, our reasonably prudent 
policy maker and warfighter should be asking why any group or individual 
purportedly dedicated to environmental and natural-resource protection would 
actively attempt to impede scientific studies to determine whether an activity 
may have an adverse environmental or natural-resource impact� 
Finally, are U�S� military technologies or capabilities exclusively, or almost 
exclusively, the targets? Since similar human activities will likely cause adverse 
impacts anywhere in the world regardless of the political or military affiliation, 
genuine environmental challenges should be politically and militarily neutral 
in strategy and tactics� Disparities here may indicate malicious intent� It casts 
no aspersion on any environmental group or individual—certainly none is 
Case Court Claim Result
Earthjustice et al. v. Nat’l 
Marine Fisheries Service 
(NMFS)a
U�S� Federal Dist� Court 
(N�D� Cal� 2012)
APA, ESA, and MMPA 
violated by U�S� Navy’s 
MFAS use for ASW 
training in its Northwest 
Training Range Complex 
off Washington State
Injunction sought by 
plaintiffs to enjoin U�S� 
Navy MFAS use
Earthjustice et al. v. NMFS, 
U.S. Dept. of Commerce, 
and U.S. Navyb
U�S� Federal Dist� Court 
(D� Haw� 2014)
ESA, NEPA, and MMPA 
violated by U�S� Navy 
MFAS use for ASW  
training in its Hawaii–
Southern California 
Training and Testing 
Study Area
Summary judgment in 
favor of environmental 
NGO plaintiffs granted on 
31 March 2015
Notes:
 a. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, U.S. Dist. Ct. (No. Dist. of Cal.), 25 January 2012, available at earthjustice.org/. Plaintiffs: Earthjustice, 
InterTribal Sinkyone Wilderness Council, Center for Biological Diversity, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., People for Puget Sound, Friends of 
the San Juans, and Friends of the Earth. 
 b. Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, U.S. Dist. Ct. (Dist. of Hawaii), Civil No. 13-00684 SOM RLP, 15 January 2015, available 
at earthjustice.org/. Plaintiffs: Earthjustice, Conservation Council for Hawai’i, Animal Welfare Institute, the Center for Biological Diversity, and Ocean 
Mammal Institute.
Source: Craig, “Beyond Winter v. NRDC.”
U.S. DOMESTIC SONAR LITIGATION EXAMPLES CONTINUED
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intended—to point out in this connection a potentially important discrepancy in 
current practice� At least one major environmental NGO has adopted the strat-
egy of mounting challenges in federal court to compel U�S� Navy environmental 
compliance while simultaneously adopting cooperative “partnerships” to obtain 
equivalent Chinese and Russian environmental compliance�31 The nationality 
of the military forces should be irrelevant, one might reasonably expect, to the 
potential adverse impacts of waterborne sound energy on marine resources� 
Motivation matters�
Where Is the Targeted Activity? 
Lawfare analysts should look for temporal, political, and geographic discrepan-
cies� For example, it seems interesting and relevant that aggressive international 
efforts, strategic communications campaigns, and domestic judicial challenges 
against military sonar use started only within the last decade or so, although the 
U�S� Navy has used sonar for eighty-five years and Congress has enacted envi-
ronmental protection laws for over forty� As noted above, environmental efforts 
appear focused almost exclusively on Pacific Fleet testing and training areas� 
Temporally and spatially they seem aligned with the national security “pivot to 
Asia” and with geopolitical events in the U�S� Pacific Command area of responsi-
bility� They also coincide with China’s drive for naval domination on both sides of 
the Malacca Strait, the South China Sea, and Taiwan Strait and with its (and other 
potential adversaries’) growing acquisition of quiet conventional and nuclear 
submarines� These strategic shifts, in turn, have driven a resurgence of interest 
within the U�S� Navy in antisubmarine warfare� If military sonars do adversely 
affect marine mammals at the individual and species “crisis” levels claimed by 
environmental organizations, one would expect the impacts to be worldwide� Yet 
to date there has been little or no such interest in, and few lawsuits and injunc-
tions have sought to stop, similar sonar use or training in the Atlantic Ocean, Gulf 
of Mexico, Mediterranean, or Persian Gulf� 
It goes without saying that no one factor alone is determinative in identifying 
and assessing potential lawfare threats� Each situation is fact and circumstance 
specific� It is the very nature of nontraditional warfare threats that other factors 
exist outside the scope of this article� What is required is either creativity from 
future analysts or the harsh reality of 20/20 hindsight gained from hard lessons 
learned� 
DEALING WITH AN UNINTENDED VULNERABILITY 
Policy makers and warfighters today should not allow themselves to be com-
placent or, worse, uncreative about such threats as environmental lawfare� They 
must be open to exploring all avenues of attack available to potential adversaries, 
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recognizing the potential for long-term strategic damage inflicted by a malicious 
actor operating either parallel to, or in conjunction with, authentic judicial and 
strategic-communications challenges to military-readiness activities. 
A good rule of thumb would be that the more nontraditional, unusual, and 
unfamiliar the threat, the more serious the required inquiry and assessment. 
Lawfare in general, and international and domestic lawfare in particular, war-
rants the attention of U.S. service colleges and policy think tanks. 
TABLE 3
ACRONYMS
ACCOBAMS Agreement on the Conservation of Cetaceans in the Black Sea, Mediterranean Sea and Contigu-ous Atlantic Area 
APA Administrative Procedure Act (5 USC § 701 et seq. [1946])
ASCOBANS Agreement on the Conservation of Small Cetaceans of the Baltic, North East Atlantic, Irish and North Seas
ASW antisubmarine warfare
CMS Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals (also Bonn Convention)
CZMA Coastal Zone Management Act (16 USC § 1451 et seq. [1972])
EP European Parliament 
ESA Endangered Species Act (7 USC § 136, 16 USC § 1531 et seq. [1973])
EU European Union
ICRW International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling
kHz kilohertz
LWAD Littoral Warfare Advanced Development (program)
MFAS midfrequency active sonara
MMPA Marine Mammal Protection Act (16 USC § 1361 et seq. [1972])
MSA Marine Sanctuaries Act (16 USC § 1431 et seq. and 33 USC § 1401 et seq. [1988])
NEPA National Environmental Policy Act (42 USC § 4321 et seq. [1969])
NGO nongovernmental organization 
RIMPAC Rim of the Pacific (exercise series)
SURTASS-LFA Surveillance Towed Array Sensor System (SURTASS)–Low-Frequency Active (LFA)b
UNCLOS United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
Notes:
 a. U.S. Justice Dept., “Mid- and Low-Frequency Sonar,” The United States Department of Justice, September 2014, www.justice.gov/ (“Mid-frequency 
active sonar (1kHz–10kHz) is the Navy’s primary tactical sonar and its main tool to combat the threat posed by the world-wide proliferation of ultra-
quiet diesel submarines”). 
 b. Ibid. (“SURTASS-LFA is a low frequency passive surveillance system that is deployed on surface ships with acoustic data collection and analysis capabili-
ties. It provides passive detection of quiet nuclear and diesel submarines and real-time reporting of surveillance information to theater commanders”).
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Internationally, the United States is vulnerable to adverse resolutions, pro-
nouncements, interpretations, and other actions by various international bodies, 
organizations, and groups, especially those to which this nation is a party by 
treaty or other similar agreement� It is imperative that analysts understand po-
tential adversaries’ motives and capabilities, recognize vulnerabilities for threat 
exploitation, and exercise due diligence to counter those threats in a timely and 
effective manner� 
Domestically, the congressional intent in waiving U�S� federal relief from 
environmental-compliance injunctions, civil damages, and attorney’s fees and 
costs was to ensure that agencies did their part to help protect the environment 
and preserve natural resources� Notwithstanding, Congress has created an Achil-
les’ heel for military and national security, one susceptible to exploitation by 
potential adversaries willing to engage in lawfare� 
Lawfare attacks constitute the quintessential asymmetric threat, in that they 
exploit simultaneously both strengths and weaknesses of the United States� These 
weaknesses include the nation’s reliance on technology, its culturally myopic 
focus on symmetric kinetic threats, and its hypersensitivity to international 
opinion� The nation’s strengths include its deeply held belief in the rule of law, 
its declared world leadership in environmental stewardship, and its penchant 
for using treaties, laws, and judicial systems to right perceived wrongs� Finally, 
the American taxpayer, through the EAJA and voluntary donations, is clearly 
vulnerable to being made to subsidize lawfare attacks� Everything is in place for 
a sophisticated adversary with the vision, resources, ability, and a “long view” of 
history to exploit these vulnerabilities and thereby impact U�S� military capability 
and readiness� 
As with most asymmetric “peacetime” threats, there is little doctrine and 
less agreement on how to respond effectively�32 However, several commonsense 
options are available� The first is to develop processes designed to look for, rec-
ognize, and assess the full spectrum of potential and actual political or judicial 
threats, such as international and domestic environmental lawfare� It just takes 
creativity and some true out-of-the-box thinking� 
The second is aggressive response to identified lawfare threats� Response starts 
with a comprehensive and coordinated campaign to educate both military and 
civilian leadership, the American public, and allies on the nature of the lawfare 
involved and the strategic and operational implications for security and defense� 
Senior military and executive-branch leadership should begin by elevating this 
problem to a multiagency level� Currently the United States typically generates 
only stovepiped, piecemeal, tactical responses—lawyers fending off lawsuits and 
public affairs teams defensively replying to press inquiries� 
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The international counteroffensive should not be limited to the State Depart-
ment but should proactively track and participate in international conferences, 
governing bodies, symposia, and other relevant forums, in an effort to educate 
audiences and oppose attempts at international regulation of critical activities� 
The domestic counteroffensive should focus on eliminating the pathways vulner-
able to legal lines of attack, especially the exploitation of domestic law� Potential 
options include, but are not limited to, defining and exempting from regulation 
critical military-readiness activities, enforcing registration and tracking as ap-
plicable of environmental organizations and NGOs under the Foreign Agents 
Registration Act, and implementing NGO reforms similar to recent election and 
lobbyist measures� The United States must insist that when it comes to limiting its 
critical military capabilities, litigants must definitively prove the military activi-
ties are actually doing harm—not the other way around� The United States must 
not be continuously obliged to prove its innocence in public forums, online, and 
in the courtroom� 
Additional responses include limiting judicial review of such cases, remov-
ing injunctions as an enforcement option, and legislatively requiring regulatory 
agencies and courts to balance military-readiness impacts with environmental 
protection� Finally, Congress should shift critical environmental compliance of 
military-readiness activity from a matter of statute to presidential executive or-
der� This would maintain the imperative for environmental protection by federal 
agencies but remove judicial enforcement vulnerabilities� An excellent model 
is the executive order directing the services to conduct rigorous environmental 
planning and impact assessments for overseas activities but ensuring these re-
quirements remain free from international or American domestic law interfer-
ence, enforcement, or abuse�33
Potential adversaries are clearly thinking about “subdu[ing] the enemy with-
out fighting” by asymmetric attack against U�S� military capabilities under the 
guise of environmental and natural-resource protection or other types of lawfare� 
American policy makers and warfighters can afford not to respond only if they 
believe no potential adversary will recognize or act on exploitable vulnerabilities� 
If adversaries do seize the opportunity, they may without opposition achieve their 
likely goal—cheaply and effectively eliminating or reducing U�S� Navy readiness� 
In the case of capabilities against quiet diesel-electric and nuclear submarines, 
this reduction or elimination will lead to inability to protect sea lines of commu-
nications, cause a wasteful expenditure of resources in exchange for a minimal 
benefit in natural-resource protection, and substantially reduce U�S� operational 
and strategic options� To exercise the doctrinal creativity required to recognize, 
assess, and respond to such nontraditional asymmetric warfare threats as possible 
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environmental lawfare is not paranoid but rather a prudent exercise in cautionary 
strategic thinking� 
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This article represents the views of the 
authors, unless otherwise attributed, and not 
necessarily the views of the Department of 
Defense, the Department of the Navy, or any 
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BOOK REVIEWS
WHAT DOES CHINA WANT?
Heath, Timothy� China’s New Governing Party Paradigm: Political Renewal and the Pursuit of Na-
tional Rejuvenation. Farnham, Surrey, U�K�: Ashgate, 2014� 256pp� $109�95
In 2012, Tim Heath, then an analyst 
at U�S� Pacific Command, published a 
scholarly article that considered whether 
in fact China had a national strategy 
(“What Does China Want? Discerning 
the PRC’s National Strategy,” Asian Secu-
rity 8, no� 1 [2012], pp� 54–72)� Draw-
ing extensively from Chinese sources, 
Heath argued that China did not have 
a formal national strategy document 
but did outline the essential elements 
of a national strategy in the authorita-
tive writings of the Chinese Communist 
Party� Among professionals working 
Pacific security issues, the article was 
widely discussed and well regarded� 
In China’s New Governing Party Para-
digm, Tim Heath expands and broad-
ens this theme, examining the central 
narrative that both provides internal 
justification for exclusive Chinese 
Communist Party rule and shapes the 
policies the party imposes on China� 
Along the way, he offers a detailed 
description of the mechanisms the 
party employs to study, develop, and 
communicate the essential decisions 
that literally form the “party line�”
Up until the 1980s, academic studies 
of the People’s Republic of China often 
focused on ideology, revolution, and 
the impact of the Communist Party and 
party struggles� In the years since Deng 
Xiaoping announced the “reform and 
opening up” that freed China’s economic 
potential, analysts have focused on the 
impact of this economic change and 
the social forces it unleashed� In many 
cases, these studies portray the party 
as having abandoned ideology, offering 
the Chinese people national prestige 
and economic prosperity in its place�
Heath suggests that party ideology was 
not abandoned but transformed to 
ensure the party’s continued relevance 
and claim to authority� The key change 
came in 2002 when an authoritative 
official report referred to the Com-
munist Party as the “governing party�” 
Though largely unremarked on at 
the time, this pronouncement repre-
sented a formal abandonment of the 
“revolutionary party” ideology that had 
justified party rule since the founda-
tion of the People’s Republic in 1949� 
NWC_Winter2016Review.indb   153 12/3/15   11:47 AM
157
War College: Winter 2016 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2016
 1 5 4  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
While governments universally claim 
that they can govern competently, Heath 
underscores the exclusivity of the party’s 
claim: not merely that it can rule well, 
but that it is uniquely equipped through 
rigorous study and discovery of natural 
laws to rule well� In Heath’s words, the 
party asserts that “no other political 
group possesses an intellectual grasp of 
the historic natural laws underpinning 
China’s development�” The exclusivity of 
this claim means that ideology, far from 
being dead, is of central importance in 
justifying the party’s rule� The party’s 
grasp is expressed in correct theory 
that, promulgated by the party, becomes 
the basis for central directives that 
then are expressed in laws and policy� 
Party theory is broad and elastic, set-
ting a central direction and allowing 
increasingly professional bureaucra-
cies to develop more-detailed guidance 
that aligns with the party line� The shift 
to a “governing party paradigm” has 
caused the party to focus on formalizing, 
regularizing, and bounding this process 
of policy interpretation� This interpreta-
tion process allows ministries and lower 
levels of government some genuine 
latitude in decision making within the 
overall guidance� This is, however, “rule 
of law” in the Chinese rather than West-
ern sense� The absolute demand that 
law conform to party guidance renders 
any move toward independent author-
ity, either bureaucratic or democratic, a 
threat to party rule, and transgressions 
of party guidance are quickly sup-
pressed via an enforcement process that, 
to Western eyes, appears extralegal� 
Much of the book describes the bu-
reaucratic structure that develops, 
reviews, and issues party guidance� 
Heath emphasizes the key role of the 
Central Party School in this process� 
The two most recent general secretar-
ies of the Communist Party, Hu Jintao 
and Xi Jinping, previously served as 
Central Party School presidents� They 
have relied on the school, its staff, and its 
students as both a think tank and a key 
means of promulgating their guidance�
For readers interested in national se-
curity, Heath’s analysis raises a number 
of essential issues� The party’s claim to 
unique competency means that its legiti-
macy is in large part performance based� 
While the concept of “performance 
legitimacy” in the Chinese system is not 
new, Heath underscores how critical it 
is that the party be able to present itself 
as successful, or at least competent, in 
every key policy area� In this context, it 
is clear why Xi Jinping views endemic 
corruption as a key threat to party rule�
Further, Heath’s analysis has impor-
tant implications for the future of the 
Chinese military� The People’s Libera-
tion Army (PLA) has a unique relation-
ship with the party� It is, of course, the 
party’s army, first and last accountable 
to the party leadership� It too, however, 
has been impacted by the tendency to 
delegate execution-level detail to profes-
sional bureaucracies� Heath’s model 
suggests that PLA leaders, as technical 
experts in their field, will expect to enjoy 
increasing influence and autonomy 
within their area of expertise� The party, 
however, is especially sensitive to its 
control of the military, and the tension 
in this relationship that Heath identifies 
will likely continue in coming years�
This is a dense, specialized book, and 
the generalist would do well to start 
with a work such as Richard Mc-
Gregor’s excellent The Party: The Secret 
World of China’s Communist Rulers 
(2012) as an introduction to the topic� 
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However, the work is approachable 
to the motivated reader and for the 
Navy’s growing cadre of Asia-Pacific 
hands represents essential reading� 
DALE C� RIELAGE 
Serrat, Austin, Lawrence Douglas, and Martha 
Merrill Umphrey, eds� Law and War� Stanford, 
Calif�: Stanford Univ� Press, 2014� 248pp� $75
Law and War is a collection of five essays 
on the role of law in war offered as part 
of the Amherst Series in Law, Jurispru-
dence, and Social Thought� What ties the 
essays together is their shared interest in 
“interrogating the assumption � � � that 
the insertion of law into war is necessar-
ily a salutary achievement�” But this con-
nection is often loose, and, while several 
of the essays have a great deal of indi-
vidual merit, it is perhaps a weakness 
of the book that it lacks the degree of 
overall coherence that one might expect�
Sarah Sewell leads off with the essay 
most relevant to military legal practi-
tioners and warfighters� In “Limits of 
Law: Promoting Humanity in Armed 
Conflict,” Sewell makes a compelling 
argument that modern norms about 
what is acceptable in war often outstrip 
the limits imposed by the actual law; 
that is, norms often make “unacceptable” 
conduct that the law inarguably still 
permits� She views this as a negative de-
velopment, fearing that as gaps develop 
between the norms and the law, it will 
increasingly erode respect for the latter� 
By way of example, Sewell highlights 
the growing normative expectation that 
powerful states will eliminate civilian 
casualties in war, while the law of armed 
conflict has always recognized an uneasy 
balance between humanitarian protec-
tion and military necessity—a balance 
that “the norm of minimizing civilian 
casualties” does not need to maintain� 
Gabriella Blum follows Sewell, and in 
“The Individualization of War” she 
explains how such norms have taken 
hold through a process she describes 
as a shift from “collectivism” to “cos-
mopolitanism,” by which she means 
a shift from a “state-centered set of 
obligations” to one focusing on the 
rights of individuals to be protected 
from the evils of war� Like Sewell, Blum 
asserts that this development is not 
necessarily good, leading to an increas-
ing conflation between the norms of 
policing and those of warfighting (with 
negative consequences to both)�
The third essay represents a substan-
tive, if not thematic, departure, as Laura 
Donohue writes on “Pandemic Disease, 
Biological Weapons, and War�” Dono-
hue offers a historical treatment of U�S� 
federal authority for responding to such 
threats, and argues that post-9/11 fears 
have led to a paradigm shift in think-
ing about them—from public health 
menace to national security threat� 
This essay is probably most relevant 
to military practitioners dealing with 
domestic support to civil authorities�
Samuel Moyn’s essay “From Antiwar 
Politics to Antitorture Politics” offers 
a fascinating comparison between the 
legal arguments offered against the 
Vietnam War and those often presented 
regarding America’s conduct of its 
post-9/11 wars in Iraq and Afghanistan� 
Through a careful examination of the 
role of law in the antiwar movement of 
the 1960s and 1970s, Moyn highlights 
the extent to which the debate centered 
on the legality of America’s entry into 
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the conflict, as opposed to focusing 
on how America fought� Moyn then 
traces a shift toward the end of the war, 
particularly Telford Taylor’s trenchant 
criticism of American warfighting 
practices, which Taylor came to view 
as unlawful� By contrast, Moyn argues 
that criticism of our modern conflicts is 
directed at the conduct of hostilities—
torture, rules of engagement, and war 
crimes� He ascribes this to the end of 
conscription and the relative inoculation 
of much of the American public from 
the effects of our wars abroad, but also 
to a larger shift in the broad discourse 
about the law of war in the modern era, 
in which the means and methods of 
warfare are much more tightly regulated� 
The final essay builds to some extent on 
Moyn’s work, though Larry May’s “War 
Crimes Trials during and after War” is 
less cogent and ultimately less valu-
able� May sets out to examine whether 
war crimes trials are best prosecuted 
while hostilities are still under way or 
after hostilities are concluded� Contro-
versially, May argues that war crimes 
trials during hostilities ought to address 
jus ad bellum matters: once a tribunal 
finds that unlawful “aggressive war” is 
being waged, soldiers of that side are 
on notice that they may be participants 
in the war crime of aggression� This 
strikes the reviewer as highly implau-
sible, and for that reason this essay 
is perhaps the weakest of the five�
Ultimately, Law and War is a collec-
tion of essays that are largely concep-
tual and highly normative in their 
arguments� As such it is undoubtedly 
a thought-provoking and challenging 
book, but also one that is not likely to 
be of immediate use to military lawyers 
per se� On the other hand, for non-
lawyers who ponder the role of law in 
war, in policy making, and in shap-
ing and reflecting societal norms, the 
book offers many valuable insights�
JOHN MERRIAM
Daddis, Gregory� Westmoreland’s War: Reassess-
ing American Strategy in Vietnam� Oxford, U�K�: 
Oxford Univ� Press, 2015� 320pp� $36�95
General William Westmoreland, the 
American commander of Military As-
sistance Command Vietnam (MACV) 
from 1964 through 1968, remains one of 
the most contentious personalities of the 
Vietnam War, still the subject of intense 
debate among veterans and historians 
of the war� Prevalent still is the view 
that “Westy” could not see the forest for 
the trees, or vice versa, and disastrously 
lacked strategic vision and operational 
creativity owing to his parochial focus 
on employing Cold War “big unit” 
doctrine and attrition to combat an 
insurgent war of unification� The most 
extreme of such assessments of West-
moreland comes from Lewis Sorley, who 
in multiple works, notably Westmore-
land: The General Who Lost Vietnam 
(Houghton Mifflin, 2011), all but charges 
Westmoreland with gross negligence� 
Gregory Daddis, formerly of the Military 
History Department at West Point and 
now associate professor of history at 
Chapman University, offers what he 
believes is a more balanced view of this 
controversial general� In Westmore-
land’s War, Daddis argues that instead 
of lacking understanding of the con-
flict in Vietnam and warmly wrapping 
himself in the comfort of familiar “big 
unit” doctrine, Westmoreland em-
braced counterinsurgency approaches 
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and pacification, strongly supported 
building up the Army of the Republic 
of Vietnam (ARVN), and recognized 
the importance of establishing the 
political legitimacy of the government 
of the Republic of Vietnam among the 
South Vietnamese people� Far from 
the bumbling, career-climbing marti-
net characterized by Sorley, Daddis’s 
Westmoreland at least asserted an intel-
lectual understanding of the challenges 
of revolutionary warfare� Daddis argues 
that West moreland recognized the need 
for pacification and other counterinsur-
gency measures, but failed to articulate 
his strategy publicly or to his command-
ers in the field, ending up conducting 
what was in essence an unwinnable war�
Daddis offers a challenging corrective on 
Westmoreland, but some will find that 
his ideas fall a bit short� What West-
moreland said and wrote, which Daddis 
ably reveals through his extensive and 
valuable archival research, does not con-
nect to what happened on the battlefield� 
Westmoreland could not militarily rec-
tify the political problems of South Viet-
nam, and, as both the military and polit-
ical situations continued to deteriorate, 
Westmoreland in turn relied more on 
big-unit search and destroy operations 
and the massive firepower the American 
military had at its disposal� The military 
situation, arguably, dictated that West-
moreland use his limited resources—yes, 
limited resources—to stem the tide 
on the military side at the expense of 
manpower and resources for pacification 
and other nonkinetic programs� Attri-
tion, whether Westmoreland intended 
it or not (Daddis argues not), was the 
public face of his strategic and opera-
tional approach throughout his tenure 
as commander of MACV� If that was 
indeed the case, then Westmoreland’s 
failure is in part one of miscommunicat-
ing what it was he believed he was doing 
in South Vietnam, if not disconnecting 
that belief through intent or ignorance 
from the military reality his forces 
faced, especially from 1966 forward�
Vietnam was not Westmoreland’s war� 
Yes, Westmoreland has been and prob-
ably will continue to be the face of that 
conflict� He is, after all, an easy if not 
agreeable target on which to place a 
great deal of blame for the American 
debacle� However, as Daddis correctly 
points out, the Johnson administration, 
not Westmoreland, placed limitations on 
what Westmoreland could do in Viet-
nam� Political leaders in Washington, 
like the military leader Westmore land, 
eagerly accepted the primacy of Ameri-
can firepower as a military solution to 
both military and political problems in 
South Vietnam� Still, one must accept 
that the officials of the Johnson admin-
istration grounded those limitations in 
deep political earth� At the time, they 
believed they had good reasons for ap-
proaching the conflict the way they did� 
Ultimately, as Daddis suggests, it did not 
matter what those in Washington, Sai-
gon, or MACV did� The war in Vietnam 
was a bad war that American leadership 
believed had to be fought nonetheless, 
resulting in defeat and tragedy that still 
haunts the United States fifty years later�
Westmoreland’s War is an important 
book� Scholars of the conflict should 
read it� Daddis offers thought-provoking 
arguments that counter the Sorley 
school on the Westmoreland years of 
American involvement in Vietnam� 
Whether one agrees with Daddis (or 
Sorley for that matter), diligent scholars 
must consider Daddis’s point of view 
and his interpretation of the archival 
evidence� Daddis has made a valuable 
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contribution to the discussion, just 
as he did with his similarly provoca-
tive No Sure Victory: Measuring U.S. 
Army Effectiveness and Progress in the 
Vietnam War (Oxford, 2011). As for 
Westmoreland, the debate continues.
WILLIAM THOMAS ALLISON
Hill, Christopher. Outpost: Life on the Frontlines 
of American Diplomacy. New York: Simon & 
Schuster, 2014. 448pp. $30
An American diplomat for over three 
decades, Christopher Hill’s service 
took him all over the globe and into 
some of the most challenging cir-
cumstances faced by a member of 
the Foreign Service. This account of 
his unique postings during that dy-
namic time frame is a vivid reminder 
of how much the world has changed. 
In his memoir, Outpost: Life on the 
Frontlines of American Diplomacy, Hill, 
now a dean at the Josef Korbel School of 
International Studies at the University 
of Denver, traces his rise in the Depart-
ment of State in a style that is engaging 
and lively. His writing is honest and 
reflective as he recounts his interactions 
with some of the most distinguished 
and most notorious individuals to grace 
the world stage. Over the course of his 
fast-paced narrative, he doesn’t pull any 
punches in his assessments of people or 
policy decisions and, most importantly, 
he shares valuable and candid insights 
(both successes and failures) and lessons 
learned over his distinguished career. 
Prior to his start in the State Depart-
ment, Hill spent two years in the Peace 
Corps. He recalls trying to influence a 
local credit union election in Cameroon 
and failing miserably. He learned the 
folly of trying to change the behavior 
of an entire community. He writes, 
“Years later, in the Middle East, in the 
Balkans, in Asia, I would see time and 
time again systemized efforts on the part 
of the United States to pick winners in 
situations we understood little about. 
Like my efforts at the Tole Tea Estate’s 
credit union, they never worked.”
Another key theme that emerges is the 
importance of mentoring and how it 
enabled Hill to reach his full potential 
in the State Department. His early as-
signments under Lawrence Eagleburger 
(later Secretary of State under George H. 
W. Bush) in Yugoslavia and Richard Hol-
brooke (lead negotiator at the Dayton 
Peace Accords and later ambassador 
to the UN) at the European Bureau 
exposed him to two of the best practitio-
ners of statecraft in the U.S. government. 
After recounting the great success at 
Dayton, Hill transitions his narrative 
to the latter part of his career, in which 
his record as a Foreign Service officer 
is a little more mixed. He describes 
the numerous actors, both domes-
tic (politicians and members of the 
military) and international, that he 
encountered during some of his most 
demanding billets. These postings, 
as the Assistant Secretary of State for 
East Asian and Pacific Affairs, envoy 
to the North Korean nuclear talks for 
the Bush administration, and the U.S. 
ambassador to Iraq for the Obama 
administration, seem to have left Hill 
unfulfilled and somewhat frustrated.
He takes both administrations to task 
for what he believes was an unhealthy 
blend of partisan politics and lack of a 
long-term policy vision. Of particular 
note is Hill’s withering critique of Vice 
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President Cheney and his influence in 
the Bush administration during the Six 
Party Talks� “The neoconservatives, 
aided by a vice president’s office deep 
with suspicions of the Foreign Service, 
seem to believe that the State Depart-
ment negotiated with the North Koreans 
because we enjoyed it� Our effort to ex-
plain � � � fell on deaf ears�” Despite Hill’s 
best efforts, the North Koreans decided 
not to comply with American demands, 
and he was soon brought back home� 
After a short respite, Hill was selected 
to replace Ambassador Ryan Crocker 
in Iraq� He makes many valuable 
observations about his tour in Iraq, 
especially his strained relations with 
the U�S� military leadership responsible 
for the region, in particular Generals 
David Petraeus and Ray Odierno� His 
criticism is also directed at the Obama 
administration, which he perceived as 
slow “to grasp the complexities of the 
region, the seeming confusion within 
its foreign policy team between wars 
of democracy and sectarian enmity�” 
Outpost: Life on the Frontlines of Ameri-
can Diplomacy is a significant contribu-
tion to the international studies field and 
is a must-read� This volume will appeal 
to anyone who is interested in learning 
more about the Department of State or 
the intricacies of American interagency 
relationships� However, with all the 
security challenges facing the United 
States in the foreseeable future, this 
book also needs to be read by midgrade 
and senior military professionals so 
they may gain a better appreciation of 
the Foreign Service and the people who 
serve in that important institution� 
T� J� JOHNSON
Friedberg, Aaron L� Beyond Air-Sea Battle: The 
Debate over US Military Strategy in Asia� London: 
Routledge, 2014� 152pp� $14�99
Normally, a recommendation regarding 
for which audience a book is best suited 
comes at the end of the review� In this 
case, it comes first because Professor 
Aaron Friedberg provides a tight mono-
graph that illuminates areas of great 
misunderstanding to a large population 
in the policy and defense communities: 
the debate over the concept of Air-Sea 
Battle (ASB) and the vernacular of mod-
ern maritime strategy� Landlubbers who 
have been engrossed for the last fourteen 
years in land wars in South Asia should 
read this book� As a history profes-
sor teaching a population composed 
predominantly of U�S� Army majors 
at the Command and General Staff 
College in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 
this reviewer has firsthand experience 
of this shortfall in knowledge in both 
uniformed and civilian defense person-
nel� The book is also recommended 
to all those who desire a comprehen-
sive discussion of the concept and its 
variations, alternatives, and origins�
Friedberg, a professor of politics and 
international relations at Prince-
ton University, made a compelling 
case in a January 2015 Washington 
Quarterly article about the People’s 
Republic of China’s (PRC’s) “new as-
sertiveness,” which, he argues in this 
book, is the primary motivator for the 
emergence of ASB� From this and his 
other writings, he clearly believes that a 
response to this assertiveness is abso-
lutely necessary, if not overdue, and in 
need of high-profile public debate�
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The monograph is organized into an in-
troduction, four thematic chapters, and 
a concluding chapter, all in about 150 
pages of nicely spaced text—making it a 
comparatively short read, although not a 
simple one� Friedberg first lays out how 
ASB came to be and how the concept is 
defined� Like everyone else, he traces the 
origins of ASB to the challenge present-
ed by the PRC’s adoption of a maritime 
strategy that includes antiaccess/area- 
denial (A2/AD), although when ASB 
emerged it was generically framed and 
could have referred to other coun-
tries, including Iran (see for example 
this reviewer’s “Air-Sea Battle and 
Its Discontents,” USNI Proceedings, 
October 2013)� A2/AD involved the 
expansion of the capabilities of the 
People’s Liberation Army Navy after 
the Taiwan crisis of 1996 to deny use 
of the maritime commons inside the 
so-called first island chain and to chal-
lenge approaches to that area (p� 26)� 
Geographically, the first island chain 
extends from the Japanese archipelago, 
through Taiwan and the Philippines, to 
the exit of the South China Sea (SCS) 
at the Malacca Strait near Singapore� 
China began increasing its surface 
and subsurface fleets and its ability to 
project air power from land bases into 
this region, as well as using innovative 
new weapons such as antiship ballistic 
missiles to threaten U�S� high-value 
units such as aircraft carriers, amphibi-
ous assault ships, and logistics vessels 
beyond the first island chain� Addition-
ally, as A2/AD developed it came to 
represent a “credible threat,” accord-
ing to Friedberg, to the naval and air 
bases and logistics support by U�S� allies 
along the first island chain (pp� 27–28)� 
Friedberg describes this all in detail 
in the introduction and first chapter�
His second chapter then argues that 
the United States responded belat-
edly to A2/AD because of the terrorist 
attacks of 9/11 and the 2008 financial 
crisis and great recession� The former 
distracted U�S� policy makers from the 
emerging threat, and the latter pre-
vented a strong response, because of 
the perceived costs in a dismal fiscal 
environment� Evidently he believes the 
current fiscal environment has eased 
enough to take the challenge more 
seriously� Here Friedberg could have 
supported his argument by emphasiz-
ing that, in addition to the economic 
crisis at home, the two wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan were consuming inordinate 
U�S� resources in 2008� Nonetheless, he 
does a credible job of debunking those 
critics of ASB who say the A2/AD threat 
is overstated or that the relationship 
between the United States and China has 
improved enough to obviate a response�
Friedberg then outlines in chapter 3 
what can be called the classical ASB con-
cept, calling it the “direct approach�” This 
approach is primarily offensive, although 
it does not posit a U�S� “first strike” but 
rather a reactive counteroffensive that 
threatens the PRC’s land-based power 
projection and naval support to A2/AD 
with commensurate U�S� naval and air 
power, preferably in concert with allies 
such as Japan� He addresses critics by 
examining ASB’s efficacy in the follow-
ing areas (using speculative analysis 
in some cases): military outcomes, 
political outcomes, escalation (including 
nuclear), deterrence value, reassurance 
to allies, and the effects on competition 
between the United States and the PRC� 
Friedberg’s inclusion of nuclear escala-
tory calculus is a welcome component, 
given how little this topic seems to 
be factored into policy discussions in 
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the multipolar nuclear world we now 
inhabit� The Department of Defense 
has an Air-Sea Battle Office, as does 
the U�S� Navy, and his discussion at the 
end of chapter 3 is aimed, presumably, 
at the folks inhabiting those organiza-
tions and their strategic masters� 
Friedberg forecasts two potential ASB 
approaches: a “linear” approach that 
uses existing resources and technol-
ogy and, in contrast, a “discontinuous” 
approach that relies heavily on new 
technologies and un-fielded weapons 
concepts (pp� 95–98)� Friedberg seems 
to prefer the linear approach, given the 
ease with which it can be implemented 
(although that ease does not mean it 
will be inexpensive), but he does not 
rule out investigating new technolo-
gies� He is obviously wary of “betting 
the farm” on a “futures” approach�
In his final chapter, Friedberg describes 
two indirect approaches or “alternatives” 
to ASB: either a distant blockade or 
what he calls “maritime denial” (pp� 104, 
116–17)� He again applies an analytic 
framework to assess the efficacy of these 
less-offensive-oriented approaches� Dis-
tant blockade is merely economic war-
fare� It would aim at Chinese shipping, 
principally oil tankers at the key straits’ 
entrances leading through the SCS to 
Chinese ports� Maritime denial is simply 
ASB limited primarily to the global com-
mons and PRC littoral inside the first is-
land chain� One might characterize mar-
itime denial as an active defense of the 
global commons, but again it is reactive, 
not something to implement without 
significant Chinese military provocation� 
The conclusion reviews the bidding on 
everything discussed� Here Friedberg 
comes across as a bit more bellicose than 
one might expect, implying that a mix 
of all three approaches—ASB, distant 
blockade, and maritime denial—would 
probably be the best course of action� 
Friedberg comes closest to the nub of 
the issue when he writes: “The first 
dividing line in the debate over this issue 
is between the advocates of maritime 
denial, who seek to avoid strikes against 
targets on the Chinese mainland, and 
the proponents of ASB, who believe 
that war cannot be won without such 
attacks” (p� 137)� However, he leaves 
the door open for the reader to make 
up his or her own mind on the issue� 
While this might be perceived as 
strength, it is also something of a disap-
pointment, because this reviewer wanted 
to know what Friedberg really recom-
mends� Friedberg is clearly not of the 
opinion that ASB should be dismissed, 
and seems to support a course of action 
that implies the direct approach option 
while being ready, at a moment’s notice, 
to implement the other two approaches 
in response to a PRC “first strike” (p� 37)�
Friedberg leverages all the latest writing 
on the topic, using the work of writ-
ers familiar to naval audiences such as 
Jan van Tol and Wayne Hughes� He has 
done his homework, and now it is time 
for all others to do theirs as the United 
States faces the A2/AD challenge�
JOHN T� KUEHN
Preble, Christopher, and John Mueller, eds� A 
Dangerous World? Threat Perception and U.S. Na-
tional Security� Washington, D�C�: Cato Institute, 
2014� 224pp� $12�95
Medical doctors are trained to recog-
nize when patients’ complaints and 
self-diagnoses need to be ignored, lest 
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the doctor be responsible for unneces-
sary medical treatment� It is unfortunate 
that we do not have similar education 
for national security officials regarding 
threats to the nation� With such train-
ing, there is a chance we could avoid 
at least some of the overreactions to 
misperceived threats that have bur-
dened recent American foreign policy� 
There is a significant and growing 
literature addressing the issue of threat 
inflation, and Christopher A� Preble and 
John Mueller’s edited volume A Danger-
ous World? is an important contribu-
tion in this area� Published by the Cato 
Institute, it is a collection of sixteen 
essays by an array of authors, each 
delving into a different aspect of the 
U�S� threat environment� Their aim is to 
question the assumptions that underpin 
so much of U�S� national security policy: 
that we live in a perilous world riven 
by uncertainty and threats, and only a 
robust, expensive, and active defense 
preserves the homeland’s security� 
To this end, the work addresses a wide 
range of topics, each examined by a 
different contributor� Francis Gavin 
and John Mueller separately examine 
America’s history of nuclear alarmism, 
noting that predictions of imminent 
explosions in a number of nuclear weap-
ons states have been commonplace for 
decades� Lyle Goldstein argues convinc-
ingly that the threat China poses to the 
United States is a limited one (he uses 
the memorable phrase “panda claws”) 
and he claims China’s rise can be coun-
tered with low-cost strategies� (As of this 
writing, recent devaluations of the yuan 
raise the possibility of a future Chinese 
retrenchment, further reducing the need 
for a potent American counter�) Former 
U�S� intelligence officer Paul Pillar  
explores substate threats (including 
terror groups), asserting that America is 
too quick to seize on new threats� Since 
9/11, more Americans have drowned 
in their bathtubs than have been killed 
in the United States by terrorist attacks, 
and improved security cannot account 
for the entirety of this disparity�
Michael Cohen asks whether other 
aspects of personal welfare, such as 
health security, should also be ad-
dressed in our discussions of security� 
Daniel Drezner explores the economic 
benefits of American military pre-
eminence, and finds them elusive� The 
United States has spent trillions on 
homeland defense and overseas con-
frontations since 9/11, Drezner notes, 
while the total economic impact of 
9/11 itself was “only” $100 billion� 
Elsewhere, Christopher Fettweis exam-
ines the pervasive anxiety in American 
national security culture, arguing that 
“geopolitical fear” has become some-
thing of an American tradition, passed 
on from generation to generation� 
“Wealth creates insecurity in individu-
als, and it seems to do so in states as 
well�” Benjamin Friedman explores the 
issue of threat inflation, arguing that 
America’s vast power “distributes the 
costs” and “concentrates the benefits” 
of confrontational policies, creating 
constituencies that promote (and even 
become dependent on) maintain-
ing a state of unnecessary vigilance�
In many respects, America can afford 
to exaggerate the world’s perils� There 
is no meaningful political pressure to 
reduce the budget of the Department 
of Defense, and America’s national 
security expenditures, large though 
they are, constitute only a fraction of 
the federal budget� At the same time, 
one must also consider the risk that 
threat inflation poses to American 
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lives� More Americans were killed as a 
consequence of the decision to invade 
Iraq in 2003 than on 9/11 itself� But 
there is also the long-term causal impact 
of the U�S� invasion� The existence 
of ISIS is another unintended conse-
quence of the American invasion� 
It is true that there are dangers in this 
world� But Preble and Mueller’s volume 
constitutes an antidote to America’s 
tendency to imagine grave peril, and 
serves as an important counter to the 
American proclivity to overstate the 
benefits and understate the costs of an 
assertive global military posture� The 
editors argue that America is largely 
free of threats that require military 
preparedness or balancing behavior� 
In his chapter, Fettweis argues that 
America’s tendency to exaggerate the 
world’s dangers can be altered, since it is 
based on a system of beliefs that can be 
changed over time� Let’s hope he’s right� 
ANDREW STIGLER
Hassan, Hassan, and Michael Weiss� ISIS: Inside 
the Army of Terror� New York: Regan Arts, 2015� 
288pp� $16�95
The surprising success of the Islamic 
State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in seiz-
ing control of large parts of northern 
and western Iraq in 2014 has gener-
ated many questions for policy makers 
and the public� How was this group so 
effective so quickly? Where did it come 
from and how did so many observ-
ers miss its rise? What threat does 
ISIS pose to the region and beyond?
Hassan Hassan and Michael Weiss ad-
dress these questions in this recent book 
about ISIS� The work is part history of 
the ISIS movement and part analysis 
of its nature and strategy� The authors’ 
backgrounds—Weiss is a prolific 
journalist and Hassan a knowledgeable 
Syrian analyst at the Delma Institute 
in Abu Dhabi—combine brilliantly to 
explain the rapidly evolving events on 
the ground within the context of the 
political-military issues in the region� 
Hassan and Weiss interviewed current 
and former ISIS movement fighters in 
Syria, dissected ISIS propaganda videos 
and statements, and combined other 
scholarly analyses of ISIS to produce 
what I consider to be the most accurate 
assessment of ISIS currently available� 
The overwhelming strength of the book 
is that Hassan and Weiss get the history 
of ISIS right� Although it is often mistak-
enly thought of as a recent phenomenon, 
the authors correctly trace the group’s 
evolution as a core of Salafist-oriented 
fighters who joined together under Abu 
Musab al-Zarqawi in Iraq in 2002–2003� 
Zarqawi’s unique outlook, based in the 
same Salafi-jihadist school as Osama 
Bin Laden’s Al Qaeda, imprinted on 
the ISIS movement early and has been 
the biggest factor in the populariza-
tion of its distinct ideology and the 
evolution of its tactics and strategy� The 
authors capture this dynamic, as well as 
ISIS’s subsequent transformation from 
a foreign fighter–based organization 
to a more indigenous Iraqi-led group 
that eventually split with Al Qaeda� 
Because of their understanding of ISIS 
history, Hassan and Weiss are able to 
demonstrate the ideological foundation 
behind ISIS’s strategic targeting and why 
the group takes on such a large spectrum 
of enemies at once� The authors are also 
able to explain ISIS’s genocidal strategy 
and how the group promotes its own 
atrocities to inspire fear in its enemies� 
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This book illuminates the strategic de-
bate over the importance of uncontrolled 
spaces to groups like ISIS� ISIS’s effec-
tive use of low levels of indiscriminate 
violence to take over large parts of Syria 
and Iraq since 2013 demonstrates the 
opportunity that ungoverned space af-
fords malignant actors such as ISIS� The 
ISIS movement began in the Kurdish ar-
eas of Iraq outside the reach of Saddam 
Hussein in 2002, and moved quickly 
into Anbar after identifying a security 
vacuum following the invasion of Iraq in 
2003� The collapse of the Assad govern-
ment in eastern Syria and the defeat of 
the Sunni Awakening militias and their 
Iraqi security partners in several Iraqi 
provinces (2008–12) once again created 
space for the ISIS movement—this time 
to recover from its 2007 defeat in Iraq� 
Despite today’s blistering air campaign, 
ISIS maintains control over most of 
the Sunni areas of Iraq and Syria, and 
arguably continues to develop deep 
roots of support among the population�
The authors also highlight the problems 
of both the Bush and Obama adminis-
trations’ war-termination strategies for 
Iraq, in what has become a recognized 
weakness in the American way of war� 
Comfortable with outsourcing security 
in Sunni areas to an untrained civilian 
militia, both the Iraqis and Americans 
turned a blind eye to the fact that ISIS 
would make the Sunni Awakening an 
important target in order to reestablish 
core sanctuaries inside Iraq� The authors 
point with amazement to the gradual 
release of hard-core ISIS prisoners 
(2008–11) back into their communi-
ties as one of several factors that helped 
fuel the growth of ISIS from its post-
surge nadir� While the reasons for this 
shortsighted approach were undoubt-
edly political and legal in nature, these 
policies surely have contributed to the 
untimely deaths of thousands of Iraqis 
and the loss of much territory to ISIS� 
As of 2015, nineteen of twenty of ISIS’s 
top leaders were formerly in American 
custody at Camp Bucca before being 
released or escaping from custody� 
Overall, I highly recommend this 
book to policy makers, educators, 
and military professionals who seek 
a deeper understanding of the ISIS 
movement� The authors have provided 
a very believable representation of a 
contemporary group that I believe will 
be vindicated by additional research in 
the future� Until that time, this book 
will become the basis for most of our 
understanding of a highly secretive 
and effective pseudostate that remains 
a threat to the region and beyond� 
CRAIG WHITESIDE
Muth, Jörg� Command Culture: Officer Education 
in the U.S. Army and the German Armed Forces, 
1901–1940, and the Consequences for World War 
II� Denton: Univ� of North Texas Press, 2013� 
376pp� $29�95
Dr� Jörg Muth has written a serious 
comparative account of the German 
and American precommissioning 
courses and general staff colleges from 
1901 to 1940� Any new work compar-
ing German and American military 
effectiveness in the first half of the 
twentieth century is guaranteed to 
be controversial, and Muth certainly 
achieves controversy� However, there 
exists a significant revisionist school 
of thought that offers an interpreta-
tion much different from Muth’s� 
The May 2010 Society of Military His-
tory annual meeting, held at the Virginia 
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Military Institute, featured a very well-
attended roundtable that posed the 
question of American or German opera-
tional or tactical superiority� The panel 
moderator first asked how many of the 
historians in the room had spent their 
teenage years reading books promot-
ing the vaunted Prussian and German 
militaries� Nearly every hand went up� 
Attracted by the works of Heinz Gude-
rian, F� W� von Mellenthin, Liddell Hart, 
J� F� C� Fuller, and others, many of these 
teenagers grew up to be believers in the 
conventional wisdom that the Germans 
got it pretty well right� A complemen-
tary opinion was that the American 
military forces got very little right� In 
1986, Heller and Stofft’s America’s First 
Battles became the standard history for 
those who found in the German army 
the bravery, intelligence, and aggressive 
leadership they sought for America� 
Muth and this reviewer were both in the 
audience for the 2010 roundtable, and 
both of our hands went up� However, 
the revisionist school, with Michael 
Doubler’s Closing with the Enemy (1994), 
Keith Bonn’s When the Odds Were Even 
(1994), and Peter Mansoor’s GI Offen-
sive in Europe (1999) in the vanguard, is 
alive and well� Perhaps the most useful 
direct discussion of this historiographic 
misalignment was Brian Linn’s piece in 
the Journal of Military History (April 
2002) “The American Way of War Re-
visited” and the comments in response 
by Russell Weigley� Linn’s article and 
Weigley’s response effectively frame the 
distinct difference between interpreta-
tions that hold that the German armed 
forces in both World War I and World 
War II either were superior to the armed 
forces of the United States or were not� 
Muth has significant challenges us-
ing primary and secondary sources� 
He seems to relish his biases, and even 
partly explains those biases in the “Au-
thor’s Afterword,” which Muth states was 
added upon the sage advice of Edward 
M� Coffman and Dennis Showalter� 
Muth’s characterization of U�S� Army  
officers—as people from whom he 
should hide as a youth hanging out with 
American soldiers on maneuvers—may be 
more self-revelatory than Muth realizes�
Muth arguably tries to do too much 
in a single book� His interpretation of 
officer education in both Germany and 
the United States focuses on two levels: 
cadets in their precommissioning pro-
grams and field-grade officers attending 
the equivalent of a general staff college� 
Unfortunately, Muth does little beyond 
making assertions unsupported by 
evidence� These assertions are frequently 
that American army officer education 
was bad, and that the equivalent in Ger-
many was good� He absolutely fails to 
place either education system in its his-
torical context, going so far as to say that 
the word Prussia would be needlessly 
complicating, and that he therefore only 
uses Germany. Muth claims that “school 
solutions” at Leavenworth were “always 
the norm” and that “ineffective courses 
were led by instructors who sometimes 
lacked knowledge of their fields and 
usually failed in didactics and pedagog-
ics�” The only footnote to this paragraph 
refers the reader to Craig Mullaney’s 
Unforgiving Minute about junior officers 
and tactical combat in Afghanistan� No 
other source is cited, except for a vague 
reference to a 2000 West Point graduate� 
This is not an isolated case� There 
are multiple unsubstantiated claims 
throughout the book� For two more 
examples, Muth says nothing of the 
poor reputation of the XI Corps of the 
Army of the Potomac when he asserts 
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that German immigrants made for 
highly respected soldiers in the Ameri-
can Civil War� He also misses the First 
and Second Schleswig-Holstein Wars of 
1848–51 and 1864, respectively, when 
he asserts that in 1866 Prussia had not 
been at war for nearly fifty years� 
Despite these significant shortcom-
ings, this reviewer hopes that Muth 
continues to contribute to both the 
conversation and the controversy�
PETER J� SCHIFFERLE
Philbin, Tobias R� Battle of Dogger Bank: The First 
Dreadnought Engagement. Bloomington: Indiana 
Univ� Press, 2014� 198pp� $32
This title is the latest work from Ameri-
can naval historian Tobias Philbin, who 
is probably best known for his 1982 
biography of Admiral von Hipper� In the 
author’s words, the book is “designed to 
provide new insights into the first battle 
between the largest fighting machines 
of the early twentieth century�” As such, 
one might expect that a detailed analysis 
of the conduct of the battle itself would 
form the heart of the work, with perhaps 
a supporting explanation of the tactics 
employed on both sides and a discus-
sion of whether these were or were not 
in line with prewar expectations� This 
could have been further supported by 
brief chapters explaining the strategic 
situation in the naval war at that point; 
the role of the key personalities; and the 
original thinking behind the develop-
ment of the “fast Dreadnought cruiser” 
as a warship type, insofar as it might 
help explain the platform’s performance 
in the battle itself� The work could then 
have been concluded with a discussion 
on the lessons learned and whether the 
proposed corrective measures were suc-
cessful� In other words, the focus should 
have been clearly on the engagement 
itself and what it vindicated or didn’t�
Sadly, however, and despite good inten-
tions, Philbin falls well short of this aim� 
His coverage of the actual battle is scanty 
and disjointed, and the remainder of 
the work is notably deficient or simply 
inaccurate� This is doubly frustrating 
given that this battle, the first of only 
two dreadnought-versus-dreadnought 
engagements in the entire war, probably 
represented each side’s “last, best chance” 
to put things right, so to speak, before 
the better-known battle of Jutland a year 
later� As such, it is indeed an important 
area for study by the naval historian�
Philbin’s difficulties are threefold� First, 
and as intimated, the balance is arguably 
wrong between the coverage of the battle 
itself and the supporting text� He devotes 
only 30 of the 150 or so pages to actual 
analysis of the battle, with the remaining 
pages dealing with the supporting areas� 
Unfortunately, these 30 pages, more than 
many others, fall victim to the second 
difficulty he has, which is in developing 
a clear and coherent narrative of a series 
of events, free from repetition and diver-
sion� Rather than recounting the main 
features of the engagement in a chrono-
logical fashion, he chooses to take the 
different perspectives of the individual 
ships involved, which does not help the 
reader elucidate the decision making as 
it might have appeared to the oppos-
ing fleet commanders at the time—a 
feature central to his stated aim—and 
leads to a nonsequential presentation of 
the main events� None of this is helped 
by the maps in the book that, although 
reproductions of the original battle 
reports and histories, are almost unread-
able in the scale presented� Thus, despite 
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being fairly familiar with the overall 
engagement, I found myself resort-
ing to Wikipedia for a quick reminder 
and sanity check� Repetition is also rife 
throughout the book, sometimes in 
successive paragraphs, pages, and even 
endnotes, which makes the reader’s 
journey more laborious than it need be� 
The real worry, though, is his third 
difficulty: that of accuracy and the 
incorporation of a comprehensive cover-
age of the relevant scholarship� On the 
accuracy side, some of the construction 
dates for the ships involved are incor-
rect, even according to the sources that 
he does use; he cites the wrong Lambert 
in the text on page 6; on page 24, he 
claims Dogger was the first “battle” in 
the Anglo-German naval race when it 
was, of course, the first dreadnought 
engagement; while on page 27 he has 
HMS Vernon as “the gunnery school for 
the Royal Navy,” when it was actually 
HMS Excellent� To make matters worse 
in the context, Admiral John “Jacky” 
Fisher was of course closely associated 
with both of these establishments, albeit 
at different points in his career� In addi-
tion, and while not as specific, there are 
all sorts of other, more general omis-
sions and inaccuracies in the presenta-
tion of the powder vulnerabilities, the 
ammunition and gunnery practices in 
use, and the train of thought that led to 
the all-big-gun ordnance, all of which 
could have been corrected by reference 
to some of the more current scholar-
ship from the likes of Jon Sumida, John 
Brooks, and Norman Friedman� Perhaps 
most importantly, though, and given 
that the author attempted to cover the 
origins of the battle cruiser type in his 
second chapter, it was disappointing to 
find Admiral Fisher’s role in the whole 
debate minimized, and the relationship 
between the true dreadnought and its 
battle cruiser variant simplified to an 
unrealistic degree� This is no trivial mat-
ter, because, to a greater or lesser extent, 
the fact that the battle cruiser was essen-
tially performing in a role that had not 
been originally envisioned by its creators 
goes a long way toward explaining the 
very mixed results these ships achieved� 
Once again, this could have been better 
represented with a more searching inclu-
sion of some of the more cutting-edge 
findings from Sumida, Nicolas Lam-
bert, Matthew Seligmann, and others�
In sum, this book will probably dis-
appoint the serious historian of the 
period� It does gather together in one 
place a host of interesting and related 
facts about the battle and its par-
ticipants� Given that these can form 
useful “points of departure” for future 
work in this area, as well as inform-
ing and inspiring the amateur naval 
enthusiast, all is not lost� But the book 
could have been so much more� 
ANGUS ROSS
Huang, Chun-chieh� Taiwan in Transformation: 
Retrospect and Prospect� 2nd ed� New Brunswick, 
N�J�: Transaction, 2014� 233pp� $52�95
As a native Taiwanese deeply steeped 
in Chinese historical and philosophical 
sources, Chun-chieh Huang adds dimen-
sions that are less emphasized in many 
other perceptive books on contemporary 
Taiwan� A prolific scholar of treatises on 
Confucian thought, Huang believes that 
Taiwan can bring much to contempo-
rary Confucian thinking, since Taiwan 
interprets the world through a lens of 
contemporary and vibrant democracy—
as opposed to China’s legacy of the 
Cultural Revolution and party control� 
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In fact, he asserts that Taiwan can help 
lead China’s Confucian revival as the 
gem in the crown of Confucian thinking�
The book is divided into approximately 
equal sections of retrospect and pros-
pect, indicating the relative importance 
that the author gives to understanding 
the past as a foundation for understand-
ing the present and the future� Before 
Huang explores the individual and social 
psychology of what it means to be a 
“New Taiwanese,” he reviews the under-
lying nostalgia that almost all ethnically 
Chinese people, including those resident 
on Taiwan, have for cultural China� 
This is a powerful shared emotion that 
has ramifications for contemporary 
cross-strait politics� Colonized by the 
Japanese between 1895 and 1945, the 
Taiwanese suffered second-class Chinese 
citizenship and were labeled spies and 
collaborators by their ethnically similar 
mainland Chinese counterparts� Aside 
from this broad-based cultural discrimi-
nation, the millions of Taiwanese were 
then also repressed politically on the 
island by the million or so Nationalists 
who came to Taiwan after World War 
II, first to set up a provincial govern-
ment to replace the Japanese occupying 
government, then to set up the Repub-
lic of China Nationalist government 
at the end of the Chinese civil war� 
The book recaps key eras in Taiwan’s 
history, including the populating of the 
island by Haklo from Fujian Province, 
Hakka from Guangdong Province, the 
Dutch (1624–61), Koxinga and the Ming 
loyalists (1661–83), the Qing (1683–
1895), and the Japanese (1895–1945)� 
Huang points out that the Chinese are 
“Homo historicus” most clearly, and 
that all ways forward must take into 
account the patterns and details of the 
past when considering the future�
According to Huang, Taiwan’s path 
forward in cross-strait relations lies 
between those extremes of citizens who 
in 2013 favored quick integration (3 
percent) and those who favored quick 
independence (7�2 percent)� He recom-
mends a necessary long-term steady 
dialogue examining and reconciling the 
mutual histories of Taiwan and main-
land China� That is to say, Huang is not a 
proponent of maintaining the status quo 
but seeks a Confucian “middle way”: 
carefully and compassionately forging 
an increasing reconciliation over time� 
Using a metaphor from literature, he 
posits that Taiwan is an orphan trying 
to reconcile with its parent� The pathos 
of the scenario is lessening because the 
orphan has had great success, but never-
theless there is a core of Chinese identity 
that still remains to be reconciled with 
the ever-emerging Taiwanese identity� 
Although, as noted, Huang is a native 
observer of the Taiwanese scene, the 
book is gracefully written in fluid, clear 
English� It is useful as core reading for 
undergraduate and graduate courses on 
Taiwan, as well as for readers seeking 
to deepen their knowledge of East Asia� 
It also provides context that should be 
considered when thinking about U�S� 
policy in the Asia-Pacific region� 
GRANT F� RHODE
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trustee of the Society of Military History and recently served as the General Harold K. Johnson 
Visiting Chair in Military History at the Army War College. 
T. J. Johnson is an armor officer and serves as an instructor in the National Security Affairs 
Department at the U.S. Naval War College. He is a graduate of Ripon College (Ripon, Wis.) and re-
ceived his master’s degree from the School of Advanced Military Studies at Fort Leavenworth. He 
has written for a number of publications, including the RUSI Journal and Defense News.
Dr. John T. Kuehn is the Major General William Stofft Chair for Historical Research at the U.S. 
Army Command and General Staff College. He is a retired naval flight officer (2004) and author 
of Agents of Innovation: The General Board and the Design of the Fleet That Defeated the Japanese 
Navy (2008) and A Military History of Japan (2014). His latest book is Napoleonic Warfare: The 
Operational Art of the Great Campaigns.
Major John J. Merriam joined the faculty of the Stockton Center for the Study of International Law 
as Associate Director for Land Warfare and associate professor in June 2014 after graduating from 
the Naval War College with highest distinction (first in class). Before coming to the War College, 
Major Merriam served in a variety of international and operational law positions, including as a 
special forces group judge advocate and a brigade combat team judge advocate.
Grant F. Rhode holds a PhD from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University in 
Asian diplomatic history and foreign policies. In addition to being a visiting researcher at the Bos-
ton University Center for the Study of Asia, he is an associate in research at the Fairbank Center 
for Chinese Studies at Harvard University.
Captain Dale Rielage serves as Director for Intelligence and Information Operations for the U.S. 
Pacific Fleet. He has served as Third Fleet N2, Seventh Fleet Deputy N2, Senior Intelligence Of-
ficer for China at the Office of Naval Intelligence, and director of the Navy Asia Pacific Advisory 
Group.
Angus Ross is a retired Royal Navy officer and professor of joint military operations at the Naval 
War College. A graduate of the Naval War College, he received a second MA from Providence 
College and is currently working on PhD studies, studying naval transformation prior to the First 
World War. His recent published works include articles in this journal and others on the dilemma 
facing both the Royal Navy and the U.S. Navy in the wake of the Dreadnought revolution. 
Peter J. Schifferle, PhD, is professor of history at the School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. 
Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and the author of Ameri-
ca’s School for War: Fort Leavenworth, Officer Education, and Victory in World War II.
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Professor Stigler teaches classes on foreign policy and national security at the Naval War College, 
focusing on the international and domestic influences on U�S� national security policy� Stigler 
has published in International Security, The National Interest, Joint Force Quarterly, and the Naval 
War College Review� He currently has a book under contract with the academic press Transaction 
(affiliated with Rutgers University) titled The Military: A Presidential Briefing Book� The work is 
a critical examination of the military from the standpoint of an incoming president, examining 
issues such as force planning, crisis response, presidential command during wartime, strategic 
change, and postwar reconstruction efforts� 
Professor Whiteside teaches theater security at the Naval War College Monterey Program� He is a 
graduate of West Point and has a PhD in political science from Washington State University� His 
primary research area is the strategy and tactics of the Islamic State movement from 2003 to the 
present� 
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REFLECTIONS ON READING
Naval War College Professor John E. Jackson is the Program Manager 
for the Chief of Naval Operations Professional Reading Program. 
Books cannot be killed by fire. People die, but books never die. No man 
and no force can put thought in a concentration camp forever. No man 
and no force can take from the world books that embody man’s eternal 
fight against tyranny. In this war, we know, books are weapons. 
FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT
 President Franklin Roosevelt responded to the wholesale burning of so-called offensive books in Nazi Germany by encouraging Americans to 
use books, and the knowledge they contained, as weapons in the war of ideas� 
With millions of U�S� servicemen deployed around the globe in World War II, 
a group of patriotic citizens and literary industry organizations came together 
to put books from both well-known and fledgling authors in the hands of these 
servicemen, who were desperate to fill the idle hours they endured from foxhole 
to fleet unit� The Council on Books in Wartime assembled a powerful alliance of 
authors, publishers, and printers to create unique paperback books, sized to fit in 
the pockets of military uniforms� Unlike traditional paperbacks, the Armed Ser-
vices Editions (ASEs) were bound on the short side of the text block rather than 
the long side, with two columns of text on each page� During the period 1943–46 
the Council produced and distributed over 123 million copies of 1,322 different 
titles! Reflecting the economics of the day, the printing cost was approximately 
seven cents per copy, and a one-cent-per-copy royalty was split between the au-
thors and publishers� 
Authors Joseph Conrad, F� Scott Fitzgerald, C� S� Forester, Zane Grey, Jack Lon-
don, John Steinbeck, Mark Twain, H� G� Wells, and scores of others participated� 
One measure of the tremendous success of this program is found in a newspaper 
article written during the war: “The hunger for these books, evidenced by the way 
they are read to tatters, is astounding even to the Army and Navy officers and the 
book-trade officials who conceived of the editions�”
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The impact of this remarkable program was far greater than many had ex-
pected� One soldier wrote,
You are instilling in them, whether you are aware of it or not, a taste for good reading 
that will surely persist come victory� I have seen many a man who never before had 
the patience or inclination to read a book, pick up one of the Council’s and become 
absorbed and ask for more� 
The Armed Services Editions helped create a nation of readers� 
If you want more detail about this forgotten chapter of World War II history, 
the story of the ASEs is beautifully told in Molly Guptill Manning’s book When 
Books Went to War: The Stories That Helped Us Win World War II� Her well- 
researched and lively text provides a comprehensive history of the ASEs, set 
within the context of the greater conflict� 
Today, the Chief of Naval Operations Professional Reading Program 
has at its core the same mission as the ASEs: to get quality books into the hands 
of our military servicemen and -women� While smaller in scale (the modern-
day program has shipped tens of thousands of books, vice millions of ASEs) the 
intent is the same: using words and ideas as weapons in the defense of freedom� 
The mission of the Chief of Naval Operations Professional Reading Program is 
to assist sailors on their career-long path of personal development in the naval 
profession� Reading professionally relevant books will help sailors develop as 
leaders of character who are strategically minded critical thinkers and skilled naval 
and joint warfighters, capable of meeting the operational and strategic challenges 
of the future� 
JOHN E� JACKSON
(My thanks go out to Electrician’s Mate, Master Chief Jack Ryan, USN [Ret.], an 
ardent reader of this column and a strong supporter of education for our sailors. His 
recent recommendation of Molly Manning’s fascinating book opened my eyes to this 
long-forgotten chapter of military history.)
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